What is the Truth About The Foreknowledge of God?

In another topic here we have been discussing things in connection with the foreknowledge of God, therefore, what is the truth about the foreknowledge of God?

In order to answer the above question, perhaps we should first answer the following question:

What is the "foreknowledge" of God in the sense of what does the word mean?

"Foreknowledge" means knowledge of future events.

I wonder if everyone would agree that God knows the future as it is.

How is "foreknowledge" defined?

An online dictionary defines it as "Knowledge or awareness of something before its existence or occurrence; prescience."

Not as it is, but as it was.

Not as it is, or as it was, but as it will be.

Daryl, in the case of God it is all three. Knowledge of the past, present, and future are, from God's perspective, one.

Scripture does not present God as acting outside of time, but rather as in it. It present Him as experiencing the reality of time as we do. There are scores upon scores of examples of this, of which I will mention just a few:

a)The Scriptures present God as being disappointed when things turn out differently than He hoped:



Similar passages include Jer. 3:19, 20; Isa. 5:1-4.

b)God ask questions in frustration.



Similarly passages include 1 Kings 22:20, Hos. 8:5.

c)God expresses regret. The most famous example:



Similar passages include 1 Sam. 13:13, 1 Sam. 15:11,35.

d)Things do not happen as prophesied. E.g. in Acts 21:10-12 Paul is warned by Agabus what will happen if he goes to Jerusalem, but what is prophesied does not happen. The most famous example is Jonah. Another example is 1 Sam. 23:10-12 where David asks what will happen, the Lord tells him, and David takes action to prevent that from happening (and is successful).

e)God discovers things. E.g. in Gen. 2:19 it says



The word translated "see" means "discover." Similar passages include Gen. 22 and Deut. where God tests to see what will happen.

f)God sets out the future in terms of maybe. For example, when Moses expressed distress at seeing Pharaoh and asked what he should do, God said to do such and such, and that maybe Pharaoh would listen to him. If not, he could try something else.


These are just a few examples. Many more could be given. The simple point is that God presents Himself throughout Scripture as acting in time, over and over again. He does not present the future as something that "happened." This a Greek idea, which came about by Greek idealism, beginning with Plato and his contemporaries and then taken up by Augustine and his followers. It's not a Hebrew idea, as is readily seen by noting how God expresses Himself in Scripture.

What translation did you use for Jer. 3:6-7???

Here is how it reads in the KJV:


The KJV is very different in the sense you are presenting it from whatever translation you have used.

I used the New American Standard Bible. The Revised Standard has the following:



The NIV has:



The English Standard Version has:

Anyway, this is a minor point. The meaning of the KJV is similar. (if we say something, we are obviously thinking it; speaking to ourselves is synonymous to thought.) I presented many other passages as well.

The point is that God, over and over again, presents Himself as participating in time. He thinks, He is influenced, He feels regret, sorrow, pain. He is disappointed. He changes His mind. All sorts of expressions are used which indicate that God acts in time, not at all like the Greek ideas we've inherited via Augustine.

The Bible is a Hebrew book, not Greek.

The immortality of the soul is another example of Greek influence, also coming from the idea of timelessness and impassibility.

So what makes you think that "I thought" and "she will" are the more correct wording?

Even if this example of Jer 3:7 will fall in the "right translation wars", there was still many other examples offered. What about them?

I will look at them next, however, to do this study justice, we had better look at what the whole Bible has to say about this, line upon line, precept upon precept, here a little, there a little.

The idea that God doesn't know exactly, precisely what will happen in the future begs the question - What is the origin and source of unconditional prophecy?

As I pointed out, Daryl, there are scores upon scores of references like this. Anyone just reading through the Bible can see that God presents Himself as One acting in time, not as One outside of it. I could have presented *many* more texts than these few.

Regarding Jer. 3:6, 7, I presented 3 translations, all of them respected, which said the same thing. As Thomas pointed out, this is just one verse among many.

Surely if you've read through the Bible you've noticed the way that God communicates is not in a Platonic, timeless way.

God sees it all outside of time, however, he obviously communicates with us where we are at, in time and on time.

Well said, Daryl.

Well said, Tom.

I wonder what more we could learn from Platon, since half of us here have concluded that he is a authority on the timelessness of God?

How about learning from our own SDA Bible Dictionary?

I pulled out my SDA Bible Dictionary to see what it has to say about the word "foreknowledge" and read the following:


Let's take a look at the prophecies relating to Christ to the precision of knowing in advance that Christ would die on a cross way before this manner of death was ever invented. God obviously knew in advance that the Romans would invent this type of death penalty for a non-Roman citizen.

How does one explain this away?

You are asserting that God communicates with us in time, and simultaneously are asserting that He, in spite of the fact that He communicates with us in this way, actually experiences time in some other way. In other words, God is not accurately expressing His experience.

This raises a couple of questions. First of all, why is God inaccurately communicating with us? Surely God is capable of communicating accurately, isn't He?

Secondly, you are asserting that you know something about God's communication which God has not revealed. That's the really interesting thing. You assert that God communicates with us in time, yet you know that God is really outside of time, in spite of the fact that God communicates with us in time. How do you know that? How do you know something that God has communicated to us is false?

Consider the following statement from the Spirit of Prophecy:



If God's foreknowledge means that only one thing can happen in the future (that which God knows will happen), then how could God have incurred a risk when He sent Christ? Wouldn't it have been certain that Christ would succeed? (since God foresaw that and prophesied it)

How can something which is 100% certain to happen be described as a "fearful risk"? Wouldn't that be like my betting you $100 dollars that the sun will rise tomorrow, and calling that a "fearful risk"?

Here is a quote by EGW regarding the foreknowledge of God:


EGW saw that the foreknowledge of God didn't and doesn't affect the free will of man. Even the words "had seen would be" is interesting in connection with the foreknowledge of God in connection with this topic and the other related topics.

This type of knowlede is very much in order, for it does not foreknow who will personally choose to be under God or under Satan. It does know the results of either.

John's comment is exactly right. God knows the end from the beginning, which means that He knows what will be the result of the choices we make. He doesn't know "the" choice we will make, because there is no such thing. That is, God could only know "the" choice we would make if there was only one possible choice for us to make.

I've repeated the following point many, many times, but I've never gotten any confirmation that this point has been understood. It's one thing if a point has been understand, and not agreed to for some reason, and another if the point hasn't been understood. So I'll keep on repeating it until I get some indication that it's been understood, because the repeated statements that God's knowing what we will do does not cause us to do it seems to be pretty strong evidence that it hasn't been understood.

It's not that God knows what we will do that "causes" us to do that thing He knows, but that there's only one possible thing that we can do to be known. That is, God can only know the one thing we will do if there's only one thing we can do. If there's more than one thing we can do, then that's what God will know.

Daryl, I don't think you've commented on the passage from the Desire of Ages which tells us that God sent His Son at the risk of failure and eternal loss. "Risk" means it wasn't certain Christ would succeed. In other words, God wasn't 100% certain Christ would be successful.

This is actually very amazing, when you think about it. It means that God loved us so much He was willing to lose His only Son to secure our redemption. We lose a blessing if we refuse to believe this.

You can see that Ellen White was also amazed by this concept because she ended her comment saying,



Wonder, O heavens! and be astonished, O earth!

This is entering the realms of the Almighty, and may be hidden to us. Beware of reaching farther than we can fathom, but we are permitted to wonder.

A Sabbath School teacher once wondered if God in His infinite wisdom does not choose Himself not to ponder into all that he could see, if needed, in order not to curb the freedom of man.

What do we know of Almighty Love, Wisdom, Freedom? Anything that the human mind cannot comprehend?

Johann, I really don't think this is difficult to understand. God sent His son at a risk, because of His great love for us.

As far as I know, nobody responded to this post, therefore, I ask again, how does one explain this away?

The risk of failure is a good question, therefore, I will need to study that one further before responding to that in relation to this and the other related topics.

Ok, Daryl. Here are a couple of related texts you may wish to consider.

In light of it all, God the Father foreknew that Christ in His humanity wouldn't fail, however, Christ in His humanity did not know whether He would succeed or failure, therefore, it was a risk to Him.


Christ in His humanity depended on information given to Him by the Father, most likely through the Holy Spirit, such as the denial of Peter and the betrayal by Judas. Christ didn't use His own divine power in His humanity while on this planet. The Father chose not to reveal to Christ whether or not He would succeed or fail.


He had to do this alone in His humanity without using His own divine power as well as without any outside divine presence or interference whatsover.

This is why it was a risk to Christ, as He couldn't see "through the portals of the tomb." God the Father could see "through the portals of the tomb" but Christ in His humanity couldn't.

This is the answer that came to me.

Daryl, what you're saying doesn't tie into what Ellen White wrote in any way, as far as I can tell. She didn't write that it appeared to Christ that He was taking a risk, when really He wasn't, but that *God* took a risk in sending His Son. She said the following things:

1.God sent His Son at the risk of failure and eternal loss.
2.Remember Christ risked all for us.
3.All heaven was imperiled for our redemption.

These are fake things that weren't really the case that Christ, in ignorance, thought might happen, but really there wasn't any really danger. There was real danger involved here!

If you read carefully Ellen White's statements, you see she not only communicated that actual danger was involved, but she was moved by the fact that God would allow Christ to undertake such a dangerous mission.

Tom,

How do you harmonize the text which says that Christ is "the lamb slain from the foundation of the world" with the passage which says that He could, at the Gethsemane, "refuse to drink the cup apportioned to guilty man. It was not yet too late. He might wipe the bloody sweat from His brow, and leave man to perish in his iniquity" (DA 690)?

I think the passage speaking of Christ's being the lamb slain from the foundation of the world is dealing with God's character; it's not a prophecy. IOW, even had sin not originated, the statement would still be true, because Christ was willing to risk all for our redemption, and God was willing to risk His Son, had the need come about.

The principle is outlined here:



The danger which God undertook was real. He really did risk losing His Son in order to redeem us, which is an awesome thought.

How is that so? If He had refused "to drink the cup apportioned to guilty man" and left "man to perish in his iniquity" (DA 690), He wouldn't have been willing to risk all for our redemption.

I agree with you, Tom.

This was the whole question which Satan raised. There's a statement from the SOP which I can't remember well enough to find which says something like the cross answered forever the question, "Is there selfishness with God."?

Satan had accused God of requiring things of His creatures which He was unwilling to do Himself. Christ proved the rightness (or "righteousness") of God; He demonstrated His true character.

The fact that He was willing to drink the cup to its dregs, and not only willing but actually did, proved conclusively that Satan was wrong, and secured the universe.

Tom,

I assume that you were referencing the above quote, particularly the bolded section of that quote, when you said in your post that "God sent His Son at the risk of failure and eternal loss."

You are, therefore, using that quote to say that God did not know in the sense of His foreknowledge what choice Christs would make while here on this planet even right up to His dying on the cross. Am I correct?

You can't have risk without uncertainty, can you? God in His foreknowledge knows the future as it is. If the future were determined, having only one possible result only, then God would know exactly what choice Christ would make. But given that the future is open, then God's foreknowledge of it must of necessity be open.

God cannot know the future as different than how it actually is. That is, God cannot know it as fixed if it isn't fixed. He knows everything that can happen in the future, but until free moral agents make choices, the future must remain in the realm of the possible, not the realm of the certain (except in certain broad strokes, such as Christ will come again, there will be a Sabbath/Sunday controversy, etc., and even in these things the implementation is up in the air; for example, the Sunday law was ready to come into being in the 1890's, and Christ could have come then, but the message of Jones and Waggoner was resisted).

Tom,

Having in view God's character, was refusing to drink the cup a possibility or not?

Given that God repeatedly revealed through Ellen White that He took a risk in sending His Son, wouldn't the answer have to be "yes"? Otherwise, there wouldn't have been any risk. Risk signifies uncertainty.

This is exactly where truth becomes error; when character is equated with possibility.

When one speaks of character, one speaks of "faithfulness"; and it is glorious. This is what we are called to. Faithfulness is dependability despite all odds. Character is always subject to the will. And remember that the issue that Christ faced had not to do with "sin or law" but had to do with the depth of "love" against which there is no law; meaning that it was empirical to Christ how far he was "willing" to go.

When one speaks of possibilities, one speaks of things that war upon character. To say that there was no possibility is to say there was nothing warring upon the character. To say that there was nothing warring on the character is to say that no character was needed.

So to say that there was no possibility is to say that there was no character issue.
To hold ones character in such esteem so as to consider it not a possibility, has to do with trust/faith and not possibilities.

The whole controversy has to do with character.

We must not confuse character with possibilities, or we end up defeating what we set out to establish.

Good points. I was just add, by way of comment, that God had faith in His Son.

Amen Tom, and the Son had faith in his Father.

And, we are all called to that same faith.

Did God's choices and actions, in light of the various possibilities, determine His character? Or was His character already established, and his choices and actions serving only to display that character to the rest of the universe?

One's character - his thoughts and feelings - determine his choices. My choice to obey or disobey depends on the kind of character I have. What goes on inside me will be displayed by my actions. Says Jesus, "By their fruits you will know them."

In any particular circumstance, would you know for sure which way I would choose? No, because you don't fully know my character. From your perspective, my actions reveal my character. You are discovering what kind of character I have based on the choices I make.

The same holds true for all non-divine beings. None of us can read the heart. So, God put Himself on trial. By the evidence of His actions, we can decide for ourselves if He is of such a character that we would want to spend eternity with Him. What He did tells us what He is like.

But before the Incarnation, did God know what kind of character Jesus had? Did He have any idea what choices such a character would make?

Going back to R's question, if God's character is love, could He choose selfishness?

This is a very interesting question, Arnold. Until your asking it, I've always thought of it in terms of displaying that character to the rest of the Universe. However, in the case of Jesus' humanity, there's no question whatsoever that He developed character. It's interesting that a human being has the capacity to represent the divine character to such a degree that Christ did.

Also your question is interesting to ponder insofar as divine character is concerned.

Regarding your last question, Waggoner for a time argued that Jesus could not have failed, using reasoning similar to what you are suggesting (i.e. because God's character is love, Christ couldn't choose selfishness), but Ellen White corrected him. Interestingly, this is the only instance I've aware of where she ever did this (corrected Waggoner's theology) during the time she was endorsing him (roughly in the 1888-1896 time frame). (Waggoner corrected this, and this idea does not appear in his book "Christ Our Righteousness" later renamed "Christ And His Righteousness," which is based on the material he presented at the 1888 Conference).

I am sorry for the confusion. I used a wrong word inadvertently. I used the word "empirical" thinking that it meant “sovereign judgment” (derived from Emperor; that was my etymology).

So what I was saying:

And remember that the issue that Christ faced had not to do with "sin or law" but had to do with the depth of "love" against which there is no law; meaning that it was sovereign to Christ how far he was "willing" to go.

Nevertheless, those are good thoughts that were brought out of it.

God and time? What about when time shall be no more?

We are creatures which exist in time. By "time will be no more," do you mean "eternity"?

Tom,

If refusing to drink the cup was a possibility, and if God didn’t know what kind of character Christ would develop, in what way are the words “the lamb slain from the foundation of the world” a description of Christ’s character?

Considering the character of a sinner, is it possible to save a sinner?

Rosangela, the words are descriptive of Christ's character because Christ was (and is) agape. Agape gives of itself, regardless of the cost, even unto the death of the cross.

Satan disputed there was such a thing as unselfishness with God, that He requires things of His creatures He is not willing to do. This question was forever put to rest by Christ.

Christ's struggle was real. The danger was real. The risk was real. The love was real.

Let us take this another step further.

Does God foreknow whether a person will ultimately be saved or lost?

Rev 3:5 He that overcometh, the same shall be clothed in white raiment; and I will not blot out his name out of the book of life, but I will confess his name before my Father, and before his angels.

This reminds me of what you said a couple of posts back. Was Jesus of Nazareth always agape, or did He become agape?



Let's back up from the Incarnation. Did Christ put the question to rest by displaying how unselfish God has always been? Or how unselfish He had become?

Yes, but in Christ. That is, God foreknows what will happen to an individual, in Christ.



God did not foreknow certain individuals to be saved or lost, but he foreknew everyone to be saved in Christ (or lost outside of Him).

Regarding our actual decision, that remains for us. God knows the end from the beginning, so whichever route we choose to begin (the one with Christ, or the one without), God knows the end. But there isn't just one route, so God foreknows both. There's no reason to foreknow only one, since both are possible.

So if we were to ask God, "Will [plug in name] be ultimately saved or lost?" God's answer (providing the person has not committed the unpardonable sin) will always be, "If (X) chooses Christ" (if the person isn't already saved) or "If (X) chooses to remain faithful" (if the person is) "then (s)he will be saved."

God cannot foreknow an event as having only one possible outcome, if in reality there is more than one possible outcome for the event. This is a point I've been trying to make clear. If there's only one possible outcome for an event, then the future is determined (which is to say, already set in stone). It's just ignorance on our part that we don't know what it is. God could tell us what will happen (if we'll be saved or not), if He wanted to. This would be the logical result of such an hypothesis. But in such a case, our future would be not open, to be determined by us. Obviously if the future is already set in stone, it can't be open to be determined by us. It just remains for us to live out what is already certain to happen.

Jesus didn't become agape. Jesus became a man, who chose to live according to the principles of agape. We, as men, do not become agape. However Jesus, as God, was agape. We, as humans, do not become God; nor did Jesus, as a man, become God. (so He didn't become agape).

Since Jesus denied Himself, and revealed the Father, He revealed the agape that God always has been.

Tom,

Are you saying that the words "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world" are a description of Christ's character as God or as a man?


Then, with all due respect, I would be as omniscient as God, because I would give the same answer.

There is a time when time will be no more for those that are saved. Can we live in this realm now?

To what degree are we limiting Infinite and Almighty God into our time frame? Or pressing Him into our limited concepts?

Time? Do we realize that this earth might well be the only place in the Universe where time is what we think it is? How would you keep the Sabbath on any of the other planets in our solar system? Not one of them has a 24-hour day system that is like ours? And they seem to have been that way right from the beginning, since Creation.

Rev 10:6 And sware by him that liveth for ever and ever, who created heaven, and the things that therein are, and the earth, and the things that therein are, and the sea, and the things which are therein, that there should be time no longer:
Rev 10:7 But in the days of the voice of the seventh angel, when he shall begin to sound, the mystery of God should be finished, as he hath declared to his servants the prophets.

This is not speaking about "time" in the sense of the existence of time, but in the sense of 'opportunity' or 'delay'.

Time is a sequence of events. Only in death there is no time; where no time is, there is no sequence of events. For time to cease to exist is for life to cease to be; for time is as life is in God.

Tom,

Are you saying that the words "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world" are a description of Christ's character as God or as a man?

As God.



Rosangela:Then, with all due respect, I would be as omniscient as God, because I would give the same answer.

With all due respect, this is about as fine an example of faulty logic that one is apt to find.

Let's say someone asked the question, "How much is two plus two?" and you said "Four". Does that make you as omniscient as God, since it's the same answer He would give?

The fact that the future is open and not fixed does not make God any less omniscient. In addition, His knowledge of the future is different than yours because anything that happens is something He has foreseen. That's not true for you.

All that we know about God is what He communicates to us. If He tells us things like He repented that He made man, that He sent His Son at great risk, that all heaven was imperiled for our redemption, are we limiting Him if we believe what He tells us?

If we disbelieve the bible when it says God changed His mind on something (such as creating humans as Toms example points out). What else are we then free to disbelieve the bible about?

The problem is not disbelieving the Bible, Thomas, but having in view everything that the Bible says about a subject.

Repentance involves a change of mind. But the Bible is clear that God does not change (Mal. 3:6; James 1:17). It’s also clear that God is not a man that He should repent (1 Sam. 15:29). So, the explanation is that God does not change, but as man changes, God has to alter His procedure towards him.

Tom, despite the fact that God is love, refusing to drink the cup was a possibility, so without His foreknowledge the Lord could not be sure, from the foundation of the world, that Christ would die for the human race. The text does not say that the Lamb offered Himself to be slain from the foundation of the world, but that the Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world.

This is what I've been saying on the Ecclesiastes thread. It takes discernment to understand what is being communicated.

Repentance involves a change of mind. But the Bible is clear that God does not change (Mal. 3:6; James 1:17).

His character! His *character* doesn't change. That's what these texts are talking about.

It’s also clear that God is not a man that He should repent (1 Sam. 15:29).

Regarding His purposes. That's what this text is concerning.

So, the explanation is that God does not change, but as man changes, God has to alter His procedure towards him.

Your procedure here is reminding me of how Calvinists interpret Romans 9 to show that God predestined the individuals Jacob and Esau, when the text isn't dealing with individuals at all. In order to rightly interpret Scripture, we need to consider the context.

Regarding Genesis, it's simply saying that God was disappointed with what man did, and He expresses regret in having created man.






There are many places where God expresses Himself in ways such as expressing regret, disappointment, surprise, a number of emotions, which would be impossible if the future were determined.

Christ's being slain was a possibility from when God created man. This is what this is addressing; God's character revealed in Christ, the overriding theme of Scripture. The quote I gave from Education explains the principle well. Before the need arose, God was ready with a solution.

We see from the description in, I think it's The Story of Redemption, that even after having had a plan ready in case it were necessary, God still had to struggle with the decision to let Christ go, as the angel explained. So even *after* sin arose, there was *still* the possibility that Christ wouldn't come. *Before* sin arose, there was the possibility that the remedy wouldn't be necessary.

Scripture speaks of the mystery which was hidden from eternal ages, which is the mystery of God's love, of the gift of God's Son for sin. Had sin not come about, the mystery would have remained hidden, but it would nevertheless have been true. God's love didn't change when sin made it necessary to reveal the mystery of Christ crucified; even without the revelation, the description of God's love (the lamb slain from the foundation of the world) would have been true (just not revealed).

In considering this phrase, we can take into account that God sent His Son at the risk of failure and eternal loss, and that all heaven was imperiled for our redemption. Since we know these things are true, we know that there is conditionality involved in the future.

Certainly one cannot extend this very far, but if you're correct, at least in the case of determining someone's eternal destiny, our "omniscience" is the same as God's. You have Him saying nothing more than what I've been teaching for many years: If you're faithful you'll be fine.

But let's consider some more verses: Be thou faithful unto death and I will give thee a crown of life. He who endures to the end will be saved.

God is clear that salvation comes only to those who are faithful to the end. A good start does not outweigh a bad end.

1. Is it possible to be in a "saved" condition, but turn away from it later in life?
2. Can God tell if a person will turn away later, or if he will be faithful to the end?
3. How could He be so sure that Enoch and Elijah were OK to translate, but not Moses?
4. Is my "if" as insightful as His?

These are good questions. I've thought a lot about them. I can't say too much, except that I think it's possible to be "sealed in the truth," sort of like the unpardonable sin in reverse. It's not that one can't be lost, because we never lose free will (even in heaven, we could be lost if we wanted to), but that one won't. But I don't believe God ever communicates this to us, because even in the end time the 144,000 do not know that probation has closed. What they do know is they have, above all else, a desire that God's character be known and vindicated.

Heere is a thought.

With the Lord, the default position is that we are received of Him. One has to prove oneself to be not of faith to be lost.

I agree with that perspective, John.

I agree. Isn't that what the sealing is all about? Settling into the truth such that one is immovable?

Again we see here the distinction between what can be done and what will be done. I agree that we will always be free to choose to sin. But I think we agree that God will only give everlasting life to those who He knows will not choose to sin.



This hearkens back to an old line of discussion. Since God knows who will not choose to sin, does the fact that He does not communicate that knowledge to us change reality? Does His knowledge of what we will do limit the possibilities of what we can do? Does His foreknowledge of my future choice remove my ability to choose?

I can say, "If one is faithful, he will be saved." It will be 100% accurate. But I really have no idea which individuals will take that conditional branch.

I believe God has better insight into our characters, and has a really good idea which conditional branch each one of us will take.

I agree. Isn't that what the sealing is all about? Settling into the truth such that one is immovable?

Yes. I almost used that language, in fact.

Again we see here the distinction between what can be done and what will be done. I agree that we will always be free to choose to sin. But I think we agree that God will only give everlasting life to those who He knows will not choose to sin.

What do you mean by "give everlasting lift to those He knows will not choose to sin? As soon as a person is converted, they have everlasting life. Your statement would translate to "once saved, always saved." If this is involving the "sealed into truth" and "cannot be moved" idea, I can see this, but not if it means simply making a decision for Christ at some point in one's life. However, I think your statement is likely true, with the meaning that I think you have in mind.

Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall
But I don't believe God ever communicates this to us, because even in the end time the 144,000 do not know that probation has closed. What they do know is they have, above all else, a desire that God's character be known and vindicated.


This hearkens back to an old line of discussion. Since God knows who will not choose to sin, does the fact that He does not communicate that knowledge to us change reality?

No. God doesn't communicate this to us because it's not useful or helpful, either to us, or anyone else. He gives us witness through the Holy Spirit that we are sons of God, and that is enough.

Does His knowledge of what we will do limit the possibilities of what we can do?

No. This isn't possible.

Does His foreknowledge of my future choice remove my ability to choose?

No. Also not possible. What *could* remove you ability to choose, although in a logical sense, not in the sense of force, would be if the future were such that God could view it like a T.V. rerun. In this case, if there were only one possible future, then, of course, your choice would be limited to that one future. You would perceive many possible choices available, but your perception would be wrong.

So there is a world of difference between "faithfulness" and "foreknowledge". Because the knowledge of what the future choices will be, reside in the "faithfulness" of him who is faithful, and not in the knowledge of future events.

We are likewise called to that knowledge and faithfulness. We are called to live in just such a knowledge of God's faithfulness; thus shall our "faith" and "faithfulness" be established in the foundation.

In this instance, I used "everlasting life" in a literal sense; i.e., life that never ends. IOW, only those who God knows will not choose to sin are the ones who will continue to live forever; everyone else will die. And of course, only those who are faithful to the end will be given the finishing touch of immortality.

I think that's true, but not for any arbitrary reason. That is, it's not that God gives one thing to one group of people and not to another because they have met some arbitrary condition that He has decided they need to meet, but the principle involved is, "To know God is life eternal," or, synonymously, "He that has the Son has life."

That is, eternal life is the outgrowth of knowing God, just as eternal death is the outgrowth of living for self.

Right. There's nothing arbitrary about it. It's an incontrovertible, unavoidable fact of God's creation.

Have the Son -> have life.

Have not the Son -> have not life.

In Him is no sin.

If you are in Him -> in you is no sin.

It's not arbitrary. It is strictly cause and effect. And the very predictable nature of cause and effect is the foundation of foreknowledge. And since God has a really good knowledge of the causes (general and specific), He knows very well what the effects will be (general and specific). He knows the end from the beginning because He can see the future effects of present causes.

I agree with everything you wrote, except for the last sentence, which I don't so much disagree with, but see as incomplete. God knows the end from the beginning not only, or even primarily, because He foresees what will happen, but because He understands the principles involved. Actually, I was re-read your last sentence, it's entirely possible that this is what you meant.

I'm glad you see thing things as non-arbitrary and strictly cause and effect. I think understanding this truth unlocks a great many others.

Yes, that is what I meant. Just like if I throw 10 lbs of pure sodium in a lake, I can "see" what's going to happen, and run away very fast even before the sodium hits. Then, I can literally see from a safe distance.

Again, the text doesn’t say that the Lamb offered Himself to be slain from the foundation of the world (which would have to do with His character), but that the Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world (which has to do with a concrete fact – a certainty, not a possibility).


Can God be surprised?


First, the future isn’t determined by God’s foreknowledge. This would mean that things happen because God saw that they would happen, which is not true.
God predicted, through His foreknowledge, that the Jews would reject Him. Did they reject Him because this had been predicted?

"Christ quoted a prophecy which more than a thousand years before had predicted what God's foreknowledge had seen would be. The prophecies do not shape the characters of the men who fulfill them. Men act out their own free will, either in accordance with a character placed under the molding of God or a character placed under the harsh rule of Satan." {RH, November 13, 1900 par. 11}

Second, suppose a mother could see, before her son is born, the video of his life, and she sees that at 14 he will have cancer and die. Is your contention that she can’t feel sorry when he is diagnosed with cancer because she knew beforehand that this would happen?

Good Arnold. Looks like we're on the same page (at least for this post!)

Christ's being slain was a possibility from when God created man.

Again, the text doesn’t say that the Lamb offered Himself to be slain from the foundation of the world (which would have to do with His character), but that the Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world (which has to do with a concrete fact – a certainty, not a possibility).

"The Lamb offered Himself to be slain from the foundation of the world"? That's extremely awkward. Nobody writes like that.

At any rate, it should be clear that "the lamb slain from the foundation of the world" is dealing with the character of God, because that's what the whole Great Controversy is about. Are you arguing that sin had to happen? If sin was a certainty (that is, there is no way that sin could not have happened), there are serious consequences with such a view. If sin was a possibility, and not a certainty, then Christ's death on the cross was a possibility, and not a certainty. However, His character would still be the same.

The cross *revealed* what was hidden in ages past. It didn't create a new reality; it revealed what had always been true about God.

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There are many places where God expresses Himself in ways such as expressing regret, disappointment, surprise...

Can God be surprised?

He expresses Himself in the ways I stated. For example:



That's the NIV. The KJV has "entered my heart" I think. RSV and NASB have "come into my mind," I think.

God knew of the possibility of this happening from all eternity, but it was apparently not a likely event. In many places God expresses that similar emotions speaking of His reacting in time to the hardness of heart of the Israelites. These expressions in Scripture are in harmony with Ellen White's writing that God took a risk in sending His Son, and that all heaven was imperiled for our redemption.

God created the universe with an open future, not a determined one. This is what we see expressed over and over.


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... a number of emotions, which would be impossible if the future were determined.

First, the future isn’t determined by God’s foreknowledge.

Correct! However, it must be determined for God to have a foreknowledge of it which is determined. In other words, if God foreknows the future as determined (has only one possibility -- the one He sees), then it is certainly determined, because reality is as God knows it to be.

The issue has never been that God's foreknowledge *causes* anything to be. This apparently is a very difficult point to understand because you, Daryl, and MM repeatedly make this point over and over again, but I have never stated nor implied that this is the case, but rather have repeatedly, over and over again, and redundantly affirmed, asserted, pointed out, and explicated that God's foreknowledge does not cause us, or anyone else, to do anything. That this point continues to be made is a bit perplexing.

This would mean that things happen because God saw that they would happen, which is not true.

This is backwards. The things that happen happen regardless of whether God sees them. God sees them because they happen. If there's only one future that can happen, then that's what God sees. If God sees only one future, then that's reality. One future is what there is! God cannot see things different than what they are.

God predicted, through His foreknowledge, that the Jews would reject Him. Did they reject Him because this had been predicted?

No. The rejected Him because of the hardness of their heart. God's foreseeing things does not cause things to happen. However, just like Nineveh, just like Israel (as related in Jer. 18), those in Christ's time could have accepted Him.

"Christ quoted a prophecy which more than a thousand years before had predicted what God's foreknowledge had seen would be. The prophecies do not shape the characters of the men who fulfill them. Men act out their own free will, either in accordance with a character placed under the molding of God or a character placed under the harsh rule of Satan." {RH, November 13, 1900 par. 11}

This is correct. The fact that God revealed that He sent His Son at the risk of failure and eternal lost, makes it obvious that He saw failure as a possibility. Similarly the statement that all heaven was imperiled for our redemption makes clear that heaven was imperiled for our redemption, since that's what it says. So God does not just see one possibility, which is good, because that's not the way the future is.

Second, suppose a mother could see, before her son is born, the video of his life, and she sees that at 14 he will have cancer and die. Is your contention that she can’t feel sorry when he is diagnosed with cancer because she knew beforehand that this would happen?

It's my contention that she could not say that she brought her son into the world with the "risk" that her child wouldn't get cancer. (I put "risk" in quotes because "risk" is associated with loss, and the loss here would be the loss of a good thing -- not getting cancer)

Obviously your analogy was meant to point out that although God foresees what will happen, this does not mean He cannot feel pain when the foreseen thing happens. There's certainly a different when the foreseen possibility becomes reality, and God feels pain when that happens.

Consider the following:




Unless this is a farce, these things actually happened. If Christ went to God three times to convince God to allow Him to come, and the angel expressed this as a "struggle," then it wasn't a foregone conclusion that God would do this. If God knew for all eternity that His Son would ask Him three times to allow Him to come, this could hardly be called a "struggle." The whole narrative wouldn't make sense.

What I mean is, “from the foundation of the world, the Lamb offered Himself to be slain.” Does this make sense?


This is not at all the way I understand the verse. To me, what God is trying to communicate is that not only had He never commanded such a practice, but that the very thought of it could never have been originated by Him.


You are simply changing the meaning of the word. To determine means “to establish or affect the nature, kind, or quality of; fix.” In other words, for Judas’ future to be determined, God would have said, “I need someone to betray my Son, in order that He may be crucified. I will choose Judas to do it, and he will have no choice but do it.” In that case, Judas wouldn’t have been an instrument of the devil, but an instrument of God. God would have chosen and fixed the nature of the events and the role of the participants; Judas’ will would have been affected, making it impossible for him to choose to do otherwise.


Let’s change the illustration in order to understand this subject of “risk”. Suppose I’m a doctor and there is an epidemic of a lethal disease in Africa. There is no vaccine for it, so I can’t take one. I decide to travel there to help. Suppose that before traveling to Africa I have a glimpse of the future, and become aware that I will be lucky enough to not catch the disease. The probability of catching the disease, for everyone who is in this region of Africa, is of 80%. Would you say that the probability for me was of 80% too or that it was zero? Would you say that I took no risk in going to Africa? After I have that glimpse of the future, what I saw passes away from me, so that when I arrive in Africa I’m no longer aware of how things will come out. How real will I feel the risk to be for me?


Taking a decision and implementing the decision are two different things. Even for God.

If your glimpses of the future are always 100% accurate (and you know that they are 100% accutate), then there is a 0% risk for you.

The Lamb offered Himself to be slain from the foundation of the world"? That's extremely awkward. Nobody writes like that.

What I mean is, “from the foundation of the world, the Lamb offered Himself to be slain.” Does this make sense?

There is a sense in which this is true. For example, EGW writes, "Remember Christ risked all." and Paul writes of how Christ gave Himself for us. However, it is also true that God so loved the world that He gave His only Son. So to have written, "from the foundation of the world, the Lamb offered Himself to be slain" seems to me to be more limiting in meaning that to speak of the "lamb slain from the foundation of the world."

Later on you write that there is a difference, even to God, of making plans and implementing them, which is my point here. The "lamb slain from the foundation of the world" speaks to the plan that was set up, should it become necessary. Since God could still have decided not to implement the plan, let alone the fact that sin didn't need to happen at all, it would be a mistake to read into this text some statement regarding the future being determined. It's not a treatise on foreknowledge/ontology of the future. It's a beautiful statement as to God's character.

For example, when John speaks in Revelation of Christ, he speaks of how he heard an angel speak of the Lion of the tribe of Judah. But John looked and saw a lamb. This is speaking to character, and how that character is perceived.

Ellen White brings out the thoughts I've been trying to share here:



Quote:
That's the NIV. The KJV has "entered my heart" I think. RSV and NASB have "come into my mind," I think.
God knew of the possibility of this happening from all eternity, but it was apparently not a likely event. (Jer. 7:31)

This is not at all the way I understand the verse.

Of course! You don't understand any of these verses this way. But there are nevertheless many of them, verses which communicate God experiencing regret, disappointment at the way things turn out, contingency, and so forth.

To me, what God is trying to communicate is that not only had He never commanded such a practice, but that the very thought of it could never have been originated by Him.

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In other words, if God foreknows the future as determined (has only one possibility -- the one He sees), then it is certainly determined, because reality is as God knows it to be.

You are simply changing the meaning of the word. To determine means “to establish or affect the nature, kind, or quality of; fix.”

I'm using the word in a technical sense, in the context of what we are discussing. The "determined" means "fixed" in the sense of "certain" or "cannot be changed." I'm using it in the standard way the term is used when foreknolwedge is discussed.

In other words, for Judas’ future to be determined, God would have said, “I need someone to betray my Son, in order that He may be crucified. I will choose Judas to do it, and he will have no choice but do it.” In that case, Judas wouldn’t have been an instrument of the devil, but an instrument of God. God would have chosen and fixed the nature of the events and the role of the participants; Judas’ will would have been affected, making it impossible for him to choose to do otherwise.

No, that's not what it means. The term is ontological, dealing with the future. It does not necessarily imply predestination, as your scenario implies. Actually, Calivinists would argue that it does, but Arminianists deny this claim. I think the argument of the Calvinists is logically consistent (but disagree with the premise of the future being determined).

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It's my contention that she could not say that she brought her son into the world with the "risk" that her child wouldn't get cancer.

Let’s change the illustration in order to understand this subject of “risk”. Suppose I’m a doctor and there is an epidemic of a lethal disease in Africa. There is no vaccine for it, so I can’t take one. I decide to travel there to help. Suppose that before traveling to Africa I have a glimpse of the future, and become aware that I will be lucky enough to not catch the disease. The probability of catching the disease, for everyone who is in this region of Africa, is of 80%. Would you say that the probability for me was of 80% too or that it was zero? Would you say that I took no risk in going to Africa? After I have that glimpse of the future, what I saw passes away from me, so that when I arrive in Africa I’m no longer aware of how things will come out. How real will I feel the risk to be for me?

I'm not understanding your point. First of all, I don't understand why "risk" is in quotes. Why would the risk of the doctor be zero? Is he doing something not to catch the disease that others aren't doing? How real you feel a risk is has nothing to do with how real the risk actually is. God took a real risk in sending His Son. He didn't just feel like He was taking one. Heaven really was imperiled for our redemption. It's not the case that it just felt like it was imperiled.

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Unless this is a farce, these things actually happened. If Christ went to God three times to convince God to allow Him to come, and the angel expressed this as a "struggle," then it wasn't a foregone conclusion that God would do this.

Taking a decision and implementing the decision are two different things. Even for God.

I agree with this. However, if it were the case that the future is determined (i.e., it can only take one possible course, the one which God sees), then there wouldn't be any difference. God would simply do what He always foresaw He would do. Any "struggle" that would take place would have been resolved long ago in eternigy, when God first saw what He would do. "Struggle" doesn't begin to make sense in such a scenario. Neither does the concept of risk make any sense.

The point I've been making is very simple. If there's only one possible thing which can happen in the future (which is what God see will happen), then there's only one possible thing which can happen in the future, in which case, one cannot choose to do something different than what will happen, since there's only one possible thing which will happen. Now the fact that God knows what that thing is, is irrelevant. Regardless of whether God knows what will happen or not, what will happen will happen.

Thomas,

A complex interplay between genetic and environmental risk factors affect the development of breast cancer. If I inherited genetic risk factors and/or am exposed to environmental risk factors, but have a glimpse of the future that I won’t develop breast cancer, how can this mean that my risk was zero?

Tom,

What is your contention about the future being “determined” according to your definition? You said one cannot choose to do something different than what will happen, so is your contention that the individual’s free will is affected? Or what? If I decide to go to the beach on Sunday, but at 7:00 a.m. it rains, and I decide not to go any more; however, at 8:00 a.m. the rain stops and the sun shines again, and I again decide to go; then when I’m ready to leave, at 8:45 a.m., it begins to rain again, so I decide not to go. But at 9:30 a.m. the sun starts shining again, and I decide to go, raining or no raining. The whole day was partly sunny and partly rainy. Was my future “determined”? By whom – by God, by the weather, or by myself?

Rosangela,

Lets say you have a family history where every relative that has this far died that you know of died off cancer, you live in a house where you breathe asbestos and radon at high concentrations, you work with handling nuclear waste without using a protective suit, you eat poorly cooked pork in an area where everyone you know regularily eats medication to get rid of worms recieved from eating poorly cooked pork and you drink nothing but highly distilled vodka, but God has told you that you will die of old age and live free of sickness til that day. What is then your risk level of becoming ill?

If the future is determined and God who can see the rerun of that which has not yet happened tells you that this is how your life will end, then there is no risk whatsoever. You could even add smoking and wrestling with tigers to your list of unhealthy habbits as you would know that neither of them would kill or harm you. (though I dont know how interesting tiger wrestling would be if you knew the tiger couldnt harm you...)

If the future is not determined but God knows all possible options that exist (as the thesis Tom has been presenting) and God decides to protect you from all of these dangers and then tells you that neither of them will be allowed to harm you, then again your risk is zero.

If the future is not determined but God knows all possible options that exist, but God doesnt decide to grant you supernatural protection from these dangers, then you better start making some major changes in your life right away unless all of these risks kill you.

So how you view your risk factor in this scenario with God giving a glimps of your future is decided by what you think about God and the future. If the future is Mikes TV-rerun or if God decides to protect you from yourself, then there can be no risk once God tells you there is no risk. Only if the future is as open as the next season of the series that has not yet been written, and God doesnt grant you that very high level of protection can there be a risk. But I dont think God would tell you unless He also set His mind to making it so.

What is your contention about the future being “determined” according to your definition? You said one cannot choose to do something different than what will happen, so is your contention that the individual’s free will is affected? Or what? If I decide to go to the beach on Sunday, but at 7:00 a.m. it rains, and I decide not to go any more; however, at 8:00 a.m. the rain stops and the sun shines again, and I again decide to go; then when I’m ready to leave, at 8:45 a.m., it begins to rain again, so I decide not to go. But at 9:30 a.m. the sun starts shining again, and I decide to go, raining or no raining. The whole day was partly sunny and partly rainy. Was my future “determined”? By whom – by God, by the weather, or by myself?

It's not "my" definition, it's standard for this type of discussion. The "determined" (or "fixed") simply means that there is one possible future. The alternative would be "open" which means there are multiple possible futures. Who determines the future is a separate question from whether it is determined.

The first question to consider is, is there only one possible future, or many possible futures. For example, when God looks into the future, does He see what will happen (the one actual, determined future), or does He see all the things which may happen (every possible future, not of which is a reality yet)?

If there is an actual future, which exists, but it's simply a case that because of our ignorance we don't know what it is (but God knows, and could tell us if He wanted; for example, if you will go to the beach or not) then free will is affected in a logical sense, not in a casual sense of force (i.e. God, nor anyone else, is forcing you to act contrary to your free will).

To put it another way, if the future is such that there is only one thing that you can actually do (the thing which will happen, the thing that God sees you doing -- although the fact that He sees it is totally irrelevant), then *logically* you do not have free will, if free will is defined as the ability to do either of mutually exclusive possible things. If free will is defined instead as your being able to do what you choose to do, then the logical problem is avoided.

Nice job explaining things, Thomas. The risk is intertwined with the concept of openness, as you point out. No openness means no risk (assuming one has knowledge; even with knowledge, openness can still involve risk).

If this were true, then there is no possible way that God could predict the rise and fall of nations, as He did in the prophecies of Daniel. He could not have predicted that Cyrus would defeat Babylon nearly 160 years before his birth! And even named Cyrus by name!! Nor could God have predicted that Cyrus would do so in the exact manner as was predicted!!!

If God only knows, as you say, what choices people have and what the results of each possible choice would be, then the prophecies in Daniel would have to read something like: "If this king does such-and-such, and if that king does this, and if a certain couple actually decides to have a child, and if they happen to name him Cyrus, then Cyrus would defeat the kingdom of Babylon, but only if Cyrus chose to divert the river, and if he choose to do this or that, etc, ad infinitum ad nauseum.

I believe God truly is omniscient.

God made some very specific predictions (not "broad strokes"), such as Christ dying on a cross, the predictions in Daniel (including naming Cyrus by name as conquerer of Babylon and that he would do so in a very particular way, nearly 160 years before it happened), predicting that Peter would deny Christ (not just the possibility but with certainty) three times, etc.

There are way too many specifics and 100% accurate time line prophecies for God's foreknowledge to be some fuzzy possibilities as you are describing them.

Rather, they have been very certain!

It is written:

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God is not man, that he should lie, or a son of man, that he should change his mind. Has he said, and will he not do it? Or has he spoken, and will he not fulfill it? - Numbers 23:19

What you have been saying is that God cannot possibly be omniscient (i.e. He cannot know with absolute certainty what will happen 5 seconds from now, or 5,000 years from now), because if He did, then the future is "fixed". And if the future is fixed, then we have no freedom of choice and we cannot but do what our future dictates.

Your philosophy hinges upon the idea that if God knew exactly what would take place, then the future is "fixed", which is not logically sound. You have the cause-and-effect relationship all backwards, as I have stated elsewhere.

You are saying that I spilled my drink (and God knew for certain that I would do so) because the future says my shirt is wet. But the truth of the matter is that my shirt was wet because I spilled my drink on my shirt.

Just because God knows with absolute certainty and with absolute clarity does not change the cause-and-effect relationship between our choices and the future events. Think of all the predictions He gave in His Holy Word with exact precision in time, hundreds or thousands of years before they happened, with exacting detail ... God could not have made such predictions if His foreknowledge was as fuzzy and iffy as you describe.

I've mentioned example prophecies in my recent posts on this thread to illustrate how exact and precise His predictions are. They are not a bunch of "If this, and if that, and if they just so happen to choose this way, then this will happen", No! He predicted with exactness which leaves no doubt about His foreknowledge ... this is one of the biggest things that identifies God as the One and Only True God!

Gen 6:6 And Jehovah repented that He had made man on the earth, and He was grieved to His heart.

Dan 4:25 And you shall be driven from men, and your dwelling shall be with the beasts of the field. And you shall be fed with grass like oxen. And you shall be wet with dew of the heavens; and seven times shall pass over you until you know that the Most High is Ruler in the kingdom of men, and He gives it to whomever He desires.

Surely you can see why this argument is flawed. If God knows the future perfectly, He not only knows that your shirt will be wet, He also knows that it will be wet because you will spill your drink on your shirt, and He knows what drink you will spill even though you havent yet written what you have in your glas. Furthermore, there is no way that you will not spill that drink on that shirt because if you do no spill it, then God would know something of the future that did not happen and that would make God wrong. And since we believe that God is not wrong, then if He knows that you will spill drink on your shirt, you surely will have a wet shirt in the appointed time wether you like it or not. The cause and effect is still there, true. Your shirt becomes wet because you spilled a glas of drink on it. But if the future is fully known, then this cause must happen becaues it is predicted so. That drink will spill just as surely as Cyrus was born to overthrow Babylon.

On the other hand, with an open future, God could still make prophecy. The difference is that instead of telling the prophets about the future that in Gods eyes has already happened, He tells the prophets about what He plans to do. And surely God would have no problem with causing a child to be named Cyrus, then causing that child to be trained in leadership and warefare tactics and finaly through him open the gates of Babylon to kill a drunken king? In my view, exact prophecy is exact for the reason that God makes things happen. One could say He creates that which He has predicted. There are prophecies which are as you say, quite to the point and no uncertainities in sight. But there are no lack of prophecies where God says, if you do this, then...

Thomas,

Then the view you are defending is much worse than the view we are defending. In the view that God knows the future beforehand, the fact that He knows the future in no way affects the free will of His creatures. But in the view you are defending the opposite is true. If God makes things happen, then He made Cyrus conquer Babylon, He made Judas betray Christ, He made Christ not sin. If He made all these things happen, this means that the individuals involved had no choice, because they were made to do what God had planned them to do.

Tom,

In the illustration was my future determined by God, by the weather, or by myself?

Rosangela,

Interesting points, I will have to think that through some more. I confess I havent thought through the prophecy part as thorroughly yet. As for the foreknowledge part, I will quote a post made in the BSDA forum that contains another way of explaining this besides the ones I and Tom have made here. Maybe it will be a little clearer then. I quote the summary here:

It doesn't matter (to any points I'm making).

I understand your point to be that the fact that God knows what choice we will make, does not impact our free will (our ability to make the choice we wish to make). This is, of course, true.

I think you may be getting sidetracked by the word "determined." Instead of determined let's try using "like a T.V. rerun" and see if that works better. Asking what determines the future isn't really a question that needs to be consider in relation to the points I've been making.

The point I've been making is that if the future is such that only one thing can happen (for whatever reason), then that's the only thing that can happen. If there's only one thing that can happen, we can't choose to do something different than that thing.

The fact that God knows what this thing is is irrelevant in terms of this point. Who determines this single-threaded future is irrelevant in terms of this point (although it should be obvious that we can't determine a future that is known before we exist).

Free will, under the future-is-like-a-TV-rerun scenario cannot be logically understood as the ability to do either of more than one mutually exclusive events, since only one event (the one we will choose) can happen. Free will must logically be defined as the ability to do what we choose to do, in order to be logically consistent with this view of the future.

This isn't quite accurate. God does not know *definitively* that portion of the future which is contingent on man's free choice. There is nothing that can happen which God has not foreseen. God foresees that a person can do either this or that, and knows what the consequence of each choice is. He knows the end from the beginning. However, until the choice is actually made, there isn't a definitive answer to the question of which choice will be made, since it hasn't been made yet. God knows the future as it actually is, which is comprised of a combination of certainties and possibilities.

Regarding prophecy, God knew of things that could happen, and prophesied them ahead of time. God's acting to make Cyrus a leader can hardly be charged against Him as a bad thing. Perhaps Cyrus was the best possible leader there could have been, the one most likely to be receptive to the Holy Spirit.

Also, the fact that God has prophesied something does not mean that it must happen. God Himself makes this point in Jeremiah 18:



Of course Nineveh is a prime example of this.

Israel was given ample opportunity to repent, more than ample, and had they repented, they would not have been conquered, and this was prophesied by God, just as what actually happened, where they did not repent and were conquered. Over and over Jeremiah told them what would happen if they repented.

Bro Tom,

Do you agree with the generalization that "On the other hand, with an open future, God could still make prophecy. The difference is that instead of telling the prophets about the future that in Gods eyes has already happened, He tells the prophets about what He plans to do. And surely God would have no problem with causing..."?

For example, when God said to Peter, "You will deny me three times," was that just a really good guess of what he thought Peter might do, or did He cause Peter to sin, or was it simply God knowing the facts so well that He could know for certain the effects of future causes on Peter, or something else?

This is *far* too simplistic. The future is comprised of many things, including:
a)Some things that are certain to occur
b)Some things that might occur
c)Some things that God might cause to happen




Of course He didn't cause Peter to sin. Do you really think that was a possibility?

God knew Peter's character. That was the main thing. He also knew what was about to happen. Certain elements of what would happen would depend upon the free will choice of sentient beings, but it certainly would not have been difficult to know that Peter would deny Christ. Again, God knew his character.

That was just there for completeness.



I completely agree that God's prophecy was certain because He knew Peter's character. Our characters determine our choices, and God's accurate knowledge of Peter's character allowed Him to make an accurate prediction of Peter's choices. Peter's character was the cause (at least, one of them) and his choice to deny Christ was the foreseen effect.

My view in this matter is that God's universe is not arbitrary. Effects are determined by their causes, not by chance.

If Peter's choice can be accurately predicted by God, does that mean that Peter did not have free will? Or does it mean that Peter was free to choose what he wanted to do, but God knew what he wanted to do (even more than he did)? After Christ gave the prophecy, was there a possibility that Peter was going to do something different?

The fact that Christ made the prophesy didn't change whether or not Peter could choose to differently than Christ predicted. In this scenario, it was simply a case that Christ knew Peter better than he knew himself. It sounds like we're on the same page on this.

I forgot what I was going to say. Hate it when that happens.

Moving on to something else... I don't believe in a deterministic universe. Chaos theory and quantum mechanics seems to make it clear that God loves spontaneity and randomness. They are in the very building blocks of things. I think it's a wonderful thing that God is able to create things, even things without free will, which fill Him, the creator, with joy, so that He could say that they were "very good." Of course, when being capable of exhibiting free will enter the picture, this is even more the case.

Tom,


My choice was made having in view the weather, and the fact that God knew if I was going to the beach or not didn’t in any way affect my choice. This should be obvious.

Another point I want to make is that according to your view all prophecies are conditional, including Christ’s death and resurrection.

Arnold,

Does God know our character before we are born? I’m asking this having in view a quote we discussed previously:

“Jacob and Esau, the twin sons of Isaac, present a striking contrast, both in character and in life. This unlikeness was foretold by the angel of God before their birth. When in answer to Rebekah's troubled prayer he declared that two sons would be given her, he opened to her their future history, that each would become the head of a mighty nation, but that one would be greater than the other, and that the younger would have the pre-eminence” (PP 177.1).

I think so.



That will surely impact our ideas of free will, but it is what it is.

I think so.



How do you reconcile that with "cause and effect" reasoning? That's on the other side of the fence from randomness.

If Peter's free will had elements of randomness, he could have proclaimed his faith in Christ. Then God would have to scratch His head and say, "Whoa, I guess I spoke too soon."

I don't know much about chaos theory, but it doesn't necessarily imply randomness. One little cause could certainly have great (and humanly unforeseen) effects. For example, though the part we play is exceedingly small, it is required to effect the miracle of the salvation of the soul.

QM does strongly imply randomness. But the evidence is empirical and based on human limitations (as all physics is). It says nothing of divine knowledge.

If QM applied universally, then randomness would impact our choices. How could God ever make definitive judgments about our character?

QM deals with small changes, and Chaos theory could be thought of as amplifying the changes. For example, you've heard the saying that a butterfly flaps its wings in Africa and there's a hurricane across the ocean? The butterfly's flapping is a random event, which causes a disturbance in the air, which combined with other factors creates a bigger disturbance, and so forth. Small random events at just the right time can have unexpected large consequences.

Similarly, you do some small gesture for a person, who helps him/her, propelling them to do something nice for someone else, etc. As you put, our small influence can wind up in something great.

If one looks at the large picture, for example, weather patterns, one could predict that a hurricane will occur, because conditions are right, but there's no way of knowing which butterfly will flap its wings to get the thing going. Or which particle will start a chemical reaction is random, but it is known that the reaction will occur and how. Or when a fire is started, which spark gets it going is random, but it is known that a fire will start.

I don't know how well I'm explaining this, but I'm trying to communicate that randomness and cause and effect work together. Specific details can be random, but there is still cause and effect.

Regarding Peter, the effect of randomness upon free will would have more of an impact upon one who is standing on the fence. But Peter was settled in his self-sufficiency, so it could be known what would happen. The effect of randomness would effect something like how soon Peter would give way.

I know you and MM and Daniel make this point very frequently, but it really has nothing to do with what I've been trying to share. It's a mystery to me why you all keep wanting to make this point.

My point has nothing to do with God's foreknowledge. It has to do with the simple fact that if the future is single-threaded, in that there is only one possible thing that can happen (which is what will happen), then our free will cannot logically mean that we are capable of doing either of several mutually exclusive alternatives. That should be obvious.



Well, obviously if Christ had failed, that would have had an impact upon His resurrection. I recall EGW writing that the stone guarding His tomb would never have been removed.

There is a conditional element to all prophesies which involve free will. If God is simply prophesying what He Himself will do, without there being any impediment caused by someone else's free will (which God will not violate), then of course He knows what He will do, and can tell us ahead of time.

Christ said Peter would deny Him three times. In other words, in order for Peter to deny Christ three times, Christ also knew that Peter would be challenged three times.

This not only involved Peter's choice to deny Him three times, but it also involved the choice by others to challenge Peter three times.

Unless foreknowledge is a fact in the sense of a TV-rerun, this seems kind of detailed and specific to me.

Bro Tom,

Your examples do not exhibit true randomness. The butterfly's flapping wings and the particles in a chemical reaction are random to us only because we lack information. There in nothing in principle that says we cannot know these things. If we knew these things, and had the computational power to calculate the effects of physical laws on all particles involved, we can accurately predict the weather, chemical reactions, etc. Accurate weather forecasts is one of the proposed uses for future supercomputers. But because we do not have such fine-detailed information, and we do not have the resources to make the necessary calculations if we did, we only deal with aggregates. That's why they look random to humans. If we knew all the causes, we will know all the effects.

These things are not really random. They just look random because of our ignorance.

True random behavior is better exhibited by electrons in the double-slit experiment. Shoot one electron toward the slits, and we really have no idea where it's going to go. Even in principle, we do not know where it will go. Essentially, our current theories have no explanation of how the electron goes from one place to the other. And all our efforts to detect where the electron is along the journey have been fruitless. In principle, it is random.

But as in the other examples, even here we know a lot about the aggregate. When we're talking trillions of electrons, we have a really good idea what they will do. But we know nothing about individual electrons.

But that's from a human perspective. Our theories have been incomplete/wrong before, and we can certainly repeat that trick. It is very possible that God knows things that we don't.

This becomes very important when we look at it theologically. Can we say that God knows what will happen with the aggregate, but not the individuals? He who knows how many hairs I lost in the shower this morning would certainly know the more important matter of my character. And with character come choices, actions, destiny.

Arnold,

Does true randomness exist anywhere in the universe?
If the answere is no, that would mean that sin wasnt random. But was it rational? Can irrationallity exist if every action has a cause? Wouldnt irrationallity together with randomness be just words we use for things we do not understand?
Now, if these things above would be true, and sin be neither random nor irrational, wouldnt it then be both predictable and rational, maybe even unavoidable?

If all of those things would be true, could we then still say that God is good in any sence of the word? Why or why not?

Arnold, I’m in perfect agreement, but this is because He sees things like in a re-run. Everybody, whatever his/her personality, circumstances, or inherited tendencies, can have a good or a bad character, depending on his/her choices. Not even identical twins have identical characters. Therefore God, without seeing things like in a re-run, would have no means of knowing, before we are born, if we will develop a good or a bad character.

Free will means "the freedom of the will to choose a course of action without external coercion but in accordance with the ideals or moral outlook of the individual" (Webster). What you mean is that people are coerced by God's foreknowledge to do things?

My definition of free will also requires more than one option of action. My definition of free will requires that in the dawn of creation, there always was the option that Lucifer would not have sinned. It requires that Peter could have chosen not to follow Jesus in to the high priests courts and be challenged there. It requires that Judas could have stayed in the upper room and only walked out in company with Jesus and the diciples and refrained from carrying out the betrayal. Anything less, wether it be predetermination or if it be that in each of these cases the individuals where free to choose the course of action that was foreknown, I cannot see as free will.

I have learned that this creates some problems to the understanding of God being all powerful and all knowing. But the difficulties of the other view, where by one cause or another, wether by predestination or because God has forseen it, a sertain result will come to pass, has greater weight.

If God has decided that I will be saved or that I will be lost, that would greatly concern me that my destiny would be decided by factors outside of my controll. If God knows that I will be saved or that I will be lost, that would greatly concern me that if God knows that I will be lost I really cant do or choose anything that would end up in a different end result than in my damnation, or if God knows that I will be saved, I couldnt really do or choose anything that would have a different end result than in my salvation.

Oh well, this has all been said before and saying it again is not likely to change anything.

Thomas

Tom, you said:


Isn't this determinism?

"Determinism states that the way things will be is a result of how things are and the work of natural laws. That is only to say that if we know exactly how things are at the present moment and the laws that govern how the world (or the universe) works, then we can derive how things will be at some future time."
(http://www.galilean-library.org/int13.html)

God only sees what you will choose, and He died to make this choice possible. It's simple. Choose salvation and you will be saved. Choose it every day and every hour.

Deu 30:19 I call heaven and earth to witness against you this day, that I have set before thee life and death, the blessing and the curse: therefore choose life, that thou mayest live, thou and thy seed

I would say No at this time. And I agree with your conclusion.

Sin was not random. There was a reason why it arose in Lucifer; reasons that did not exist in others.



The SOP tells us that it was a species of insanity.



The cause can be something outside the physical realm. There may be spiritual phenomena that can cause physical effects.



Perhaps. We humans are ignorant of a great many things. What may seem random might turn out to be perfectly predictable.

Irrational, though, is a different class from random.



Though it is not random, it is not rational. But I suppose Satan might disagree. My daughter sometimes disagrees when I point out to her that being mean is a bad thing.



They are not all true.

Individual salvation is based on whether or not the individual partakes of grace through faith. But there are many factors that come into play throughout one's lifetime. I believe that God knows all those factors.

If we accept the idea that our thoughts and actions are based solely on physical processes in the brain, then there is no freewill. Either everything is determined by how particles interact with each other in your brain, or they are probabilistic due to random occurences. Either way, your character is just the result of physical processes beyond your control.

But beyond the realm of human science, there is the possibility of non-physical factors that can come into play. Spiritual matters are beyond the scope of science, but is the only way I see for free will to exist. IOW, there are unseen forces at work that affect our characters.

I believe God knows all about these things as well. When all factors are taken into account, He can see the end from the beginning.

Is that fixed or open? I'm not sure how the terminology is used, but I would say open and known. Open because we have the ability to affect what will happen to us, and known because God knows all about it.

It's interesting that you would suggest weather here, because the experience of Lorenz regarding weather is probably the best known item that kicked of chaos theory. Here's one account of it: http://pear.math.pitt.edu/mathzilla/Examples/chaos/studentReports/DanielAnderson.html

Van Neumann was interested in using supercomputers as you suggested, but Lorenz' experience sort of killed the idea, changing the whole approach to trying to predict the weather. It showed that the problem was not having enough information, but that small changes in one are can respond in large changes in another. For example, two drops of water can be right next two each other and fall of a waterfall. One drop goes one way, while the other goes another. There are water eddies which exhibit this type of behavior as well. The problem is not one of simply not having enough information.

Daryl, If the future were like a TV rerun, then there could be no risk or danger for God. You can see that, can't you?

This is the compatibilitistic definition. This is not the definition Arminianists use. This is from wikipedia:



The ... represents "Libertarianism" or "Incompatibilistic free will," which is what SDA's have traditionally believed (having come from an Arminian tradition).

The definition I've been using is that ability to do either of more than one mutually exclusive alternatives. For example, the wikipedia articls says "at this moment, one could either continue reading this article if one wanted, or cease." The compatibilistic definition, that you cited, would says that one is able to do what one wishes to do (either read the article, or not, according to what one wishes).

I'm not getting where your question, "What you mean is that people are coerced by God's foreknowledge to do things?" comes from. I wrote the following:



This makes it awfully clear that I couldn't possibly mean "that people are coerced by God's foreknowledge to do things," doesn't it?

Aside from this that I've quoted above, I've also made the point many, many, many times that God's foreknowledge does not cause us to do anything. I've also stated many times that this isn't the issue.

Tom, you said:

Quote:
God knows the end from the beginning not only, or even primarily, because He foresees what will happen, but because He understands the principles involved.

Isn't this determinism?

"Determinism states that the way things will be is a result of how things are and the work of natural laws. That is only to say that if we know exactly how things are at the present moment and the laws that govern how the world (or the universe) works, then we can derive how things will be at some future time."

This is from a wikipedia article on determinism:



I don't believe this is true. This is logically consistent with the idea that the future is like a T.V. rerun, which has been argued by Jonathan Edwards and others. I don't agree with the premise, however. I believe one is able to act different than what has been "programmed." For example, Adam and Lucifer were "programmed" not to sin, yet they chose to sin. This is a mystery, and unexplainable, yet possible because of the reality of free will.

God did not intend or plan for sin to occur, nor did God anything do anything to predispose either Lucifer or Adam to sin, yet they used their free will to sin.

Anyway, to answer your question, determinism doesn't have to do with how one foreknows the future but rather with the question of whether all actions (especially actions of the will) can be explained by previous consequences.

Actually, your question, while interesting, is a bit out of place. You've taken a definition which has to do with physics, but "determinism," in the context I've been using it, has to do with philosophy, which has a different definition for the term than physics uses.

Thomas:If God knows that I will be saved or that I will be lost, that would greatly concern me that if God knows that I will be lost I really cant do or choose anything that would end up in a different end result than in my damnation, or if God knows that I will be saved, I couldnt really do or choose anything that would have a different end result than in my salvation.

Rosangela:God only sees what you will choose, and He died to make this choice possible. It's simple. Choose salvation and you will be saved. Choose it every day and every hour.

But you can't choose to do something which cannot happen! That's Thomas' point! How could Thomas possibly choose to do something different that what God has seen? Thomas may *think* he can choose something different than what God has seen, but he can't, because the logical conclusion is untenable. That is, say God has seen that Thomas will be lost, yet Thomas winds up being saved. Then something God has seen would happen would not have happened, which is not possible. (this whole paragraph is assuming your premise regarding the future, that's it can be seen like a T.V. re-run).

It's as simple as 1, 2, 3.

1)God sees that Thomas will be lost.
2)Everything that God sees will happen, does.
3)Therefore Thomas will be lost.

Thomas may be ignorant regarding his future, ignorantly feeling like he can choose to do either salvation or damnation, but unless you want to open up the possibility of being able to bring into being a reality which is different than what God has foreseen will happen, Thomas cannot do differently than the action that God has foreseen will happen.

Again, I hasten to point out that the problem is not that God has seen what will happen (as if God's seeing what will happen causes it to happen; no one is saying that), but the problem is that there is (supposedly) only one future, and that future is such that if Thomas is lost, then Thomas can do nothing to change that future (just as he can do nothing to change any other future; we can do nothing different than what is known will happen).

The precise description is that small variations in initial conditions result in large variations further along the process. Here's the Wiki:

It seems random because variations in initial conditions are propagated through the system exponentially. But if we eliminate the variations, i.e. measurement errors, the system is deterministic and completely predictable.



There are only 4 forces that are universally accepted: Gravity, Electromagnetic, Weak, and Strong. Gravity between the water and air molecules is too weak in that scenario to make any difference. The Weak and Strong forces work only at subatomic distances. That leaves us with the Electromagnetic force.

Earth's Gravity and Electromagnetic interaction between the water particles and the air particles determine the path of every drop. If we knew the exact positions and momenta of every particle in the system, we could determine where every drop of water will end up. At that scale, there is nothing random about its behavior. It only seems random because we lack information.

Again, the chaos is due to ignorance of initial conditions combined with exponential growth of the error, leading to vague predictions. The article you linked to said as much.

With a slight change to your words, it expresses what I believe at this time: There is (supposedly) only one future, and that future is such that if Thomas is lost, then Thomas will do nothing to change that future.

The key is not Thomas' ability, but his choice. Free will speaks of ability; foreknowledge (in the way I think of it) speaks of choice.

And in either case, my future would be set as if in stone. One theory would be harder on God than the other but none would offer me free will as in "it is my choise to either accept or reject God." Wether I cant do something or I wont do something has implications for some questions, but neither offer me free choise.

Tom, sorry, but I’m not understanding the point you are trying to make. I’m free to obey or disobey God. If God knows that I’m going to disobey Him, what is your contention? That I’ve never really had the alternative to obey Him?

Thomas,

Are temptations real or not? Have you ever felt the force of temptation? If God knows that you will be victorious over temptation, does this mean you didn't have the choice to do wrong? If you didn't have the choice to do wrong, how could you feel the force of temptation? How could there be any real struggle?

Temptations are real, and yes, sometimes they are very persuasive.

You ask: If God knows that you will be victorious over temptation, does this mean you didn't have the choice to do wrong?
-In such a situation as this, if I do wrong, Gods knowledge would prove to be a lie. We dont want to go there do we?

You ask: If you didn't have the choice to do wrong, how could you feel the force of temptation?
-I have heard that a person that is on a drug high can be entierly convinced of things which have no connection to the real world. Pink elephants, having the capacity to fly, fear of being hunted and so on. The Matrix all over again.
But if I do have the choise to do either right or wrong, then this is no problem, is it?

You ask: How could there be any real struggle?
-Indeed, how could there?

If the future is such that only one thing can happen (the thing which will happen, the thing which God sees), then you are not free to do anything different than what will happen. You may *feel* like you are free to make a different choice, but you can't actually do anything different than what is known will happen (this is using the one-threaded future model, which can be seen like a T.V. rerun).

Your "freedom" is really ignorance. You *think* you can do either of A or B, but if it is known with 100% certainty (the fact that God knows what you will do is immaterial; the important point is that it is known, or knowable) that you will do A, then your thinking you might do B or could do B is just ignorance.

The definition you quoted from Webster's was a compabibilistic definition of free will, which basically stated that you are free to do what you choose to do. This definition avoids the logical problem which comes of asserting that free will implies one can actually do either of A or B (not just do the action one wishes to do, but actually do either of several mutually exclusive actions).

What I've been pointing out is that the future-is-like-a-TV-rerun model is not logically consistent with the view of free will SDA's have traditionally held that one is free, not simply to do what one wishes, but to do either of more than one mutually exclusive alternatives (the latter being a stronger definition).

To put it in less technical terms, you come to a road which forks. You can go either right or left. The definition of free will you quoted says you are free to go right if you choose to go right. The definition of free will I've been using (the traditional SDA one) says that you can actually go either right or left.

Now if it is known that you will go left, then you can't go right (not because of a physical constraint, but a logical one). You can't logically do something different than that which is with 100% certainty known will happen.

This doesn't express the logical problem strongly enough. It is not simply that case that Thomas *won't* do something to change the future, but he *can't*.

It's not possible that Thomas could do something different than what God has known for all eternity with 100% certainty will happen, correct?

What passes in Thomas' mind as free will is in reality just ignorance.

I guess that's why I don't see a logical problem. There is none, in my mind.

As I see it, the case is *won't*, not *can't*.



Right. Because the will is the governing power in the nature of man, you cannot do what you will not do. But the inability is not inherent in nature, nor is it dictated by God's foreknowledge; it is determined by Thomas' free will choice.

The way Arnold sees it is exactly how I also see it.

I also see it as "won't" rather than "can't" for the very reason that God sees what he "won't" do, not what he "can't" do.

I also agree. God knows the future like a rerun. Such foreknowledge or hindsight does not rob us of our ability or freedom to choose. God knows in advance what we will or will not do. He is God; He knows the end from the beginning. He inhabits eternity.

Can we do something that God sees won't happen? Logically we can't, correct? (because if we did, then something which God saw would happen wouldn't, which is impossible). So saying that we cannot do something which God see won't happen is logically correct. Changing the word "can't" to "won't" doesn't change the veracity of the assertion. If the assertion is false, please produce a counter example.

This sounds like determinism. If you have time, please take a look at the following: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/edwards/will.ii.v.html

The link to the book is the following (http://www.ccel.org/ccel/edwards/will.toc.html). I took you to a specific spot which deals with the question at hand, since the book is quite long. Anyway, the link I gave above discusses a definition of free will, which is the deterministic one.

I can ask the question this way. Which of the following do you see as defining free will?

a.One is free to do what one pleases.
b.One can do either of more than one mutually exclusive events.

Your statement (quoted above), is sounding like a. to me. If that is the case, then you are correct that there isn't a logical problem. The logical problem comes up if one holds to b. as the definition of free will.

Daryl, if you're reading this, I'd be curious as to your answer to this question as well (i.e., which defines free will, a or b)?

It's not God's knowledge, whatever you wish to call it ("hindsight" is a really weird choice of words for describing a knowledge of the future) which robs us of our ability to do something which He has seen will happen (or happened, I guess, to be consistent with "hindsight"), but our inability to affect the future (or past, if you prefer).

It's not that God *knows* what we will do which causes the problem (take God's foreknowledge of out the picture, and the problem identically remains), but the fact that there is only one possible future which can happen.

I've explained this many, many times to you MM, and have never gotten any indication that you have understood what I'm saying.

But I can. With true free will, a man can do what he would never in a thousand years want to do. As an example, with a very small exception, no people would ever want to jump neck deep into human excrement. Yet we know that in desperate circumstances, people have done exactly that. It was never their will to go swimming in the poop, but they did anyhow.

This is exactly what I was referring to in the Jonathan Edwards link. I should have made this more clear.

This is precisely the point that is in question. Can one only do that which one wills to do? Determinists (or, more accurately, those who believe in compatibilistic free will) say, "yes." Libertarians say, "no."

My answer is "a.One is free to do what one pleases."

God's foreknowledge doesn't affect this answer whatsoever.

That's true, Daryl, but choice a) is not what SDA's have traditionally believed ( that would be choice b) ).

The first quote above addresses the point that Arminian free will is libertarian (or incompatibilistic). Free will is defined as being able to do either of more than one mutually exclusive events.

The second quote addresses that the SDA tradition is Arminian (not Calvinistic). Calvinistic ideas have come into the church in about the last 60 years or so.

Why so much complication? Free will is just freedom of choice, as opposed to coercion. This is a simple definition, and is Ellen White's definition.

"God might have created man without the power to transgress His law; He might have withheld the hand of Adam from touching the forbidden fruit; but in that case man would have been, not a free moral agent, but a mere automation. Without freedom of choice, his obedience would not have been voluntary, but forced. There could have been no development of character. . . . It would have been unworthy of man as an intelligent being, and would have sustained Satan's charge of God's arbitrary rule." {CC 13.3}

"To man alone, the crowning work of His creation, God has given a conscience to realize the sacred claims of the divine law, and a heart capable of loving it as holy, just, and good; and of man prompt and perfect obedience is required. Yet God does not compel him to obey; he is left a free moral agent." {NL 30.1}

Although they didn't like it, this is what they wished to do and chose to do at the moment to achieve the objective they wished to achieve (preserve their lives, or earn money, or whatever). It's opposed to being forced by someone to do that. For instance, you could be forced to do that under hypnosis. Under hypnosis you have no free will - your will is the will of the hypnotist.

So you are saying that a man is unable to choose to do something which he does not wish to do? I disagree, but you knew that of course.

Thomas

As I said, we are free to do that which we do not wish to do.

Rom 7:15 I don't understand what I am doing. For I don't do what I want to do, but instead do what I hate.

Hmm. My post vaporized. I'll try again.



The concept is not at all complicated. There are two main definitions of free will that are most often postulated in regards to theology. The compatibilistic one you are suggesting:

a)Free will is the ability to do what you wish to do.

The incompatibilitistic (or libertarian) one is

b)Free will is the ability to do either of more than one mutually exclusive event.

Iow, as Thomas has been mentioning, the ability to do something you do not wish to do. The libertarian definition asserts that this is possible. The one you are suggesting says it isn't.

Choice b) is the traditional definition used by Arminianists, a) the choice of Calvinists. The reason Calvinists like definition a) is because it is logically compatible with the deterministic view of the future which they hold (which is why it is called "compatibilistic"). Arminianists reject the principles of Calvinism, and proposed a different definition, as in b). Free will, in the view of Arminianists, includes the ability to perform either of mutually exclusive events at a given time.

SDA's come from a Wesleyan tradition, which is Arminian. Calvinistic ideas started coming into the church about 60 years ago. Now while your view is not the traditional SDA view, it is logically consistent with the view of the future which you hold (that it is one-threaded), so it does have that going for it. However neither Ellen White, nor others of our spiritual ancestors, held the view you are suggesting. This is perhaps most easily seen in their conviction that we can hasten or delay Christ's coming, a conviction which is logically impossible given the single-threaded idea of the future.

Thomas,

Before his conversion, man is indeed a slave of Satan. But he still can choose to be free in Christ.

Rom 8:2 For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has made me free from the law of sin and death

There must be something wrong with your definitions. First, most choices, if not all, presuppose mutually exclusive events. You cannot go and not go to the beach at the same time. Second, every day we do things we do not wish to do – beginning with getting up instead of staying in bed. So how can a distinction between two definitions of free choice be based on elements like these, which are present in most choices?
The best definition is Ellen White’s definition – free choice is the power to choose without being coerced.

First of all, regarding what Ellen White wrote, not being coerced is a necessary but not sufficient condition for what free will means from an Armenian perspective. That is, everyone on both sides of the question agrees that free will involves the will not being coerced. The difference of opinion is regarding whether or not it involves actually being able to do either of more than one mutually exclusive event. More on this later.

Regarding the word "wish," or "desire," or "will," the meaning of this word has to do with what one chooses to do, not with one's tastes. Your previous posts were using the word correctly (in the context of this discussion). I used the word in the same way you were using it (before).

Ok, here's an example of the point. Let's use your beach example. If one defines free will in the compatibilistic was (i.e. you are free to do what you wish to do; remember "wish" = "choose") then it does not necessarily follow, under this definition, that you can either go to the beach or not. God could see that you would not want to go to the beach (because He knows it's going to rain, or whatever), and knows with 100% certainty that you will not go to the beach. Now if God knows with 100% certainty that you will not go to the beach, then you are not going to the beach. That will not happen. It can't. It's impossible. Nothing that God knows with 100% will happen will not happen. However, this is not a logical problem under the compatibilistic definition. In fact, it's called "compatibilistic" precisely because it's not a logical problem. As long as you are able to do that which you choose to do, as is well. No logical problems. This is the Calvinistic definition, and, as I've pointed out many times, is logically consistent.

The liberatarian, or incompatibilistic condition, is a stronger condition than the compatibilistic one. The compatibilistic definition is necessary, under the libertarian one, but not sufficient. It requires all that the compatibilistic one requires, and more besides. It requires that you are actually able to either go to the beach or not go to the beach. This definition is logically inconsistent with the view of the future which you hold. This definition is the traditional Armenian definition (SDA's come from a Wesleyan/Armenian tradition) which is why I started my post on this subject, on whichever thread this was, asking if everyone agreed with the definition.

You have probably heard the story of two preachers exchanging pulpits. They met midway in their buggies, and one said,

- The Lord knew from the beginning that we would exchange pulpits today.

- To prove that he didn't I'm turning around to preach in my own church today.

Did they prove anything?

No, it didn't prove a thing, for the Lord knew that he would end up preaching in his own church today.

I might be very dense because I don't see the distinction. I'm leaning toward All of the above.

When the alarm clock goes off, I can either leave it on or turn it off - two mutually exlusive events. And I'm free to do whichever one I want to do. It looks like both A and B happen to me everyday.

If you are forced to do that which is against your will, then that is not free will. That is enslaved will.

The poop swimmer, if he truly has free will, has chosen to jump in because the alternatives were worse (e.g. decapitation, castration, eye-gouging, dismemberment, ...). If I was looking at those options, I would willingly and gladly hop in the poop. You want backstroke? Breaststroke? I'd even learn to do the butterfly on the spot, if that's what I needed to do.

That's free will. It includes the option of changing one's choice under varying circumstances.

Maybe this is where the problem is. You've transposed the cause and the effect.

Here's how I see it: If you are not going to the beach (for whatever reason), then God knows with 100% certainty that you will not go to the beach. And the fact that God knows those reasons long before you do is irrelevant to your ability to choose between the two mutually exclusive actions.

The cause and effect is only logical. Here's the order of things:

a.The future is single-threaded (only one possible future, which can be seen like a T.V. rerun).
b.Rosangela will go to the beach, because that's what the single-threaded future shows.

The fact that God knows what this will be is irrelevant. What's important is that it is knowable. That is, there exists a future , which can be seen like a T.V. rerun, wherein Rosangela goes to the beach. Therefore, it is certain that Rosangela will go to the beach. Therefore Rosangela will go to the beach.

Whatever reasons Rosangela has for going or not going don't matter, and neither does the fact that God knows what she will do. The logical difficult arises when one makes the assumption that the nature of the future is such that it can be known like a T.V. rerun (i.e., seen in a single-threaded way).

The problem is an ontological one, having to do with the future, not an epistemological one dealing with God's knowledge.

If one accepts the compatibilistic definition of free will, that one is free to do what one chooses to do, this avoids the logical contradiction that arises with the single-threaded view of the future. If one accepts the libertarian definition, however (i.e. it's possible for Rosangela to either go to the beach or not), then there is a logical problem. She cannot logically do something which she certainly will not do.

Just a quickie.

knowable future != single=threaded

That seems to be the crux. Do you agree?

When I said "knowable," I meant knowable in a single-threaded way, like a T.V. rerun. I don't believe that's possible (because that's not reality). However, I certainly believe the future is knowable. (as it really is, like a web vs. single-threaded)

TE: ... ("hindsight" is a really weird choice of words for describing a knowledge of the future) ...

MM: God knows the end fom the beginning.

TE: It's not that God *knows* what we will do which causes the problem ...

MM: I agree. It's not a problem.

TE: ... (take God's foreknowledge of out the picture, and the problem identically remains), ...

MM: I disagree. We wouldn't be having this discussion were it not for God's ability to know the future like a rerun.

TE: ... but the fact that there is only one possible future which can happen.

MM: The future is in the hands of God. That's why He can prophesy what people will do in the future.

TE: I've explained this many, many times to you MM, and have never gotten any indication that you have understood what I'm saying.

MM: I understand what you're saying, but I do not have a problem with God knowing what we will do before we do it. I trust God.

Your response makes me wonder if you really have understood what I'm saying, since there's nothing in what I've said which would negatively impact trusting in God. So if you wouldn't mind, could you put in your own words what you understand my position to be?

Thank you.

TE: ... ("hindsight" is a really weird choice of words for describing a knowledge of the future) ...

MM: God knows the end from the beginning.

That's not what "hindsight" means.

TE: It's not that God *knows* what we will do which causes the problem ...

MM: I agree. It's not a problem.

There is a logical problem involved in your view, if you hold to the incompatibilistic idea of free will, which is that one can do either of more than one mutually exclusive events. If one uses the definition which you suggested, being able to do what you choose to do, then there isn't a logical problem.

The logical problem which exists is not epistemological, but ontological. That is, the logical problem does not arise because of God's foreknowledge, but because of the nature of the future (its being single-threaded).

TE: ... (take God's foreknowledge of out the picture, and the problem identically remains), ...

MM: I disagree. We wouldn't be having this discussion were it not for God's ability to know the future like a rerun.

Again, the problem is ontological, not epistemological.

TE: ... but the fact that there is only one possible future which can happen.

MM: The future is in the hands of God. That's why He can prophesy what people will do in the future.

If the future were *only* in the hands of God, then it would be single-threaded (or, at least, it could be). However, God has shared the ability to be self-determining with His creatures (at least the sentient ones), so that the future is not only in God's hands. The existence of sin is testimony of this.

TE: So if you wouldn't mind, could you put in your own words what you understand my position to be?

MM: You believe God knows all of the possible outcomes, but that He doesn't know precisely which one will play out.

That was succinct! Not bad. I would not put it in terms that God doesn't know something however. That makes it sound as if God is somehow deficient. Which possibility will play out hasn't been determined by the self-determining creatures which God created.

God knows everything which is knowable. That's what omniscience is; to know all things which can be known, similar to omnipotence means to be able to do anything which can be done.

Some things cannot be done. For example, God cannot force anyone to love Him, but He is still omnipotent.

Assuming the future were as you think it is, a single-threaded thing like a T.V. rerun, why do you think God would have created Lucifer to sin instead of not to sin (i.e., create a different Lucifer who wouldn't sin)? How does the fact that God, in effect, created sin make God look good? (You recognize that God did in fact do this by calling Him the "author of sin").

If God cannot know the future because it is not knowable, how, then, can He foretell the future like a rerun?

God is indirectly the author of sin. You know what I mean, don't you? Or, do you think I believe God causes FMAs to sin? If you do, then you are seriously wrong. At any rate, why God created Lucifer and Adam in spite of the fact He knew they would choose to sin is not clear in the Bible or the SOP. Here is how Sister White answered it - "... for the Lord would establish His throne in righteousness."

AG 129
The purpose and plan of grace existed from all eternity. Before the foundation of the world it was according to the determinate counsel of God that man should be created, endowed with power to do the divine will. But the defection of man, with all its consequences, was not hidden from the Omnipotent, and yet it did not deter Him from carrying out His eternal purpose; for the Lord would establish His throne in righteousness. God knows the end from the beginning. . . . Therefore redemption was not an afterthought . . . but an eternal purpose to be wrought out for the blessing not only of this atom of a world but for the good of all the worlds which God has created. {AG 129.2}

As I've pointed out many times, God does know the future. He knows it perfectly, as I've pointed out many times. As I've pointed out many times, God knows the future as it is. God cannot know the future in some way it is not. If the future is not single-thread, then God cannot know it as single-threaded. The issue is not epistemological (having to do with God's knowledge of the future), but ontological (having to do with the nature of the future; is it single-threaded or multi-threaded).

Does that help, MM?

Regarding God being the author of sin, you wrote:

What do you think the following means? "God is responsible for creating a situation where sin and death was inevitable."

TE: As I've pointed out many times, God knows the future as it is. God cannot know the future in some way it is not.

MM: The "nature" of the future, in God's case, is like a rerun. That's why He can tell us precisely what will happen before it happens. You believe God cannot know the future like a rerun. Therefore, you cannot believe God knows precisely what will happen before it happens.

What do you think the following means? "God is responsible for creating a situation where sin and death was inevitable."

Sin and death were inevitable, because God created a situation where such must come to pass. God is responsible for creating this situation.

TE: As I've pointed out many times, God knows the future as it is. God cannot know the future in some way it is not.

MM: The "nature" of the future, in God's case, is like a rerun.

The "case" doesn't matter. That is, either the future is single-threaded, and can be seen like a T.V. re-run, or it isn't. The nature of the future does not change because of one's ability to see it or not see it. It is what it is. Ignorance of truth does not change the reality of truth.

The future is precisely as God sees it to be. God perceives reality as it is. If the future were single-threaded, God would see it that way. If it's multi-threaded, then God sees it that way.

That's why He can tell us precisely what will happen before it happens.

The future could be mult-threaded, God can see that, and tell us precisely what will happen. God is not dependent upon the future being single-threaded in order to tell us about it.

You believe God cannot know the future like a rerun.

Because that's not the way the future is. Just like God cannot know a square to be a triangle.

Therefore, you cannot believe God knows precisely what will happen before it happens.

Suppose I play a note for you on the piano, and you say, "That's an A". I could say, "You must have perfect pitch. That's the only way you could know that's an A." But there are other possibilities. Maybe you saw the note I played. Maybe you were just singing a note, and knew what that note was, and could compare it to the note you were singing, and deduce what note I played.

You're assuming that the only way that God could know the future is if it were like a T.V. rerun. God is not limited in that way. The future can be more complicated than that, and God can *still* know what it is like. He is not dependent upon the future being single-threaded in order to be able to see it.

TE: Sin and death were inevitable, because God created a situation where such must come to pass. God is responsible for creating this situation.

MM: Why “must”? It implies an untruth. I assume you believe sinning and dying were impossible before God created FMAs. Thus, I also assume you believe God understood that both were at least possible after He created FMAs. In fact, He had a backup plan in place to deal with sin and death should it arise.

TE: As I've pointed out many times, God knows the future as it is. God cannot know the future in some way it is not.

MM: The "nature" of the future, in God's case, is like a rerun.

TE: The "case" doesn't matter. That is, either the future is single-threaded, and can be seen like a T.V. re-run, or it isn't.

MM: If God were a mere man, like you and me, then I would agree. But because God is God He sees the future like a rerun. Divine foreknowledge in no way means the future is set in stone and that FMAs are nothing more than mere automatons.

………………………

MM: That's why He can tell us precisely what will happen before it happens.

TE: The future could be mult-threaded, God can see that, and tell us precisely what will happen. God is not dependent upon the future being single-threaded in order to tell us about it.

MM: But that’s not what He does, is it? Instead, God tells us precisely what will happen before it happens. He doesn’t tells us “Now, this or that could happen.”

………………………..

MM: You believe God cannot know the future like a rerun.

TE: Because that's not the way the future is. Just like God cannot know a square to be a triangle.

MM: Again, if God were a mere man, then I would agree. But God is God, therefore, He sees the future like a rerun. In so saying, I am talking about God, not necessarily the future. God is not bound by time and space. You believe God can be everywhere at the same time, therefore, you should have no problem believing He knows the future like a rerun.

……………………….

MM: Therefore, you cannot believe God knows precisely what will happen before it happens.

TE: You're assuming that the only way that God could know the future is if it were like a T.V. rerun. God is not limited in that way. The future can be more complicated than that, and God can *still* know what it is like. He is not dependent upon the future being single-threaded in order to be able to see it.

MM: God sees the future like a rerun, therefore, He can tell us precisely what will happen before it happens. In fact, from God’s perspective it has already happened. In this sense, hindsight and foreknowledge are one and the same things.

For God, the past and the future are similar. He also experiences it with us according to our time and space continuum. God sees the future exactly the way it will play out, not as a series of limitless options and possibilities. Unconditional prophecy is proof that God knows exactly how things will play out.

TE: Sin and death were inevitable, because God created a situation where such must come to pass. God is responsible for creating this situation.

MM: Why “must”? It implies an untruth.

You wrote that sin and death were inevitable. To say that something is inevitable, and to say it must happen is to say the same thing in other words. I agree this implies an untruth.

I assume you believe sinning and dying were impossible before God created FMAs. Thus, I also assume you believe God understood that both were at least possible after He created FMAs. In fact, He had a backup plan in place to deal with sin and death should it arise.

Yes, I agree with this.

TE: As I've pointed out many times, God knows the future as it is. God cannot know the future in some way it is not.

MM: The "nature" of the future, in God's case, is like a rerun.

TE: The "case" doesn't matter. That is, either the future is single-threaded, and can be seen like a T.V. re-run, or it isn't.

MM: If God were a mere man, like you and me, then I would agree. But because God is God He sees the future like a rerun. Divine foreknowledge in no way means the future is set in stone and that FMAs are nothing more than mere automatons.

MM, do you understand the difference bewteen epistemological and ontological? You keep making epsitemological arguments, and I keep explaining the problem is ontological, but you don't seem to be getting this. In short, God's knowledge of the future doesn't change its essence or nature. The future has a manner of existing, a way of being, an essence, a nature, which is independent of anyone's knowledge of it. Do you understand this concept?

………………………

MM: That's why He can tell us precisely what will happen before it happens.

TE: The future could be mult-threaded, God can see that, and tell us precisely what will happen. God is not dependent upon the future being single-threaded in order to tell us about it.

MM: But that’s not what He does, is it? Instead, God tells us precisely what will happen before it happens. He doesn’t tells us “Now, this or that could happen.”

He does present alternatives. For example, with Moses He said, perhaps they will believe when they see this sign, but if not, do this one next. With the Israelites He presented them with two possibilities, one if they obeyed, and one if they didn't. When they wanted a king, He told them what would happen if they took a king, or if they didn't. When they complained that they couldn't change things once God had issued a prophecy, God explained to them that He was like a potter and they like the pot, and that He chould change what He was going to do, and the prophecy did not need to occur, if they changed their behavior. The Bible is filled with examples like this.
………………………..

MM: You believe God cannot know the future like a rerun.

TE: Because that's not the way the future is. Just like God cannot know a square to be a triangle.

MM: Again, if God were a mere man, then I would agree.

If God were a man, you would agree that the future is not single-threaded. But since God is not a man, you believe the future is different than it would be if He were not a man. That doesn't really make sense, does it? The way a thing is seen doesn't change its essence, does it?

For example, before quantum mechanics, atoms were understood differently than they are now. But what atoms are like didn't change because some property about them was discovered. Things are the way they are, regardless of what we know about them.

But God is God, therefore, He sees the future like a rerun.

This isn't good logic. Good logic would be, "But God is God, therefore, He sees the future as it is in reality." God can only see the future like a rerun if it really is like a rerun. God perceives things as they are in reality.

In so saying, I am talking about God, not necessarily the future. God is not bound by time and space. You believe God can be everywhere at the same time, therefore, you should have no problem believing He knows the future like a rerun.

I could believe that if the future really were like a rerun. I believe God sees the future as it really is.

……………………….

MM: Therefore, you cannot believe God knows precisely what will happen before it happens.

TE: You're assuming that the only way that God could know the future is if it were like a T.V. rerun. God is not limited in that way. The future can be more complicated than that, and God can *still* know what it is like. He is not dependent upon the future being single-threaded in order to be able to see it.

MM: God sees the future like a rerun, therefore, He can tell us precisely what will happen before it happens. In fact, from God’s perspective it has already happened. In this sense, hindsight and foreknowledge are one and the same things.

For God, the past and the future are similar. He also experiences it with us according to our time and space continuum. God sees the future exactly the way it will play out, not as a series of limitless options and possibilities. Unconditional prophecy is proof that God knows exactly how things will play out.

If the future were like a rerun, then He could not have told us that He sent His Son at the risk of failure and eternal loss. He could not have told us that all heaven was imperiled for our redemption. This just doesn't make any sense. You have made no attempt to make any sense out of this. All you've done is suggest that words like "risk," must mean something different than they normally mean. This tack would allow one to reinterpret any inspired statement. We just interpret words like "sin," "repent," "risk," whatever disagrees with our believe to have some other meaning which does agree with our belief.

You really don't see a problem with this approach?

TE: You wrote that sin and death were inevitable. To say that something is inevitable, and to say it must happen is to say the same thing in other words. I agree this implies an untruth.

MM: The word “must” implies more than inevitable. I would use the word “will” in the place of “must”. God foresaw the fall of Lucifer and Adam but it did not deter Him from carrying out His eternal purpose.

DA 22
From the beginning, God and Christ knew of the apostasy of Satan, and of the fall of man through the deceptive power of the apostate. God did not ordain that sin should exist, but He foresaw its existence, and made provision to meet the terrible emergency. {DA 22.2}

AG 129
But the defection of man, with all its consequences, was not hidden from the Omnipotent, and yet it did not deter Him from carrying out His eternal purpose; for the Lord would establish His throne in righteousness. God knows the end from the beginning. {AG 129.2}

TE: “In fact, He had a backup plan in place to deal with sin and death should it arise.” Yes, I agree with this.

MM: But that’s not how Sister White describes it. Instead, she wrote, “He foresaw its existence, and made provision to meet the terrible emergency.” She even wrote, “…yet it did not deter Him from carrying out His eternal purpose.” Her meaning is clear; God knew Lucifer and Adam would sin die before He created them, but He chose to create them anyhow. There is nothing uncertain about it. God did not create them hoping they would not sin and die. He knew perfectly well that they would sin and die.

TE: MM, do you understand the difference bewteen epistemological and ontological? You keep making epsitemological arguments, and I keep explaining the problem is ontological, but you don't seem to be getting this. In short, God's knowledge of the future doesn't change its essence or nature. The future has a manner of existing, a way of being, an essence, a nature, which is independent of anyone's knowledge of it. Do you understand this concept?

MM: The future is only the “future” from our perspective. From God’s perspective the future is also the past. So when we talk about God’s foreknowledge of the future we’re actually talking about the past and not necessarily the future. As such, the essence of the future is not compromised. From our perspective, the future is what it is.

TE: “God tells us precisely what will happen before it happens. He doesn’t tells us ‘Now, this or that could happen.’” He does present alternatives. For example, with Moses He said, perhaps they will believe when they see this sign, but if not, do this one next. With the Israelites He presented them with two possibilities, one if they obeyed, and one if they didn't. When they wanted a king, He told them what would happen if they took a king, or if they didn't. When they complained that they couldn't change things once God had issued a prophecy, God explained to them that He was like a potter and they like the pot, and that He chould change what He was going to do, and the prophecy did not need to occur, if they changed their behavior. The Bible is filled with examples like this.

MM: None of the examples you provided prove God did not know in advance exactly how things would play out. Telling them the outcomes of different decisions does not imply God was not sure how things would turn out. He knew precisely what would happen before it happened. Even in the case of Nineveh, God knew exactly how they would respond, which is why He worded things the way He did. It had the desired effect.

TE: “But God is God, therefore, He sees the future like a rerun.” This isn't good logic. Good logic would be, "But God is God, therefore, He sees the future as it is in reality." God can only see the future like a rerun if it really is like a rerun. God perceives things as they are in reality.

MM: Again, since God has already watched the future play out, He knows the future like the past. Thus, from God’s perspective the future and the past are essentially the same. In reality, then, we are talking about the past and not the future.

TE: If the future were like a rerun, then He could not have told us that He sent His Son at the risk of failure and eternal loss. He could not have told us that all heaven was imperiled for our redemption. This just doesn't make any sense. You have made no attempt to make any sense out of this. All you've done is suggest that words like "risk," must mean something different than they normally mean.

MM: Tom, I believe you are misapplying the “risk” concept Sister White employed. You keep insisting that “risk” emphatically means God does not know in advance exactly how things will play out. You do this in spite of the fact Sister White does not. You justify yourself by insisting it is a logical conclusion.

But in light of the fact the Bible and the SOP nowhere teaches God does not know in advance how things will play out is positive proof against your “logical” conclusion. Logic is no match for the truth. The absence of plain statements teaching that God does not know in advance how things will lay out speaks loudly against your “logical” conclusion. You do not have a leg to stand on if all you have is “logical” conclusions. You need a plain Thus saith the Lord.

TE: You wrote that sin and death were inevitable. To say that something is inevitable, and to say it must happen is to say the same thing in other words. I agree this implies an untruth.

MM: The word “must” implies more than inevitable. I would use the word “will” in the place of “must”. God foresaw the fall of Lucifer and Adam but it did not deter Him from carrying out His eternal purpose.

Inevitable means "incapable of being avoided or evaded" (Webster). So let me put it this way. Sin and death we something incapable of being avoided or evaded. God (according to you) was responsible for creating this situation.

DA 22
From the beginning, God and Christ knew of the apostasy of Satan, and of the fall of man through the deceptive power of the apostate. God did not ordain that sin should exist, but He foresaw its existence, and made provision to meet the terrible emergency. {DA 22.2}

AG 129
But the defection of man, with all its consequences, was not hidden from the Omnipotent, and yet it did not deter Him from carrying out His eternal purpose; for the Lord would establish His throne in righteousness. God knows the end from the beginning. {AG 129.2}

TE: “In fact, He had a backup plan in place to deal with sin and death should it arise.” Yes, I agree with this.

MM: But that’s not how Sister White describes it. Instead, she wrote, “He foresaw its existence, and made provision to meet the terrible emergency.” She even wrote, “…yet it did not deter Him from carrying out His eternal purpose.” Her meaning is clear; God knew Lucifer and Adam would sin die before He created them, but He chose to create them anyhow. There is nothing uncertain about it. God did not create them hoping they would not sin and die. He knew perfectly well that they would sin and die.

MM, you can't just cherry pick quotes. To know the truth regarding a certain subject, ALL the quotes need to be taken into account. She tells us that Christ took the risk of failure and eternal loss. She tells us that Christ risked all, that all heaven was imperiled for our redemption. When Waggoner said that Christ could not have failed, she corrected him. She wrote that Christ "could have sinned. He could have fallen." You need to take these statements into account when interpreting the DA quote or any other quotes.

TE: MM, do you understand the difference between epistemological and ontological? You keep making epistemological arguments, and I keep explaining the problem is ontological, but you don't seem to be getting this. In short, God's knowledge of the future doesn't change its essence or nature. The future has a manner of existing, a way of being, an essence, a nature, which is independent of anyone's knowledge of it. Do you understand this concept?

MM: The future is only the “future” from our perspective. From God’s perspective the future is also the past. So when we talk about God’s foreknowledge of the future we’re actually talking about the past and not necessarily the future. As such, the essence of the future is not compromised. From our perspective, the future is what it is.

It sounds like the answer is "no," you don't understand the concept. It seems like we're spinning our wheels here. I've tried explaining it; I don't know what else to say. The basic point is that one's perspective of a thing does not change the essence of it.

TE: “God tells us precisely what will happen before it happens. He doesn’t tells us ‘Now, this or that could happen.’” He does present alternatives. For example, with Moses He said, perhaps they will believe when they see this sign, but if not, do this one next. With the Israelites He presented them with two possibilities, one if they obeyed, and one if they didn't. When they wanted a king, He told them what would happen if they took a king, or if they didn't. When they complained that they couldn't change things once God had issued a prophecy, God explained to them that He was like a potter and they like the pot, and that He chould change what He was going to do, and the prophecy did not need to occur, if they changed their behavior. The Bible is filled with examples like this.

MM: None of the examples you provided prove God did not know in advance exactly how things would play out.

MM, you wrote, "He doesn’t tells us, 'Now, this or that could happen.'” I provided many example to disprove your assertion. Now you're making some other assertion. Why not recognize that your original assertion was false? *Then* go on an make some other assertion.

Telling them the outcomes of different decisions does not imply God was not sure how things would turn out. He knew precisely what would happen before it happened. Even in the case of Nineveh, God knew exactly how they would respond, which is why He worded things the way He did. It had the desired effect.

TE: “But God is God, therefore, He sees the future like a rerun.” This isn't good logic. Good logic would be, "But God is God, therefore, He sees the future as it is in reality." God can only see the future like a rerun if it really is like a rerun. God perceives things as they are in reality.

MM: Again, since God has already watched the future play out, He knows the future like the past. Thus, from God’s perspective the future and the past are essentially the same. In reality, then, we are talking about the past and not the future.

Again, one's perspective of a thing does not change the thing itself.

TE: If the future were like a rerun, then He could not have told us that He sent His Son at the risk of failure and eternal loss. He could not have told us that all heaven was imperiled for our redemption. This just doesn't make any sense. You have made no attempt to make any sense out of this. All you've done is suggest that words like "risk," must mean something different than they normally mean.

MM: Tom, I believe you are misapplying the “risk” concept Sister White employed. You keep insisting that “risk” emphatically means God does not know in advance exactly how things will play out. You do this in spite of the fact Sister White does not. You justify yourself by insisting it is a logical conclusion.

But in light of the fact the Bible and the SOP nowhere teaches God does not know in advance how things will play out is positive proof against your “logical” conclusion. Logic is no match for the truth. The absence of plain statements teaching that God does not know in advance how things will lay out speaks loudly against your “logical” conclusion. You do not have a leg to stand on if all you have is “logical” conclusions. You need a plain Thus saith the Lord.

MM, if you don't understand what "risk" means, just look it up! Here: (Webster)

1 : possibility of loss or injury : PERIL
2 : someone or something that creates or suggests a hazard
3 a : the chance of loss or the perils to the subject matter of an insurance contract; also : the degree of probability of such loss b : a person or thing that is a specified hazard to an insurer <a poor risk for insurance> c : an insurance hazard from a specified cause or source <war risk>
4 : the chance that an investment (as a stock or commodity) will lose value

Tom,

Even if I know that I will jump into the water to save someone and will not be drowned, my risk in jumping is defined by how near I was to being drowned, how close I was to dying, how desperately I fought with the water. You can speak all you want that because I knew I wouldn’t die I took no risk in jumping, I faced no peril, but my close call with death tells a different story.

None of the things you are suggesting define risk. Risk is defined by one thing alone, which is probability. If the probability of loss is zero, then the risk is zero. That is the meaning of risk.

Interesting. The first definition of Webster is PERIL.

Here's what I see:

This is from Oxford, for "danger"



Both risk and peril involve the possibility of harm or loss.

Here's peril:



All of these definitions are bringing out the same thing: without a possibility of loss, or harm, there is no risk, danger, or peril.

In financial markets there are penalties for inside trading, because of the unfair mitigation of risk that takes place. Insurance, and other financial instruments, are founded on probabilities of risk.

If the probability of success were 100%, you wouldn't have risk; you'd have certainty.

TE: Inevitable means "incapable of being avoided or evaded" (Webster). So let me put it this way. Sin and death we something incapable of being avoided or evaded. God (according to you) was responsible for creating this situation.

MM: Again, God foresaw the fall of Lucifer and Adam and yet it did not deter Him from carrying out His eternal purpose. She does not say, as you believe, that God foresaw the possibility of Lucifer and Adam sinning. Her wording is too clear to misunderstand.

DA 22
From the beginning, God and Christ knew of the apostasy of Satan, and of the fall of man through the deceptive power of the apostate. God did not ordain that sin should exist, but He foresaw its existence, and made provision to meet the terrible emergency. {DA 22.2}

AG 129
But the defection of man, with all its consequences, was not hidden from the Omnipotent, and yet it did not deter Him from carrying out His eternal purpose; for the Lord would establish His throne in righteousness. God knows the end from the beginning. {AG 129.2}

TE: MM, you can't just cherry pick quotes. To know the truth regarding a certain subject, ALL the quotes need to be taken into account. She tells us that Christ took the risk of failure and eternal loss. She tells us that Christ risked all, that all heaven was imperiled for our redemption. When Waggoner said that Christ could not have failed, she corrected him. She wrote that Christ "could have sinned. He could have fallen." You need to take these statements into account when interpreting the DA quote or any other quotes.

MM: Tom, you are mismatching quotes. The risk concept she introduced has nothing to do with God’s foreknowledge. You are comparing apples and oranges. You are forcing her risk concept to mean something it doesn’t.

TE: The basic point is that one's perspective of a thing does not change the essence of it.

MM: I agree. But God’s knowledge of the future is based on His ability to know the future like the past, like a rerun. He “inhabits eternity”. The future and the past for God are essentially one and the same thing. You are right, His perspective does not change the future, not any more than your perspective of the past changes the past.

God is not bound by time and space in the same way we are. He can jump ahead and look back on the future. He has already watched it play out. Do you see how this does not alter the nature or the essence of the future as we know it, as we experience it?

From our point of view the future is unknown. It hasn’t happened yet. Our lack of knowledge does nothing to change the nature or essence of the future. As such, the essence of the future is that it is unknown. It is nothing, it hasn’t happened yet, it doesn’t exist. It is a blank page. That’s its nature, its essence.

But from God’s point of view the future has already happened. From His point of view we are talking about the past, not the future. Thus, your concerns about the essence of the future do not apply. Why? Because we are talking about the past, not the future. From God’s point of view the “future” as we know it is known, it has happened already, it has an existence, it is not a blank page, therefore, it is not the “future” as we know it.

TE: MM, you wrote, "He doesn’t tells us, 'Now, this or that could happen.'” I provided many example to disprove your assertion. Now you're making some other assertion. Why not recognize that your original assertion was false? *Then* go on an make some other assertion.

MM: Telling them the outcomes of different decisions does not imply God was not sure how things would turn out. He knew precisely what would happen before it happened. Even in the case of Nineveh, God knew exactly how they would respond, which is why He worded things the way He did. It had the desired effect.

TE: “Thus, from God’s perspective the future and the past are essentially the same. In reality, then, we are talking about the past and not the future.” Again, one's perspective of a thing does not change the thing itself.

MM: I agree. But in God’s case, from His point of view, we are not talking about the future. Instead, we are talking about the past, what God has already watched happen and play out.

TE: MM, if you don't understand what "risk" means, just look it up! Here: (Webster)

MM: Webster’s definition of “risk” does not prove that Sister White introduced the concept of risk to prove or to imply God does not know in advance precisely what will happen. Just because God knew Jesus would succeed on the cross it does not mean the “risk” Jesus took wasn’t real. But Jesus never came close to failing. “…but not for one moment was there in Him an evil propensity.” (FLB 49)

The fact Jesus never came close to failing indicates that although the risk was real it never truly posed a threat. It didn’t cause anyone in heaven to wring their hands hoping Jesus wouldn’t fail. It wasn’t a cliffhanger. Again, Jesus didn’t barely succeed. He didn’t succeed by a narrow margin. In fact, there is nothing to suggest that He almost failed. Jesus succeeded with flying colors, which proves that although the risk was real it never threatened to unseat Him, it never had a chance against Him.

TE: Inevitable means "incapable of being avoided or evaded" (Webster). So let me put it this way. Sin and death we something incapable of being avoided or evaded. God (according to you) was responsible for creating this situation.

MM: Again, God foresaw the fall of Lucifer and Adam and yet it did not deter Him from carrying out His eternal purpose. She does not say, as you believe, that God foresaw the possibility of Lucifer and Adam sinning. Her wording is too clear to misunderstand.

This just makes it worse! You are claiming that God foresaw with certainty that Lucifer would certainly sin. Yet God, who was under no duress, chose to create Lucifer anyway, when He could have chosen not to, thus preventing sin from existing. So, by this theory of yours, sin came into being because of the free will act of God to create a being who would certainly sin.

MM: Tom, you are mismatching quotes. The risk concept she introduced has nothing to do with God’s foreknowledge.

This is just simple logic, MM. When I commented earlier that God's foreseeing something would happen meant this it was 100% certain to happen, you said, "Amen!". Now if something is certain to happen, there can be no risk that it will not happen. So if Ellen White's statement is true, that God sent His Son at the risk of failure and eternal loss (a "more fearful risk" she calls it), or if her statement that "heaven itself was imperiled," then you idea simply cannot be true.

Under you way of seeing things, it cannot be the case that heaven was under any danger whatsoever. I do not see how you could possible believe this was the case (that heaven was in danger). Right?

If not (that is, you believe heaven was in danger), what danger was it in?

You're contradicting yourself here. On the one hand, you agree with me that one's knowledge of a thing does not change its essence. But on the other, you assert:

a)The future is unknown. That is its essence.
b)The future is nothing.
c)The future is just like the past.
d)It is not a blank page.

a) and b) are from our perspective. c) and d) are from God's. So on the one hand, you agree with me that the essence of the future does not change because of one's knowledge of it, but on the other, the future is completely different, even its essence, depending upon one's perspective of it.

TE: MM, you wrote, "He doesn’t tells us, 'Now, this or that could happen.'” I provided many example to disprove your assertion. Now you're making some other assertion. Why not recognize that your original assertion was false? *Then* go on an make some other assertion.

MM: Telling them the outcomes of different decisions does not imply God was not sure how things would turn out. He knew precisely what would happen before it happened. Even in the case of Nineveh, God knew exactly how they would respond, which is why He worded things the way He did. It had the desired effect.

All I can do here is to repeat myself. The assertion I refuted was the following:



I refuted this by showing you examples which disproved your assertion. I have requested that rather than move on to some other point, that you recognize your assertion was false. Rather than do this, you chose to move on to some other point.

So I will once again request that you recognize your assertion was false. *Then* you can move on to some other point.

The very words danger or peril also refer to the degree of threat to which one is exposed. You are considering just the possibility of a certain final result to occur. When I jumped into the water I was exposed to danger and peril. My life was threatened, although the final result of death did not occur.

“…this theory of yours …” What do you mean? Have you never read the following quotes? Obviously it is not my theory.

DA 22
From the beginning, God and Christ knew of the apostasy of Satan, and of the fall of man through the deceptive power of the apostate. God did not ordain that sin should exist, but He foresaw its existence, and made provision to meet the terrible emergency. {DA 22.2}

AG 129
But the defection of man, with all its consequences, was not hidden from the Omnipotent, and yet it did not deter Him from carrying out His eternal purpose; for the Lord would establish His throne in righteousness. God knows the end from the beginning. {AG 129.2}


Let’s look at it from a different angle. God knows the end from beginning. For example, He knows the USA is going to influence the rest of the world to enforce resting on Sunday and working on Saturday. He knows there will be many martyrs. But after probation closes He knows none of the 144,000 is going to die. Does God's foreknowledge of their success mean there is no risk, no peril, no danger?


But we’re not talking about the future. We are talking about the past. When God tells us what is going to happen, He is telling what has already happened. He jumped ahead in time and watched it play out. He is simply reporting on the past. Do you see the difference?


That’s not what I meant. What I meant was – God does not tells us, “This or that could happen, but I cannot say ahead of time exactly how it will play out because, frankly, I do not know." Do you see the difference?


Do you see what I mean?

Tom,

You seem to thrive on the "risk" aspect of the EGW quotes, but ignore the clear "alike" in reference to the past, present, and future in the following quote:


Why is that, Tom?

I would call that selective quoting in which you ignore one quote in favour of the other as it goes contrary to your belief system.

It seems that we have more than one topic in which the same thing is being discussed, which is why I repeated my previous post here.

I am not sure how we can get around this duplication, however, until I do, it seems we will need to live with it.

If there was no possibility of harm, you were in no danger. The degree of threat would be none. You were only exposed to danger and peril if there was some possibility of an unsuccessful outcome.

Daryl, I don't see anything in the quote which goes against my belief system. I am considering all the quotes. For example, consider the following quote:



Here is see that God sent His Son at a risk, which is compared to the risk that a human father feels for his son. The risk that God took is described as "a more fearful risk."

This seems to clear to me, that I must take it into account when considering every other comment she made on the subject. Elsewhere she writes that heaven itself was imperiled. Also clear. This means there was a possibility of failure. This also agrees with her writing that Christ "could have sinned. He could have fallen." It also agrees with her having corrected Waggoner when Waggoner made arguments similar to those being made here that Christ could not have failed. Ellen White repeated taught that He could. So all the evidence points in one way.

Regarding the quote you mentioned, it is speaking to the clarity with which God sees the future. She is not intending that it should be taken in a way which would contradict what she has written elsewhere.

Tom,

Only if Christ had come as God, would He have no possibility of sinning. As a human being, He had during His whole life the possibility of sinning. Otherwise He wouldn't be human and wouldn't be a free moral agent. The fact that God knew beforehand that He would be victorious with heaven's help doesn't mean He had no possibility of sinning. Saying that He had no possibility of sinning would make Him something else than human.

The fact that God knows if I will choose perdition doesn't mean that choosing salvation has ever ceased to be, for a single moment, a possibility for me.

That Christ foreknew His victory is something Ellen White makes clear:

"Ages before His incarnation, Christ distinctly chose His position. He foresaw His life of humiliation, His rejection and crucifixion, His victory over satanic agencies, His victory over death and the grave. He saw the world flooded with light and life, and heard the song of triumph sung by the millions rescued from the hold of Satan." {1NL 41.7}

Genesis 3:15 I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your seed and her seed; he shall bruise your head, and you shall bruise his heel."

I would like to point out that you are being completely unrealistic in relation to this subject of risk. If I am in the middle of a gunfight and, to protect my son, I jump in front of him and I'm hit by two bullets that should hit him. Suppose I had had a dream in the previous night revealing that this would happen and that I would survive. Does this mean that I didn't risk my life to save my son? Does this mean that my life wasn't imperiled? I will go to the hospital, they will have to perform a cardiopulmonary resuscitation, I will have to undergo a surgery, and there was no threat to my life? I simply disagree with you.

Rosangela, perhaps we're at an impasse.

"Risk" and "danger" have to do with probability. The definition of risk is the possibility of loss. The definition of danger is the possibility of harm.

Please explain to me how, according to how you see things, that "heaven itself was imperiled." I don't understand how that can be a possibility, given your presuppositions.

I asked MM if, given that God knows with 100% certainty that an event will occur, then it follows that the event will certainly occur. He agreed to this. I can't remember if you agree with this as well.

Assuming you do, then do you see that it follows that the risk of the given event not occurring is 0?

Therefore if God knows with 100% certainty that X will occur, the risk of X not occurring is 0.

This is completely straightforward logic.

That's the point. I don't consider that the word "risk" means only the possible occurrence of a given event, but also the threat posed for the occurrence of that event.
So you see "risk" in terms of my death occurring or not occurring, while I see "risk" in terms of the things I am exposed to that might cause my death. In the example given I consider I did risk my life to save my son, independently of my death occurring or not, and independently of my knowing if my death will occur or not.

The important factor, as far as risk is concerned, is not whether your death occurred or not, or your knowledge of the event, but whether or not is was possible for you to die. If it was possible for your to die, then you risked your life. If it was not possible for you to die, then you didn't.

Of course it was possible. I'm not an angel who cannot die. There was a threat to my life. The threat was very, very real, and it cannot be denied. After facing everything I was willing to face to save my son, what mattered least was whether I would die or not.

Let's say that God foresaw that you would not die. Was it possible for you to die?

Tom, what God knows about the outcome of a particular situation has no bearing on how we feel about it during the event. The threat of failure or death is real. There is nothing imaginary about it. Even if God reveals to us that we will succeed or survive it in no way lessens the risk or threat or danger we experience during the event.

For example, in the following account of the 144,000 (quote below) they know they are going to succeed and be translated alive when Jesus returns. Do you think it lessens the risk or threat or danger they experience? Hopefully you don't, but if you do, then consider this: Both God and Jesus knew He would succeed on the cross. Did it lessen the risk or threat or danger He experienced?

Or, do you assume the 144,000 is a different situation, that God didn't know Jesus would succeed but that He knows the 144,000 will? If so, then how do you explain all the places in the OT and NT where God described Jesus succeeding on the cross? How is that any different than all the places in the OT and NT where God describes the 144,000 succeeding?

PS - Tom, did you overlook my post to you at the top of the previous page (page 20)?

Yes, I had overlooked it.

Let’s look at it from a different angle. God knows the end from beginning. For example, He knows the USA is going to influence the rest of the world to enforce resting on Sunday and working on Saturday. He knows there will be many martyrs. But after probation closes He knows none of the 144,000 is going to die. Does God's foreknowledge of their success mean there is no risk, no peril, no danger?

Yes, of course. If God knows none of the 144,000 is going to die, then there is no chance that any of them will die, and hence no risk, peril, or danger. How could there be? Risk/peril/danger means "the possibility of loss" or "the possibility of harm." Without the possibility of loss or harm, there is no risk, peril or danger.

TE: “He doesn’t tells us, 'Now, this or that could happen.’” I refuted this by showing you examples which disproved your assertion. I have requested that rather than move on to some other point, that you recognize your assertion was false. Rather than do this, you chose to move on to some other point. So I will once again request that you recognize your assertion was false. *Then* you can move on to some other point.

That’s not what I meant. What I meant was – God does not tells us, “This or that could happen, but I cannot say ahead of time exactly how it will play out because, frankly, I do not know." Do you see the difference?

The difference between what you meant and what you said? Yes, I see the difference. Not being able to divine what you really mean when you say things, my point is that that what you actually said was false. Do you agree with this?

Tom, what God knows about the outcome of a particular situation has no bearing on how we feel about it during the event.

It could, if He shared with us what He knows.

The threat of failure or death is real.

We may feel a threat of failure or death where none exists. If God sees there is no threat, that whas we feel does not correspond to reality. Reality corresponds to what God knows, not what we feel.

There is nothing imaginary about it.

There's nothing imaginary about what we imagine to be the case; that is, we really perceive there to danger or risk. However, if God knows there is no possible chance of failure or harm, then there is none, and what we perceive is simply wrong. What God knows is right.

Even if God reveals to us that we will succeed or survive it in no way lessens the risk or threat or danger we experience during the event.

That's correct. If God revealed to us we would survive, our probability of survival would be 100%, just as it would be if God didn't reveal what He knows to us. It would impact our perception of reality, however.

For example, in the following account of the 144,000 (quote below) they know they are going to succeed and be translated alive when Jesus returns. Do you think it lessens the risk or threat or danger they experience?

No, there risk and danger is the same, regardless of what they know. God will deliver them, 100%. They are under no danger.

Hopefully you don't, but if you do, then consider this: Both God and Jesus knew He would succeed on the cross. Did it lessen the risk or threat or danger He experienced?

The precept of this question is contrary to what God has revealed to us. God has revealed to us that "heaven itself was at risk." God has revealed to us that "Christ could have sinned. He could have fallen." God has revealed to us that God sent His Son at "a more fearful risk" (compared to our children). So I must reject the premise of your question, based on what God has revealed to us.

Or, do you assume the 144,000 is a different situation, that God didn't know Jesus would succeed but that He knows the 144,000 will? If so, then how do you explain all the places in the OT and NT where God described Jesus succeeding on the cross? How is that any different than all the places in the OT and NT where God describes the 144,000 succeeding?

The 144,000 are, by definition, those who succeed. Those who don't succeed are not a part of the 144,000.

It was possible for me to die, but God saw that I wouldn't die.

Let's say that God had foreseen that I would die. Do you consider that there was a risk or not?

Risk is defined as the possibility of loss. If God saw that you would die, then you would be incurring risk, since it would be possible (100% chance in fact) that you would die.

In the case were God saw that you wouldn't die, your probability of dying would be 0, and there would be no risk. The first part of your sentence, "it was possible for me to die" is false, since nothing that God sees (under your paradigm) will happen, can fail to happen.

TE: If God saw that you would die, then you would be incurring risk, since it would be possible (100% chance in fact) that you would die.

MM: If "risk" means probability of dying, and if it means nothing else, then the certainty of death is not a "risk" - it is an inescapable fact. No risk is taken. But if risk has more than one meaning then it is possible to apply the concept in cases involving inescapable facts.

BTW, where does Sister White say the "risk" Jesus took included dying?

Risk means the possibility of loss, which means the probability is anything greater than 0. You're statement that no risk is taken is completely wrong. There can be no greater risk than something which has a 100% chance of occurring.

No one is talking about there being a risk of Jesus' dying, so I don't know why you're bringing this up.

By the way, when speaking of an event which is certain to occur, such as death, risk is usually used in the context of time. That is, one would speak of the risk of death occurring, for example, before one turns 70, or within one year, something like that. In the context of Rosangela's question, she was speaking of death occurring in the context of a specific dangerous event.

TE: The difference between what you meant and what you said? Yes, I see the difference. Not being able to divine what you really mean when you say things, my point is that that what you actually said was false. Do you agree with this?

MM: Tom, I reposted the history of my comment above. I said, “That's why He can tell us precisely what will happen before it happens.” In response to this you posted, “The future could be mult-threaded, God can see that, and tell us precisely what will happen. God is not dependent upon the future being single-threaded in order to tell us about it.”

In response to that comment I wrote, “But that’s not what He does, is it? Instead, God tells us precisely what will happen before it happens. He doesn’t tells us ‘Now, this or that could happen.’” In response to this you switched gears and listed places where God shared different options and opposing outcomes. So, as you can see, you are the one who got off topic, not me.

In the context of our discussion I posted nothing that was off topic or false. You were arguing that God knows the future as multi-threaded and not single-threaded. We were not talking about those times when God shared options and alternate outcomes.

All along I was arguing against the idea that God does not know precisely what will happen before it happens, that He sees the future as a myriad of possibilities. I was arguing that God knows ahead of time precisely how the future will play out. I did not switch gears or say anything false.

…………………………..

MM: Let’s look at it from a different angle. God knows the end from beginning. For example, He knows the USA is going to influence the rest of the world to enforce resting on Sunday and working on Saturday. He knows there will be many martyrs. But after probation closes He knows none of the 144,000 is going to die. Does God's foreknowledge of their success mean there is no risk, no peril, no danger?

TE: Yes, of course. If God knows none of the 144,000 is going to die, then there is no chance that any of them will die, and hence no risk, peril, or danger. How could there be? Risk/peril/danger means "the possibility of loss" or "the possibility of harm." Without the possibility of loss or harm, there is no risk, peril or danger.

MM: I find it difficult to believe that anyone can read the description of the experience of the 144,000 during the last days and conclude “there is no risk, peril, or danger”. Certainly that is not how they feel about it. Again, here is how it is described:

“Their confidence in God, their faith and firmness, will be severely tested. As they review the past, their hopes sink; for in their whole lives they can see little good. They are fully conscious of their weakness and unworthiness.”

“… the anguish which they suffer is not a dread of persecution for the truth's sake; they fear that every sin has not been repented of, and that through some fault in themselves they will fail to realize the fulfillment of the Saviour's promise … it is with a keen sense of self-reproach that they themselves have no more power to resist and urge back the mighty tide of evil … suffering the keenest anxiety, terror, and distress …”

TE: If God knows none of the 144,000 is going to die, then there is no chance that any of them will die, and hence no risk, peril, or danger. How could there be? Risk/peril/danger means "the possibility of loss" or "the possibility of harm." Without the possibility of loss or harm, there is no risk, peril or danger.


Tom, perhaps it was typo because earlier you posted – “If God knows none of the 144,000 is going to die, then there is no chance that any of them will die, and hence no risk, peril, or danger. How could there be? Risk/peril/danger means "the possibility of loss" or "the possibility of harm." Without the possibility of loss or harm, there is no risk, peril or danger.”

Then later on you wrote – “If God saw that you would die, then you would be incurring risk, since it would be possible (100% chance in fact) that you would die.” Did you mean “then you would be incurring no risk”? The reason I suspect a typo is because you argued before and after it that there is no risk when the outcome is known with certainty.

…………………………

TE: No one is talking about there being a risk of Jesus' dying, so I don't know why you're bringing this up.

MM: Okay. So what risk, peril, threat, or danger did Jesus face? That He might sin and fail to save us, fail to demonstrate the law and love of God? If so, where is the evidence that such was the case? Is there any proof that Jesus nearly failed? If not, then how real was the threat of failure? What was the percentage of chance that He might fail?

……………………………….

TE: By the way, when speaking of an event which is certain to occur, such as death, risk is usually used in the context of time. That is, one would speak of the risk of death occurring, for example, before one turns 70, or within one year, something like that. In the context of Rosangela's question, she was speaking of death occurring in the context of a specific dangerous event.

MM: How does this apply to your theory that God did not know ahead of time if Jesus would fail or succeed on the cross? Simply saying the fact risk was involved proves God didn’t know seems weak to me. Is there any evidence that Jesus almost failed? Or, does “risk” mean something else?

In what way? Would it change the outcome?


What? Feeling afraid is not a reality? How can you say that? Jesus experience fear even though He knew He was going to succeed.


I agree that God knows the outcome, but I disagree that it means feeling afraid is unnecessary or “simply wrong”. Knowing the outcome of something doesn’t mean feeling afraid is wrong or an indication that we lack faith. Again, Jesus Himself felt fear.


I agree. But I do not agree that it eliminate feeling anxious or afraid.


I totally disagree. The inspired description portrays them full of fear and anxiety, which is not a sin.


Are you misapplying the risk concept she introduced? Are you drawing the wrong conclusions?


Tom, Jesus was by definition the one who would succeed. That is how God described it all throughout the OT and NT. How can you believe God knows ahead of time that the 144,000 will succeed and yet reject the idea that God knew ahead of time that Jesus would succeed? In both cases God plainly portrays them succeeding. How is Jesus’ case any different? How can God be so sure the 144,000 will succeed? Why didn’t He know Jesus would succeed?

Tom,

Again, risk has to do with the threat posed, not only with the final result. For instance, the fact that God's character will finally be vindicated doesn't mean the truth about His character has never been at risk, for Satan's charges posed a threat to it before the universe.

MM: Tom, what God knows about the outcome of a particular situation has no bearing on how we feel about it during the event.

TE: It could, if He shared with us what He knows.

In what way? Would it change the outcome?

You wrote that what God knows of a particular situation has not bearing on how we feel about it. I wrote if He shared with us His knowledge of the event, it could. The answer to "in what way" is found in your question; in how we feel (that's what you asked!).

Quote:
MM: The threat of failure or death is real.

TE: We may feel a threat of failure or death where none exists. If God sees there is no threat, that whas we feel does not correspond to reality. Reality corresponds to what God knows, not what we feel.

What? Feeling afraid is not a reality? How can you say that? Jesus experience fear even though He knew He was going to succeed.

MM, keep track of the context please. The context is the reality of death.

Quote:
MM: There is nothing imaginary about it.

TE: There's nothing imaginary about what we imagine to be the case; that is, we really perceive there to danger or risk. However, if God knows there is no possible chance of failure or harm, then there is none, and what we perceive is simply wrong. What God knows is right.

I agree that God knows the outcome, but I disagree that it means feeling afraid is unnecessary or “simply wrong”. Knowing the outcome of something doesn’t mean feeling afraid is wrong or an indication that we lack faith. Again, Jesus Himself felt fear.

You're going off on a tangent here. What is "simply wrong" is our perceiving that there to exist danger or risk when none exists. Please re-read what I wrote.

Quote:
MM: Even if God reveals to us that we will succeed or survive it in no way lessens the risk or threat or danger we experience during the event.

TE: That's correct. If God revealed to us we would survive, our probability of survival would be 100%, just as it would be if God didn't reveal what He knows to us. It would impact our perception of reality, however.

I agree. But I do not agree that it eliminate feeling anxious or afraid.

You keep asserting things which have no relation to what I'm saying. I never claimed anything in relation to our feeling anxious or afraid.

Quote:
MM: For example, in the following account of the 144,000 (quote below) they know they are going to succeed and be translated alive when Jesus returns. Do you think it lessens the risk or threat or danger they experience?

TE: No, there risk and danger is the same, regardless of what they know. God will deliver them, 100%. They are under no danger.

I totally disagree. The inspired description portrays them full of fear and anxiety, which is not a sin.

This really has nothing to do with what I've been talking about, but Scripture tells us that perfect love casts out all fear. God tells us, "Be not afraid of their faces: for I am with thee to deliver thee, saith the LORD (Jer. 1:8). The 144,000 will trust God, and not be afraid.

You've misunderstood what EGW wrote. The fear and anxiety that is depicted is not of the selfish varitey; that is, they are not afraid for themselves, for their own safety. This would depict a lack of faith, which would be sin. They would willingly die for Christ, couragiously, without fear ("they would not shrink from torture or death" is how EGW puts it). Their fear and anxiety is in regards to their own character; they fear lest some sin be found upon them which would cast God's holy name be reproached.

Quote:
MM: Hopefully you don't, but if you do, then consider this: Both God and Jesus knew He would succeed on the cross. Did it lessen the risk or threat or danger He experienced?

TE: The precept of this question is contrary to what God has revealed to us. God has revealed to us that "heaven itself was at risk." God has revealed to us that "Christ could have sinned. He could have fallen." God has revealed to us that God sent His Son at "a more fearful risk" (compared to our children). So I must reject the premise of your question, based on what God has revealed to us.

Are you misapplying the risk concept she introduced? Are you drawing the wrong conclusions?

How could the "risk concept" be "misapplied"? It's a very simple thing. She says that God sent His Son at the risk of failure and eternal loss. There's no need to "apply" a concept here. I simply believe what she wrote to be true.

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MM: Or, do you assume the 144,000 is a different situation, that God didn't know Jesus would succeed but that He knows the 144,000 will? If so, then how do you explain all the places in the OT and NT where God described Jesus succeeding on the cross? How is that any different than all the places in the OT and NT where God describes the 144,000 succeeding?

TE: The 144,000 are, by definition, those who succeed. Those who don't succeed are not a part of the 144,000.

Tom, Jesus was by definition the one who would succeed. That is how God described it all throughout the OT and NT. How can you believe God knows ahead of time that the 144,000 will succeed and yet reject the idea that God knew ahead of time that Jesus would succeed? In both cases God plainly portrays them succeeding. How is Jesus’ case any different? How can God be so sure the 144,000 will succeed? Why didn’t He know Jesus would succeed?

You are saying that Jesus could not have failed. Ellen White wrote, "Christ could have sinned. He could have fallen." I believe she was right. We seem to be going in circles a bit here. You're not going to convince me that she was wrong on this point.

TE: The difference between what you meant and what you said? Yes, I see the difference. Not being able to divine what you really mean when you say things, my point is that that what you actually said was false. Do you agree with this?

MM: Tom, I reposted the history of my comment above. I said, “That's why He can tell us precisely what will happen before it happens.” In response to this you posted, “The future could be mult-threaded, God can see that, and tell us precisely what will happen. God is not dependent upon the future being single-threaded in order to tell us about it.”

In response to that comment I wrote, “But that’s not what He does, is it? Instead, God tells us precisely what will happen before it happens. He doesn’t tells us ‘Now, this or that could happen.’” In response to this you switched gears and listed places where God shared different options and opposing outcomes. So, as you can see, you are the one who got off topic, not me.

In the context of our discussion I posted nothing that was off topic or false. You were arguing that God knows the future as multi-threaded and not single-threaded. We were not talking about those times when God shared options and alternate outcomes.

But that's exactly what multi-threaded means! God is sharing alternate outcomes precisely because the future is multi-threaded. He's doing the very thing you said He doesn't do. He is saying, "Now, this or that could happen."

All along I was arguing against the idea that God does not know precisely what will happen before it happens, that He sees the future as a myriad of possibilities. I was arguing that God knows ahead of time precisely how the future will play out. I did not switch gears or say anything false.

You said that God does not say, "Now, this or that could happen." But He does. I provided examples of that.

…………………………..

MM: Let’s look at it from a different angle. God knows the end from beginning. For example, He knows the USA is going to influence the rest of the world to enforce resting on Sunday and working on Saturday. He knows there will be many martyrs. But after probation closes He knows none of the 144,000 is going to die. Does God's foreknowledge of their success mean there is no risk, no peril, no danger?

TE: Yes, of course. If God knows none of the 144,000 is going to die, then there is no chance that any of them will die, and hence no risk, peril, or danger. How could there be? Risk/peril/danger means "the possibility of loss" or "the possibility of harm." Without the possibility of loss or harm, there is no risk, peril or danger.

MM: I find it difficult to believe that anyone can read the description of the experience of the 144,000 during the last days and conclude “there is no risk, peril, or danger”. Certainly that is not how they feel about it. Again, here is how it is described:

“Their confidence in God, their faith and firmness, will be severely tested. As they review the past, their hopes sink; for in their whole lives they can see little good. They are fully conscious of their weakness and unworthiness.”

“… the anguish which they suffer is not a dread of persecution for the truth's sake; they fear that every sin has not been repented of, and that through some fault in themselves they will fail to realize the fulfillment of the Saviour's promise … it is with a keen sense of self-reproach that they themselves have no more power to resist and urge back the mighty tide of evil … suffering the keenest anxiety, terror, and distress …”

You repeated this point in your next post (I responded in reverse order to your posts), which I responded to.

Regarding risk, it's not the final result which defines whether or not there is risk, but the possibility of harm or loss. If there is no possibility of harm or loss, then there is no risk.

For example, when EGW says that God sent His Son at the risk of failure and eternal loss, this means there was a possibility that Christ could have suffered failure and eternal loss. This is completely straight-forward. What else could it possibly mean?

No, there's no typo here. I've re-read this, and it seems to be very well explained, MM. I'm not sure where you're seeing a contradiction. In the case of the 144,000, God knows none will die. Hence there is not risk. In the hypothetical Rosangela case, God sees Rosangela died, so there is risk.

Did you notice that in one case the referenced party dies, and in the other it doesn't?

TE: No one is talking about there being a risk of Jesus' dying, so I don't know why you're bringing this up.

MM: Okay. So what risk, peril, threat, or danger did Jesus face? That He might sin and fail to save us, fail to demonstrate the law and love of God? If so, where is the evidence that such was the case? Is there any proof that Jesus nearly failed? If not, then how real was the threat of failure? What was the percentage of chance that He might fail?

As Ellen White wrote, "Christ could have sinned. He could have fallen." I don't know why you keep asking the same questions over again. As I stated before, when you asked this question, it seems to me that what Ellen White wrote completely answers your questions here. I don't know what is lacking in her answer.

……………………………….

TE: By the way, when speaking of an event which is certain to occur, such as death, risk is usually used in the context of time. That is, one would speak of the risk of death occurring, for example, before one turns 70, or within one year, something like that. In the context of Rosangela's question, she was speaking of death occurring in the context of a specific dangerous event.

MM: How does this apply to your theory that God did not know ahead of time if Jesus would fail or succeed on the cross? Simply saying the fact risk was involved proves God didn’t know seems weak to me. Is there any evidence that Jesus almost failed? Or, does “risk” mean something else?

As you agree in the past, if God knows with 100% certainty that something will happen, then it is certain it will happen. Therefore if God knew with 100% certainty that Christ would succeed, then it is certain that Christ would succeed. Yet Ellen White wrote, "Christ could have sinned. He could have fallen." This is consistent with what she wrote about God sending His Son at the risk of failure and eternal loss.

"Risk" means the possibility of loss or harm. She is not using it to mean something odd.

Similarly when she wrote that "Christ could have fallen. He could have sinned" she is not using the phrase "could have" or the words "fallen" or "sinned" in any unusual way.

Was there a possibility for God to fail in the vindication of His character?

There was the possibility for the man Jesus Christ to sin, to fall. Do you agree with that? Assuming you do, then were that to happen, would you say that this meant that God had failed in the vindication of His character? If you say "yes," then my answer to your question is "yes."

God doesn't fail and "the plans of God cannot fail" (YI, September 1, 1892 par. 5). Is this true or not?

The man Jesus Christ could have sinned; He could have fallen. Do you agree with this?

If that had happened, would you say that God's plan had failed? If you say "yes," then my answer to your question is "yes."

“Would it change the outcome?”


If God tells us we are going to survive a crisis, it doesn’t mean we are being unfaithful if we experience fear and anxiety before and during the crisis. Do you agree?


You said our fear is perceived, but in reality it is unfounded. That’s what I disagree with. Do you see the difference?


So, you agree with me. They will experience fear. Right? But why? They know full well that God has forgiven all of their sins because otherwise, according to the prophecy, they would be in league with the enemy, railing on the SDAs. Are they guilty of sinning in light of the fact perfect love makes fear unnecessary?


If your view is what Sister White intended for us to draw from the risk concept she introduced then why didn’t she simply say so? Instead, she agrees with the dozens of places where God plainly says Jesus would succeed on the cross.


What she wrote was purely theoretical, right? She wrote it after the fact. In heaven, we could look back on the final crisis and say, “The 144,000 could have sinned. They could have failed.” How is this any different than what Sister White wrote about Jesus?

Back to other questions: Jesus was by definition the one who would succeed. That is how God described it all throughout the OT and NT. How can you believe God knows ahead of time that the 144,000 will succeed and yet reject the idea that God knew ahead of time that Jesus would succeed? In both cases God plainly portrays them succeeding. How is Jesus’ case any different? How can God be so sure the 144,000 will succeed? Why didn’t He know Jesus would succeed?

Please take the time to address these points. Thank you.

Actually, in the cases you are referring to, Tom, God did not say “could”. Instead, He told them precisely what “would” happen depending on which option they followed. But in so saying God wasn’t saying He doesn’t know how the future would play out. There is absolutely no indication He was uncertain as to which option they would follow. There are other reasons why God choose to share with them, before the fact, different options and the various outcomes.


You are grossly distorting what I said. I reposted the history of what I said above, and yet you are still misrepresenting what I posted. Why?


This post provides the proof that they are anxious and fearful in spite of the fact they fully believe God has forgiven their sins and that they will not die. How can they believe they will not die if they are unsure if all of their sins have been forgiven? Surely you must the potential contradiction here?

If God knows someone is going to die there is a risk? What is the risk? That they might live? Does that mean God knew Jesus would fail because Sister White spoke of it in the context of risk? This angle seems to undermine your theory.

Tom, her risk concept does not imply Jesus almost failed, that He barely managed to save us. What she wrote is purely theoretical. It was written after the fact. You haven’t quoted anything that substantiates your theory. All you have is what you believe are “logical” conclusions. But that doesn’t cut it around here.


In light of your formula explaining the differences between certain death and risk versus certain success and risk (discussed in a previous post) aren’t you contradicting yourself? If God knows someone is going to die it proves there is a risk? What is the risk? That they might live? Does that mean God knew Jesus would fail because Sister White spoke of it in the context of risk?

MM: Tom, what God knows about the outcome of a particular situation has no bearing on how we feel about it during the event.

TE: It could, if He shared with us what He knows.

MM: In what way? Would it change the outcome?

TE: You wrote that what God knows of a particular situation has not bearing on how we feel about it. I wrote if He shared with us His knowledge of the event, it could. The answer to "in what way" is found in your question; in how we feel (that's what you asked!).

“Would it change the outcome?”

Before jumping off into something new, it would be helpful if you would acknowledge that your original question has been addressed. You wrote that what God knows of a particular situation has not bearing on how we feel about it. I wrote if He shared with us His knowledge of the event, it could. This is accurate, isn't it?

I wasn't saying anything about an outcome being changed. I don't know why you're asking this. You made a statement that what God knows about a particular situation has no bearing "on how we feel about it." If God were to share His knowledge of the future event with this, that could clearly have a bearing on how we feel about it, right?

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MM: There is nothing imaginary about it.

TE: There's nothing imaginary about what we imagine to be the case; that is, we really perceive there to danger or risk. However, if God knows there is no possible chance of failure or harm, then there is none, and what we perceive is simply wrong. What God knows is right.

MM: I agree that God knows the outcome, but I disagree that it means feeling afraid is unnecessary or “simply wrong”. Knowing the outcome of something doesn’t mean feeling afraid is wrong or an indication that we lack faith. Again, Jesus Himself felt fear.

TE: You're going off on a tangent here. What is "simply wrong" is our perceiving that there to exist danger or risk when none exists. Please re-read what I wrote.

If God tells us we are going to survive a crisis, it doesn’t mean we are being unfaithful if we experience fear and anxiety before and during the crisis. Do you agree?



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MM: Even if God reveals to us that we will succeed or survive it in no way lessens the risk or threat or danger we experience during the event.

TE: That's correct. If God revealed to us we would survive, our probability of survival would be 100%, just as it would be if God didn't reveal what He knows to us. It would impact our perception of reality, however.

MM: I agree. But I do not agree that it eliminates feeling anxious or afraid.

TE: You keep asserting things which have no relation to what I'm saying. I never claimed anything in relation to our feeling anxious or afraid.

You said our fear is perceived, but in reality it is unfounded. That’s what I disagree with. Do you see the difference?

I think you may have misunderstand my point, or perhaps understood me to be making a point I wasn't trying to make. My point is that God's perception of the future is accurate. If He perceives that a given event is certain to happen, and we perceive something different than that (i.e., the given event might not happen), our perception is wrong. I'm making this point because you have stated that from our perspective we have more than one choice available. You have even asserted that we actually have more than one choice available. But this assertion, given your presupposition, is incorrect.

If God perceives we will do A, then we will do A. The fact that we perceive we might do A, or something else, does not change the fact that we will do A. Our perception is wrong. God's is right.


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MM: For example, in the following account of the 144,000 (quote below) they know they are going to succeed and be translated alive when Jesus returns. Do you think it lessens the risk or threat or danger they experience?

TE: No, there risk and danger is the same, regardless of what they know. God will deliver them, 100%. They are under no danger.

MM: I totally disagree. The inspired description portrays them full of fear and anxiety, which is not a sin.

TE: This really has nothing to do with what I've been talking about, but Scripture tells us that perfect love casts out all fear. God tells us, "Be not afraid of their faces: for I am with thee to deliver thee, saith the LORD (Jer. 1:8). The 144,000 will trust God, and not be afraid.

You've misunderstood what EGW wrote. The fear and anxiety that is depicted is not of the selfish varitey; that is, they are not afraid for themselves, for their own safety. This would depict a lack of faith, which would be sin. They would willingly die for Christ, couragiously, without fear ("they would not shrink from torture or death" is how EGW puts it). Their fear and anxiety is in regards to their own character; they fear lest some sin be found upon them which would cast God's holy name be reproached.

So, you agree with me. They will experience fear. Right?

No. I disagreed, as I pointed out. You wrote that they were afraid because of the risk or threat or danger they experience. This is incorrect. It's important that this point be understood. EGW writes that they would not shrink from experience torture or death. So no, they are not afraid. John writes that perfect love casts out all fear. He that fears is not made perfect in love. So I disagree, for these reasons.

But why? They know full well that God has forgiven all of their sins because otherwise, according to the prophecy, they would be in league with the enemy, railing on the SDAs. Are they guilty of sinning in light of the fact perfect love makes fear unnecessary?

The 144,000 are to represent God in a public setting. They are concerned that His name not be reproached. They are aware that they are but dust. They are checking their memories to make sure that the treatment they are experiencing is not due to something they have done. They want to make sure that God's holy name will not be besmirched on their account.

No, they are not sinning to have this concern. In the chapter "The Two Worshippers," towards the end, Ellen White address a related concept, which she speaks of how, at every advance step, the repentance of the believer will deepen.

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MM: Hopefully you don't, but if you do, then consider this: Both God and Jesus knew He would succeed on the cross. Did it lessen the risk or threat or danger He experienced?

TE: The precept of this question is contrary to what God has revealed to us. God has revealed to us that "heaven itself was at risk." God has revealed to us that "Christ could have sinned. He could have fallen." God has revealed to us that God sent His Son at "a more fearful risk" (compared to our children). So I must reject the premise of your question, based on what God has revealed to us.

MM: Are you misapplying the risk concept she introduced? Are you drawing the wrong conclusions?

TE: How could the "risk concept" be "misapplied"? It's a very simple thing. She says that God sent His Son at the risk of failure and eternal loss. There's no need to "apply" a concept here. I simply believe what she wrote to be true.

If your view is what Sister White intended for us to draw from the risk concept she introduced then why didn’t she simply say so? Instead, she agrees with the dozens of places where God plainly says Jesus would succeed on the cross.

She wrote, "Christ could have sinned. He could have fallen." She said the same thing many times. She corrected Waggoner when he was teaching that Christ could not have failed.

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MM: Or, do you assume the 144,000 is a different situation, that God didn't know Jesus would succeed but that He knows the 144,000 will? If so, then how do you explain all the places in the OT and NT where God described Jesus succeeding on the cross? How is that any different than all the places in the OT and NT where God describes the 144,000 succeeding?

TE: The 144,000 are, by definition, those who succeed. Those who don't succeed are not a part of the 144,000.

MM: Tom, Jesus was by definition the one who would succeed. That is how God described it all throughout the OT and NT. How can you believe God knows ahead of time that the 144,000 will succeed and yet reject the idea that God knew ahead of time that Jesus would succeed? In both cases God plainly portrays them succeeding. How is Jesus’ case any different? How can God be so sure the 144,000 will succeed? Why didn’t He know Jesus would succeed?

TE: You are saying that Jesus could not have failed. Ellen White wrote, "Christ could have sinned. He could have fallen." I believe she was right. We seem to be going in circles a bit here. You're not going to convince me that she was wrong on this point.

What she wrote was purely theoretical, right?

No, not at all. One does not use language like, "a more fearful risk" to refer to things which are purely theoretical.

She wrote it after the fact. In heaven, we could look back on the final crisis and say, “The 144,000 could have sinned. They could have failed.” How is this any different than what Sister White wrote about Jesus?

The 144,000 are comprised of those who succeed. So it's not possible that they could have sinned or failed. Individual members of the 144,000 could sin or fail, but then they would not be a part of the 144,000.

Back to other questions: Jesus was by definition the one who would succeed. That is how God described it all throughout the OT and NT. How can you believe God knows ahead of time that the 144,000 will succeed and yet reject the idea that God knew ahead of time that Jesus would succeed? In both cases God plainly portrays them succeeding. How is Jesus’ case any different? How can God be so sure the 144,000 will succeed? Why didn’t He know Jesus would succeed?

Please take the time to address these points. Thank you.

I think this has been addressed. Ellen White wrote of Christ, "Christ could have sinned. He could have fallen." She corrected Waggoner when he taught that Christ could not have failed. She said heaven itself was imperiled. She said that Christ took a risk in coming, that God took a risk in sending Him. All of these statements indicated that it was possible for Christ to fail. In particular, the statement that "Christ could have sinned. He could have fallen" should make it clear that Christ could have sinned, and that He could have fallen.

I skipped one post, as it looked like the same points addressed elsewhere.

If God knows someone is going to die there is a risk? What is the risk? That they might live? Does that mean God knew Jesus would fail because Sister White spoke of it in the context of risk? This angle seems to undermine your theory.

I'm not following your difficulty here. As I've explained quite a number of times now, risk means the possibility of loss. To die would be a loss. The risk of death would be 100%. "Risk" does not apply to living, because living is not a loss, it's a gain. Risk has to do with loss. I've got no idea what "angle" you're talking about. I'm not following your argument at all. It seems to be predicated on not understanding what risk is.

Tom, her risk concept does not imply Jesus almost failed, that He barely managed to save us. What she wrote is purely theoretical.

Her language belies this assertion. If you look at what she wrote in DA 49, DA 131, and COL 196, you can see that you are asserting something which has no basis in fact. If you will examine her language, you will see that she expresses awe, amazement, wonder, that God, that Christ, would undertake such risk. This is not the language of something purely theoretical.

In light of your formula explaining the differences between certain death and risk versus certain success and risk (discussed in a previous post) aren’t you contradicting yourself?

No, there's no contradiction in what I wrote. I think you've just not understood what risk is.

If God knows someone is going to die it proves there is a risk? What is the risk? That they might live? Does that mean God knew Jesus would fail because Sister White spoke of it in the context of risk?

I think this just the same issue (of you're not understanding what risk is). To be honest, I've having difficulty following what point you're trying to make, but my best guess is that it has to do with confusion as to the meaning of "risk."

Any human being could have sinned, and He was a human being, but for God to send a Savior, God must be sure this Savior would not sin, otherwise He wouldn’t be a Savior. Therefore when the plan was created, God and Christ foreknew that Christ would be victorious (despite the constant threats He faced through Satan’s temptations). So the plan, obviously, could not have failed. God does not fail, and His plans cannot fail.

Whatever Sister White wrote about the risk Jesus took was written after the fact, after He succeeded, therefore, it is purely theoretical. Jesus could have sinned, true, but He didn’t. Yes, it is a fact that Jesus could have sinned, but He didn’t, right? Hypothetically He could have sinned, but He didn’t, right?


You said Sister White uses the risk concept only when death is certain. According to you, then, God knew Jesus would die, which means Jesus would be successful on the cross. If Jesus had sinned or refused to save us He would not have died.

What you are asserting here simply doesn't follow. You are arguing that any statement made after the fact is theoretical. You could apply this logic to everything Ellen White wrote about Jesus, since it was all after the fact.

If you just look at her language, and what she was actually saying, you can see that it's not hypothetical. Everything about what she wrote screams that she's talking about a *real* possibility.

You are gratuitously asserting things. There's no evidence to support your claim.

Here's what she wrote in DA 49, for example:



Point out something, anything, from the text which would give an indication that this is hypothetical. It doesn't exist!

Look at the ending of what she wrote:



This is as real as it gets! We *should* be astonished that God took such a risk. This is her whole point.

You said Sister White uses the risk concept only when death is certain.

Sometimes I wonder what your thinking is when you read things. I never said this. I never said anything even remotely close to this. What you are asserting that I said doesn't make any sense. Risk has to do with the possibility of loss. The loss doesn't have to be death. The loss doesn't have to be certain.

According to you, then, God knew Jesus would die, which means Jesus would be successful on the cross.

I've no idea whatsoever what would lead you to write such a thing. Would you please quote something I wrote, or give some sort of clue, as to how you arriving at the conclusions you are? I've never said anything at all like this.

If Jesus had sinned or refused to save us He would not have died.

If Jesus had sinned, He would not have died??? Where do you get an idea like this? The wages of sin is death. That means that sin results in death. Of course He would have died. Why do you think He wouldn't have died?

TE: In the case of the 144,000, God knows none will die. Hence there is not risk. In the hypothetical Rosangela case, God sees Rosangela died, so there is risk.

MM: From what you posted I gather you believe if there is no chance of death there is no risk. There is only risk when death is certain. Putting two and two together it is obvious you believe God knew Jesus would die, which means you believe God knew would Jesus succeed on the cross.

TE: If Jesus had sinned, He would not have died??? Where do you get an idea like this? The wages of sin is death. That means that sin results in death. Of course He would have died. Why do you think He wouldn't have died?

MM: Deity or divinity cannot die.

TE: If Jesus had sinned, He would not have died??? Where do you get an idea like this? The wages of sin is death. That means that sin results in death. Of course He would have died. Why do you think He wouldn't have died?

MM: Deity or divinity cannot die.

Your point? You're not denying Jesus died, are you?

I'm not following any of this. I don't know why you think "my point" has anything at all to do with what your saying, nor do I see that any of what I allegedly said makes any sense. Nor am I following why you are pointing out that divinity could not die.

TE: In the case of the 144,000, God knows none will die. Hence there is not risk. In the hypothetical Rosangela case, God sees Rosangela died, so there is risk.

MM: From what you posted I gather you believe if there is no chance of death there is no risk. There is only risk when death is certain.

No, MM. This isn't right. You should reason from risk means. That should be your starting point. Then the rest of it would make sense.

The definition of risk is "the possibility of loss." There is only risk when death is *possible*. Not certain. Just possible. Now if death is certain, it's evidently possible.

In the other case, the probability of death was 0. Hence there was no risk.

Putting two and two together it is obvious you believe God knew Jesus would die, which means you believe God knew would Jesus succeed on the cross.

Well, your premise is off, so whatever would follow would not constitute a sound argument in any case, but I don't follow what you're tying to say here, even if the premise weren't off.

Tom, MM, can you tell me what the following text implies, if anything about the foreknowledge of God:


To me the text is saying that God's love is the first cause of salvation. It is the 'prime mover'. It goes beyond forknowledge which in itself has no causative effect. The love of God, in contrast to His foreknowlegde, is the well spring of universal action and life.

So, in the context of our salvation, our part is to respond to that love. That is where the will comes into play. But the love of God that he has set on us and made us his chosen people is the causative principle springing from His own pure and unselfish heart. The doctrine of the election is here and throughout the prophets and apostles to remind us that God first set his love on us while we were His enemies. That makes all of the difference. The doctrine of the foreknowledge of God should be distinguished from the election. It is good to understand that God knows everything, past and future, but it is more essential to know the nature of the everlasting covenant that saves us through the outstretched arms of His love. While we were His enemies, Christ died for the ungodly.

You may say, yes but God loves everyone. That's true. But God did not set His love on all the heathen nations as He did on Israel. The blessings that He promised Israel were conditional on obedience. The covenant of love He made with them was not apparently. That is to say, God didn't love them because of their obedience. They were in fact a stiff-knecked people, few in number. But he set his love on them because of His oath to their fathers and because he loved them. So He loved them because He loved them. His deep love was a matter of principle and of choice.

To me the text is saying that God's love is the first cause of salvation. It is the 'prime mover'. It goes beyond foreknowledge which in itself has no causative effect. The love of God, in contrast to His foreknowledge, is the well spring of universal action and life.

Agreed.

So, in the context of our salvation, our part is to respond to that love. That is where the will comes into play. But the love of God that he has set on us and made us his chosen people is the causative principle springing from His own pure and unselfish heart. The doctrine of the election is here and throughout the prophets and apostles to remind us that God first set his love on us while we were His enemies. That makes all of the difference. The doctrine of the foreknowledge of God should be distinguished from the election. It is good to understand that God knows everything, past and future, but it is more essential to know the nature of the everlasting covenant that saves us through the outstretched arms of His love. While we were His enemies, Christ died for the ungodly.

Agreed.

You may say, yes but God loves everyone. That's true. But God did not set His love on all the heathen nations as He did on Israel.

Only because they weren't willing. Israel, as bad as it was, was still the people the most potentially receptive to God's love and leading. God is not a respecter of persons. He dispenses truth as quickly as we are able and willing to receive it, whether as individuals or groups.

The blessings that He promised Israel were conditional on obedience. The covenant of love He made with them was not apparently. That is to say, God didn't love them because of their obedience. They were in fact a stiff-knecked people, few in number. But he set his love on them because of His oath to their fathers and because he loved them. So He loved them because He loved them. His deep love was a matter of principle and of choice.

He loved them because He loved them? It's hard to argue with that.

Good points about love. Calling it the "prime-mover" is a nice way of putting it.

If the convenant and oath of God with Abraham was simply a matter of God's foreknowledge, that is, God made it because He knew they would respond the most favorably, then it has no depth of meaning. The main lesson of the covenant is that God first loved His people and that love liberated them from physical and spiritual bondage the same as it does for us today and His love is also His claim to our heart's devotion.


So, in the above text we have the correct balance. God first loves and enters into a covenant with His chosen people. The covenant is intended to last forever, to a thousand generations. We as individuals and as a church can still turn our backs on it but if we do, it only magnifies the grace of God in setting his love on those whom He foreknew would finally reject it.

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MS:You may say, yes but God loves everyone. That's true. But God did not set His love on all the heathen nations as He did on Israel.

TE:Only because they weren't willing. Israel, as bad as it was, was still the people the most potentially receptive to God's love and leading. God is not a respecter of persons. He dispenses truth as quickly as we are able and willing to receive it, whether as individuals or groups.

If the convenant and oath of God with Abraham was simply a matter of God's foreknowledge, that is, God made it because He knew they would respond the most favorably, then it has no depth of meaning.

I agree. God’s choice of Israel was not based on His foreknowledge.

The main lesson of the covenant is that God first loved His people and that love liberated them from physical and spiritual bondage the same as it does for us today and His love is also His claim to our heart's devotion.

I agree. God would have worked with other peoples as well, had they been willing. In fact, God often tried to do this.

Quote:
7:8 But because the LORD loved you, and because he would keep the oath which he had sworn unto your fathers, hath the LORD brought you out with a mighty hand, and redeemed you out of the house of bondmen, from the hand of Pharaoh king of Egypt.
7:9 Know therefore that the LORD thy God, he [is] God, the faithful God, which keepeth covenant and mercy with them that love him and keep his commandments to a thousand generations;
7:10 And repayeth them that hate him to their face, to destroy them: Deut.


So, in the above text we have the correct balance. God first loves and enters into a covenant with His chosen people.

God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to a knowledge of the truth. Whosoever will may come. God’s love is drying all unto Himself.



This puts it well. God draws all unto Himself. Only those who resist His drawing refuse to come to Christ.


The covenant is intended to last forever, to a thousand generations. We as individuals and as a church can still turn our backs on it but if we do, it only magnifies the grace of God in setting his love on those whom He foreknew would finally reject it.

This last part doesn’t seem to be the picture we get from Scripture. Instead we see God expressing disappointment, surprise, dismay, regret, and other emotions when He is rejected. A person, or group of persons, is free to either reject or accept. God sees both possibilities. If a person is self-determining, then there is nothing for God to foreknow but possibilities until the self-determining person makes a determination, at which point the possibility becomes a reality. The future is fundamentally different than the past or present.

God draws all to himself, that's true. But does he enter into a covenant with everyone? No. The covenant is made with the elect saints. Ellen White says the church is the special object of God's love. God loves everyone but the church is special because she is the elect bride of Christ. And if you have any doubts that God is especially in love with the bride, read the Song of Solomon which is especially about the courtship of Christ or Solomon and the church, the Shulamite shepherdess.

God draws all to himself, that's true. But does he enter into a covenant with everyone? No. The covenant is made with the elect saints.

He enters into a covenant to whoever does not resist His drawing. These are the elect. God is not a respector of persons. Whosoever will may come.

Ellen White says the church is the special object of God's love.

Of course. These are they who have responded to God's invitation, exteneded to all. Those who respond are afforded special care and love. Anyone can take part.

God loves everyone but the church is special because she is the elect bride of Christ. And if you have any doubts that God is especially in love with the bride, read the Song of Solomon which is especially about the courtship of Christ or Solomon and the church, the Shulamite shepherdess.

No doubts about God's loving the church. Just doubts that God unilaterally chooses some over others. I see that God chooses all who do not reject His drawing.

Mark, how are you relating these insights to the topic of this thread?

I thought I would bump this again.

I know it's been a very long time since these comments to which I'm replying were made. I have been rather busy, but I've been wanting to make a few comments in reply.

 Originally Posted By: västergötland

 Quote:

You have the cause-and-effect relationship all backwards, as I have stated elsewhere.

You are saying that I spilled my drink (and God knew for certain that I would do so) because the future says my shirt is wet. But the truth of the matter is that my shirt was wet because I spilled my drink on my shirt.

Surely you can see why this argument is flawed. If God knows the future perfectly, He not only knows that your shirt will be wet, He also knows that it will be wet because you will spill your drink on your shirt, and He knows what drink you will spill even though you havent yet written what you have in your glas.

Your above statements are correct: If God knows the future perfectly (and He does), He knows that my shirt will be wet and why it will be wet, and all the details such as what was spilled on it.

But your following comments is where you get off track.

 Originally Posted By: västergötland

Furthermore, there is no way that you will not spill that drink on that shirt because if you do no spill it, then God would know something of the future that did not happen and that would make God wrong. And since we believe that God is not wrong, then if He knows that you will spill drink on your shirt, you surely will have a wet shirt in the appointed time wether you like it or not.

Here you are saying that I no longer have any free-will or free choice ("Furthermore, there is no way that you will not spill that drink on that shirt"). Why do you say that? Because if I happened not to spill it, "then God would know something of the future that did not happen and that would make God wrong".

Your above comments accurately illustrate your belief that if God knew the future, then that foreknowledge would fix our future and we'd have no freedom of choice. But since you believe that we do have free choice, you therefore conclude that God does not know exactly what happens in the future.

It is entirely clear that you believe that God's perfect foreknowledge and our freedom of choice are two mutually exclusive things. But the truth is, they are not mutually exclusive, nor would God's perfect foreknowledge determine our future.

You tell us that if we have freedom of choice and if God had perfect knowledge of the future at the same time, then God could see me spill the drink on my shirt, but if I actually choose not to spill it, then God would be wrong. So, given your statement to this effect, tell me, How can God perfectly see the future and get it wrong? If I did not spill my drink, how could He possibly foresee me spilling it?! (you suggested that He would get it wrong) If I did not spill my drink, and God looked at the future, He would not see that I spilled it.

It's like you're saying that God cannot be trusted with knowing the future, because He could see the future as it will be and somehow get it wrong.

 Originally Posted By: västergötland

The cause and effect is still there, true. Your shirt becomes wet because you spilled a glas of drink on it. But if the future is fully known, then this cause must happen becaues it is predicted so. That drink will spill just as surely as Cyrus was born to overthrow Babylon.

The part of your comment which I've bolded is wrong. It isn't that it must happen, but rather that it will ... not because the future is fully known, but because that is the choice that will be made.

Your assertion above is wrong: that if the future is fully known then that foreknowledge fixes/determines the future.

 Originally Posted By: västergötland

On the other hand, with an open future, God could still make prophecy. The difference is that instead of telling the prophets about the future that in Gods eyes has already happened, He tells the prophets about what He plans to do. And surely God would have no problem with causing a child to be named Cyrus, then causing that child to be trained in leadership and warefare tactics and finaly through him open the gates of Babylon to kill a drunken king? In my view, exact prophecy is exact for the reason that God makes things happen. One could say He creates that which He has predicted.

The future is "open" ... and God's perfect foreknowledge in which the future is fully known by Him does not fix or determine the future. Just because God knows perfectly what will happen, does not mean that they must happen... it simply means that they will happen; but they will still happen because of our choices, not because of God's foreknowledge.

You are suggesting that the only way God can predict exact prophecies is for Him to cause them to happen. So then, since Jesus predicted that Peter would deny Him three times, then God caused Peter to deny Him. And since God predicted that Jesus would be betrayed for 30 pieces of silver, then God caused Judas to betray Jesus. Yet somehow, God still charges the sinner with these sins when God Himself would be the guilty party if what you say is correct: that these exact prophecies are exact only because God causes them to happen.

In the view of God knowing the future beforehand, instead of correctly saying "I chose to do this", and instead of casting blame by the excuse, "The devil made me do it", you would instead be saying, "God made me do this evil." That is a sad thing to suggest, and a very slippery slope!

It is written:

 Quote:

I am God, and there is none else; I am God, and there is none like me, Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done
-Isaiah 46:9,10

I don't what post this is you're citing, DenBorg, but I'll make a few comments. First of all, God's knowledge of the future is a bit of a red herring in this question. What is mutually exclusive is free will + future is fixed. It's really the nature of the future that's the problem. Is the future fixed, or is it comprised of possibilities?

Regarding your shirt getting wet. Is it possible that you not spill water on your shirt at the specified point in the future when God saw this taking place? That God saw it really doesn't matter. The salient point is that *anybody* could see it, whether God, or any other creature. If someone can see what will happen in the future, and what is seen will of a certainty take place, then, clearly, something different than what is seen will certainly *not* take place, and there goes free will, assuming a libertarian, or incompatibilistic, definition of free will, which gets to how free will is defined.

There are two main ways, theologically, that free will can be defined. One is that you are free to choose to do one of more than one mutually exclusive events (e.g., you can spill water on your shirt or not). The other is that you are free to do that which you choose to do.

Actually spilling water on your shirt isn't a good choice for an event, since that is likely something which happens accidentally, so does not involve free will, since you did not will for the water to fall on your shirt. So let's change this slightly to taking a drink of water, something you would choose consciously to do.

Ok, under the definition of free will that you are free to do that which you choose to do (compatibilistic), it doesn't matter if God (or anyone else) sees what you will do, since you are simply doing what you want to do regardless of whether it's seen or not.

However, under the incompatibilistic, or libertarian, definition, for you to have free will it must be possible for you to either choose to drink the water or not. If it can be seen that you definitely will drink the water (by God, or anyone else), then there is no possibility that you won't, so under the incompatibilistic definition you cannot be said to have free will.

So whether there is a contradiction involved viz a viz the future and free will depends upon your view of the future (fixed vs. open) and free will (compatibilistic definition, or incompatibilistic).

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

First of all, God's knowledge of the future is a bit of a red herring in this question. What is mutually exclusive is free will + future is fixed. It's really the nature of the future that's the problem. Is the future fixed, or is it comprised of possibilities?

No, I disagree. God's foreknowledge is not a red herring. For you are trying to tell us by your arguments that God's perfect foreknowledge would mean that the future is "fixed". So God's foreknowledge is not a red herring at all.

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

Regarding your shirt getting wet. Is it possible that you not spill water on your shirt at the specified point in the future when God saw this taking place? That God saw it really doesn't matter.

That is correct: It is possible that I not spill, and it is possible that I do spill ... it is based entirely upon my actions and choices, not upon whether God knows the outcome beforehand.

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

The salient point is that *anybody* could see it, whether God, or any other creature.

What?! Are you trying to tell us that we all omniscient and can see the future?! If so then I must wholeheartedly disagree.

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

If someone can see what will happen in the future, and what is seen will of a certainty take place, then, clearly, something different than what is seen will certainly *not* take place,

That is true ... if the future is perfectly seen (which it is by God, for His Holy and true Word tells us He is omniscient, and declares the end from the beginning), then what is seen to happen in the future will happen in the future ...

... but not because of what you are about to say next (that free will is out the window and that what happens is because of the foreknowledge instead of because of the choices made), but rather it will happen because of free will and the choices made.

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

and there goes free will,

No, free will does not go out the window. What is foreseen of the future will happen because of the choices made (i.e. free will), not because the foreknowledge somehow fixes the future.

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

assuming a libertarian, or incompatibilistic, definition of free will, which gets to how free will is defined.

There are two main ways, theologically, that free will can be defined. One is that you are free to choose to do one of more than one mutually exclusive events (e.g., you can spill water on your shirt or not). The other is that you are free to do that which you choose to do.

I'm sorry, but this is nonsense. This is not two different definitions of free will. This is only a difference in the type of choices presented to the person!

If you are faced with a choice of two mutually exclusive events (such as drinking or not drinking), and then an hour later you are faced with a choice of two events not mutually exclusive (having a sandwich and/or a piece of cake), does the definition of 'free will' oscillate between two differing definitions, simply because in one case you are faced with mutual exclusivity, and then in the other case you could do one or the other or both? No! The definition of 'free will' remains constant, regardless of whether you have to choose between two mutual exclusive things, or whether you can do one, the other, or both.

The definition of free will is very simple: as a free moral agent, you get to choose for yourself to act or to act otherwise without being coerced. This is true whether you must choose between A and B which are mutually exclusive, and whether you may choose between doing A, or B, or both A and B.

And when A and B are mutually exclusive events, the future will contain only A or B, not both. And whether it contains A or B is governed by the one faced with the choice. And if God definitely knew the decision made, that does not mean that the person was robbed of free will; it simply means that God knew exactly how it would turn out. But the future is what it is because of the person's choice, not because the future was somehow "fixed".

Some choices are mutually exclusive .. it is impossible to do both. For example, you can either take a drink, or you can not take a drink. But you cannot both drink and not drink. That is a choice between two mutually exclusive activities. It is a physical and logical impossibility to do both!

Other choices are not mutually exclusive. For example, you can choose to put money into the offering for local church budget, or you can put money in the offering for the upcoming evangelistic meetings. You can do one, or the other, or you can do both.

Either way, "you are free to do that which you choose to do".

In one case, the choices are mutually exclusive, and you are free to do that which you choose to do ... you can choose between the two mutually exclusive events.

In the other case, they are not mutually exclusive. But still, either way, you are free to do that which you choose to do.

In either case, these are two different types of choices, not two different definitions of free will. The first is an example of mutually exclusive activities. The other an example of two activities of which you can do one or the other, or you can do both.

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

Actually spilling water on your shirt isn't a good choice for an event, since that is likely something which happens accidentally, so does not involve free will, since you did not will for the water to fall on your shirt. So let's change this slightly to taking a drink of water, something you would choose consciously to do.

OK.

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

Ok, under the definition of free will that you are free to do that which you choose to do (compatibilistic), it doesn't matter if God (or anyone else) sees what you will do, since you are simply doing what you want to do regardless of whether it's seen or not.

However, under the incompatibilistic, or libertarian, definition, for you to have free will it must be possible for you to either choose to drink the water or not. If it can be seen that you definitely will drink the water (by God, or anyone else), then there is no possibility that you won't, so under the incompatibilistic definition you cannot be said to have free will.

In either "definition", it is possible for you to either drink or not drink. Contrary to your assertion above, simply because God knows beforehand what your decision will be, does not mean that God forced you to decide one way or the other.

Just because God sees the future perfectly for what it will be, does not mean that the future is predetermined by God. You are simply taking many words to say the following:

 Quote:

If God knows the future perfectly, then you have no free will, because His foreknowledge predetermines what will happen, and you have no choice in the matter. And since we do not believe that we are denied free will, then God cannot possibly know the future with perfect clarity.

This is all based upon the faulty premise that God's perfect foreknowledge of the future requires a fixed future.


Here is a quote from one of your previous posts:

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

 Quote:

First, the future isn’t determined by God’s foreknowledge.

Correct! However, it must be determined for God to have a foreknowledge

If God knows the future perfectly, and if it isn't our free will nor God's foreknowledge which determines/fixes the future, then what does fix it in this case? For you presuppose that if God knows the future perfectly, then we have no free will. Therefore, according to you, our free will cannot determine what the future will be like. But you have also previously said that God's foreknowledge, which requires the future to be fixed/predetermined, is not what fixes or predetermines the future. So what, exactly, according to your way of thinking, would have fixed the future?!

And considering the following two quotes of yours from a couple of previous posts:

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

This isn't quite accurate. God does not know *definitively* that portion of the future which is contingent on man's free choice.

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

 Quote:

For example, when God said to Peter, "You will deny me three times," was that just a really good guess of what he thought Peter might do, or did He cause Peter to sin, or was it simply God knowing the facts so well that He could know for certain the effects of future causes on Peter, or something else?

Of course He didn't cause Peter to sin. Do you really think that was a possibility?
God knew Peter's character. That was the main thing. He also knew what was about to happen. Certain elements of what would happen would depend upon the free will choice of sentient beings, but it certainly would not have been difficult to know that Peter would deny Christ. Again, God knew his character.

The question posed to you about whether Peter denied the Lord because God made him do so or because of his free choice, was prompted by Thomas' comment that "In my view, exact prophecy is exact for the reason that God makes things happen.", and you seem to at least partly support that idea.

I agree ... simply knowing Peter's character as well as did God, that alone would tell you that Peter would deny his Lord. However, while his character would indicate that he would deny his Lord, it cannot indicate that he would do so exactly three times, and exactly at the time Jesus said it would happen (before the cock crowed that very night).

So you are left with either God does know the future with perfect clarity, or God took a very big chance on being wrong by making such an exacting, precise prophecy.

Remember, Jesus did not say to Peter, "I know you so well, that I just know you will deny me." But rather, Jesus was very explicit and exact:

 Quote:

Jesus said to him, “Assuredly, I say to you that this night, before the rooster crows, you will deny Me three times.”
Matthew 26:34

Now, was this exact prophecy fulfilled because Peter had no choice because Jesus said that it will happen and therefore God made him deny Jesus three times, that very night, all before the cock crowed?

Or was it fulfilled because of the choices that Peter made, and God simply knew what his choice would be before Peter knew and He knew all of the explicit details because He knows the future with perfect clarity, but it still happened because Peter chose to do so? IOW, God knew it defintely, "assuredly", beforehand ... but this in no wise took away Peter's free will.

Tom:
First of all, God's knowledge of the future is a bit of a red herring in this question. What is mutually exclusive is free will + future is fixed. It's really the nature of the future that's the problem. Is the future fixed, or is it comprised of possibilities?

Denberg:No, I disagree. God's foreknowledge is not a red herring. For you are trying to tell us by your arguments that God's perfect foreknowledge would mean that the future is "fixed". So God's foreknowledge is not a red herring at all.

No, God's knowledge of the future has nothing to do with it's being fixed. If you think that's what's being argued, you haven't understood the argument.

Tom:Regarding your shirt getting wet. Is it possible that you not spill water on your shirt at the specified point in the future when God saw this taking place? That God saw it really doesn't matter.

DenBorg:That is correct: It is possible that I not spill, and it is possible that I do spill ... it is based entirely upon my actions and choices, not upon whether God knows the outcome beforehand.

It has never been suggested that God's knowing the outcome of an event causes it to happen. I'm getting the impression that you think this is what is being argued, but it's not.

Tom:
The salient point is that *anybody* could see it, whether God, or any other creature.

DenBorg:What?! Are you trying to tell us that we all omniscient and can see the future?! If so then I must wholeheartedly disagree.

I'm pretty amazed by this response. My point was that it doesn't matter who sees the future. The salient point is that the future is seeable. Pointing out that this is the salient point in no way suggests that anyone is omniscient. I have no idea why you would jump to this conclusion.

Tom:
If someone can see what will happen in the future, and what is seen will of a certainty take place, then, clearly, something different than what is seen will certainly *not* take place,

DenBorg:That is true ... if the future is perfectly seen (which it is by God, for His Holy and true Word tells us He is omniscient, and declares the end from the beginning), then what is seen to happen in the future will happen in the future ...

... but not because of what you are about to say next (that free will is out the window and that what happens is because of the foreknowledge instead of because of the choices made), but rather it will happen because of free will and the choices made.

The point is if the future is seeable (who sees it doesn't matter, just that it is something which can be seen) then it is fixed. If it is fixed, then only one thing can happen in the future. This is not addressing in any way, shape, or form the *cause* of the action.

You keep stressing, over and over, that God's seeing the future does not cause it to happen, but this has never been suggested. I've never addressed causality.

Tom:
and there goes free will,

DenBorg:No, free will does not go out the window.

It does assuming one is using the libertarian definition.

DenBorg:What is foreseen of the future will happen because of the choices made (i.e. free will), not because the foreknowledge somehow fixes the future.

It's irrelevant *why* the future will happen the way it will. *That* the future will happen the way it will is the salient point.


Tom:
assuming a libertarian, or incompatibilistic, definition of free will, which gets to how free will is defined.

There are two main ways, theologically, that free will can be defined. One is that you are free to choose to do one of more than one mutually exclusive events (e.g., you can spill water on your shirt or not). The other is that you are free to do that which you choose to do.

DenBorg:I'm sorry, but this is total absurdity! This is not two different definitions of free will.

I don't know why you assert something like this. This is just basic theology. Here's an introduction: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodicy

DenBorg: This is only a difference in the type of choices presented to the person!

It has nothing to do with types of choices. I just explained what the two main definitions for free will are, in theology.

DenBorg: Some choices are mutually exclusive .. it is impossible to do both. For example, you can either take a drink, or you can not take a drink. But you cannot both drink and not drink. That is a choice between two mutually exclusive activities. It is a physical and logical impossibility to do both!

Of course. Why are you making this point?

DenBord:Other choices are not mutually exclusive. For example, you can choose to put money into the offering for local church budget, or you can put money in the offering for the upcoming evangelistic meetings. You can do one, or the other, or you can do both.

Either way, "you are free to do that which you choose to do".

In one case, the choices are mutually exclusive, and you are free to do that which you choose to do ... you can choose between the two mutually exclusive events.

In the other case, they are not mutually exclusive. But still, either way, you are free to do that which you choose to do.

In either case, these are two different types of choices, not two different definitions of free will. The first is an example of mutually exclusive activities. The other an example of two activities of which you can do one or the other, or you can do both.

Why are you making these points?


Tom:
Actually spilling water on your shirt isn't a good choice for an event, since that is likely something which happens accidentally, so does not involve free will, since you did not will for the water to fall on your shirt. So let's change this slightly to taking a drink of water, something you would choose consciously to do.

DenBord: OK.


Tom:
Ok, under the definition of free will that you are free to do that which you choose to do (compatibilistic), it doesn't matter if God (or anyone else) sees what you will do, since you are simply doing what you want to do regardless of whether it's seen or not.

However, under the incompatibilistic, or libertarian, definition, for you to have free will it must be possible for you to either choose to drink the water or not. If it can be seen that you definitely will drink the water (by God, or anyone else), then there is no possibility that you won't, so under the incompatibilistic definition you cannot be said to have free will.

DenBorg:In either "definition", it is possible for you to either drink or not drink. Contrary to your assertion above, simply because God knows beforehand what your decision will be, does not mean that God forced you to decide one way or the other.

This has never been claimed. No assertion has been made about God's forcing anything to happen.

DenBorg: Just because God sees the future perfectly for what it will be, does not mean that the future is predetermined by God.

Or course not. This has not been asserted.

DenBorg: You are simply taking many words to say the following:

Quote:
If God knows the future perfectly, then you have no free will, because His foreknowledge predetermines what will happen, and you have no choice in the matter.

I've never asserted this. What you have quoted is no logically valid.

DenBorg: Here is a quote from one of your previous posts:

Quote:
First, the future isn’t determined by God’s foreknowledge.

DenBorg: Correct! However, it must be determined for God to have a foreknowledge.

If God knows the future perfectly, and if it isn't our free will nor God's foreknowledge which determines/fixes the future, then what does fix it in this case?

Nothing fixes it. It's not fixed. It's open.

DenBorg: For you presuppose that if God knows the future perfectly, then we have no free will.

God's knowledge of the future is irrelevant to what I've been saying. You keep making this same assertion over and over, but what you are suggesting has never been argued, at least not by me.

DenBorg: Therefore, according to you, our free will cannot determine what the future will be like. But you have also previously said that God's foreknowledge, which requires the future to be fixed/predetermined, is not what fixes or predetermines the future. So what, exactly, according to your way of thinking, would have fixed the future?!

I have not previously said that God's foreknowledge requires the future to be fixed. Actually I think I know what you mean, but you're not being very precise in stating it. It would probably be a good idea to quote something directly, then comment on that, rather than repeatedly make assertions that I've said things I haven't said.

DenBorg: And considering the following two quotes of yours from a couple of previous posts:

Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall
This isn't quite accurate. God does not know *definitively* that portion of the future which is contingent on man's free choice.

Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall
Quote:
For example, when God said to Peter, "You will deny me three times," was that just a really good guess of what he thought Peter might do, or did He cause Peter to sin, or was it simply God knowing the facts so well that He could know for certain the effects of future causes on Peter, or something else?
Of course He didn't cause Peter to sin. Do you really think that was a possibility?
God knew Peter's character. That was the main thing. He also knew what was about to happen. Certain elements of what would happen would depend upon the free will choice of sentient beings, but it certainly would not have been difficult to know that Peter would deny Christ. Again, God knew his character.

The question posed to you about whether Peter denied the Lord because God made him do so or because of his free choice, was prompted by Thomas' comment that "In my view, exact prophecy is exact for the reason that God makes things happen.", and you seem to at least partly support that idea.

I agree ... simply knowing Peter's character as well as did God, that alone would tell you that Peter would deny his Lord. However, while his character would indicate that he would deny his Lord, it cannot indicate that he would do so exactly three times, and exactly at the time Jesus said it would happen (before the cock crowed that very night).

So you are left with either God does know the future with perfect clarity, or God took a very big chance on being wrong by making such an exacting, precise prophecy.

Even the Gospel writers don't agree as to the details of the story. Surely the important thing isn't how many times the cock would crow, but that Peter would deny Christ. How did Christ know Peter would deny Him? Because He knew his character.

DenBorg: Remember, Jesus did not say to Peter, "I know you so well, that I just know you will deny me." But rather, Jesus was very explicit and exact:

Say there are a trillion possible futures, as of the time Jesus was speaking to Peter. In all of those trillion futures, God saw that Peter would deny Christ before the cock crowed some number of times. There is no logical problem with God's being able to predict the future, and there being more than one possible future.

I've never argued that God cannot see the future perfectly, only that the future is not fixed, which is to say, there is no one future. There are many possible futures, which is exactly what God sees. He doesn't see the one future of what will happen, because there is no such thing.

Quote:
Jesus said to him, “Assuredly, I say to you that this night, before the rooster crows, you will deny Me three times.”
Matthew 26:34

Now, was this exact prophecy fulfilled because Peter had no choice because Jesus said that it will happen and therefore God made him deny Jesus three times, that very night, all before the cock crowed?

Or was it fulfilled because of the choices that Peter made, and God simply knew what his choice would be before Peter knew and He knew all of the explicit details because He knows the future with perfect clarity, but it still happened because Peter chose to do so? IOW, God knew it defintely, "assuredly", beforehand ... but this in no wise took away Peter's free will.

The prophesy was fulfilled because God knew Peter's character, and knew what he would do.

Yes, God does at times get involved to make sure things play out in a way that will guarantee a positive outcome of the great controversy. However, even His future involvement is part of the prophecy. Of course in the case of Peter God did not cause Him to deny Jesus three times, not any more than God hardened Pharaoh’s heart.


It will happen because God’s foreknowledge of our future choices is infallible. If need be, however, God will get involved to make sure things play out according to His will. Under certain circumstances God’s “will” is what is best given the unusual circumstances (i.e. a world full of sin and sinners).


God’s foreknowledge is based on 20/20 hindsight. He knows the end from the beginning, therefore, He has already watched it play out, like watching a rerun. As such, God’s knowledge of our future choices, and His personal involvement, is based on hindsight. He simply reports the facts before the fact based on the fact He knows the facts after the fact. Only God knows the end from the beginning and to he or she who God chooses to share it.


From God’s perspective our future choices are “fixed” in the sense He knows exactly how we are going to choose. There are no surprise endings for God. But from our perspective, unless God chooses to reveal the future to us, we have no idea how we are going to choose in the future. As such, the future is open. The fact God knows the future in no way robs us of our ability or freedom to choose. His knowledge of the future is based on hindsight, not guess work. Like watching a rerun in no way effects the outcome, so too, God's knowledge of the future in no way effects the outcome.


True, but God knows exactly how we will choose because He knows the future like a rerun. In this sense there are no surprises for God.


True, God does not force an outcome that violates our ability and freedom to choose. Simply telling us in advance, based on His ability to know the future like a rerun, does not in the least mean He forces it to happen.


True. However, the fact is only God knows the future like a rerun because only God knows the end from the beginning. Satan does not know the future like a rerun. He can only guess what will happen based on his knowledge of the character of the people involved. God’s knowledge of the future doesn’t depend on His knowledge of the character of the people involved. His knowledge of the future is based on hindsight.


If God cannot foreknow or foretell the one and only future that will eventually play out how, then, was He able to know the precise details surrounding Peter’s future denial of Jesus? I agree God knew Peter well enough to guess that his future involved him denying Jesus. God knew that about all of the disciples. However, in Peter’s case God knew precise details. How was that possible?

Yes, the gospel writers recorded it differently, but it doesn’t do away with the fact that what Jesus did say was in reality completely and precisely right. There were too many variables in this case for Jesus to have gotten it right based solely on knowing Peter was capable of denying Him.

We cannot overlook the fact Jesus knew details that required more knowledge of the future than simply knowing Peter was capable of denying Him. Jesus knew the details because God shared them with Jesus. And God knew the details in advance because God knows the future like a rerun. His knowledge of the future is based on 20/20 hindsight.

This phrase, that "God knows the end from the beginning," means that God knows what will happen from the beginning, not that He has watched it play out like a rerun. "Like a rerun" is a particularly poor choice of phrases, because it implies something which is inevitable. If there is only one possible future, then we cannot bring about a different one, but merely play out whatever fate has already been seen.

Consider two roads. What is at the end of these roads? God knows. One road leads to blessings, the other doesn't. God counsels us to to choose the good road, and forsake the other. He knows what will happen in either case.

This is what the phrase means, that God "sees the end from the beginning."

There is a possible logical problem here, although not a causative one. That is, no one would argue that God's knowledge of the future forces it to happen. However, if there is only one possible future that can happen, then we do not have the ability to bring about a different future than the one that can happen. Hence, we cannot be said to have free will, under the libertarian definition (the ability to choose between more than one options at a given time), although we can be said to have free will under the compatibilistic definition (which is that we are free to do that which we want to do).

Given that our perspective is different than God's, whose perspective is likely to be accurate? God's, where there is only one possible future (the one He sees, and knows will happen) or ours? Our point of view is based on ignorance. We mistakenly think we can choose between different options, but there is only one possible option we can choose, which is, of course, the one that will happen in the one possible future.

It is not God's knowledge of the future that makes it inevitable that we will make the given choice that the one possible future holds, but rather, the fact that there is only one possible future that can happen. *This is where the problem lies".



Of course not! However, there only being one possible future makes it logically impossible for us to choose to do anything contrary to what will happen. There is only one choice that can logically be made by us (dictated by the one possible future). God's knowledge of the future is irrelevant to the fact that there being one possible future makes it logically impossible for us to do something other than that which must inevitably come to pass.



No. His knowledge of the future is based on foresight, which is based on His intelligence, the same as our is. He doesn't have some mystical power to look into a crystal ball. His knowledge of the future is based on His being all-knowing.



This really isn't the issue. The issue isn't the rerun being affected by the person watching it (which, of course, no one asserts), but on the rerun existing in the first place. Is there such a rerun? Are our lives simply "reruns" waiting to be played out? If God sees them as such, then they are, because how God sees things is how they really are. God's perspective of reality is reality.

Tom, the idea that God cannot know the futurte like a rerun is unbiblical. God's knowledge of the outcome of our future choices is not based on what we "will" do; rather, it is based on what we "did" do. As such, our options at the time are open, not fixed or determined. In other words, we are free to choose because God's knowledge is based on what we chose after the fact, not before.

Tom, the idea that God cannot know the futurte like a rerun is unbiblical. God's knowledge of the outcome of our future choices is not based on what we "will" do; rather, it is based on what we "did" do. As such, our options at the time are open, not fixed or determined. In other words, we are free to choose because God's knowledge is based on what we chose after the fact, not before.

My comments have been dealing with the contradiction between the idea that there is only one possible future and our having free will (under the libertarian definition). God's knowledge of the future doesn't matter insofar as this contradiction is concerned.

For you to state that God's knowledge of future choices is based on what we "did" do is to make crystal clear our inability to alter what will happen in the future, since it's something we "did" (Clearly nothing we "did" can be changed).

Our ability to choose has nothing to do with God's knowledge of the event, so whether God's knowledge is based on what we choose after the fact or before is irrelevant to the contradiction I've been pointing out.

Aside from that, I don't see how your last sentence makes any sense. It looks like you are confusing God's seeing a thing happening with the thing actually happening. That is, God's knowledge of what we choose to do is "after the fact" of His seeing what we will do. But it is before the fact of our actually doing it, which is the germain thing as far as are free will is concerned, since our free will has to do with the choices we make, not with God's foresight of those choices.

Tom, God's knowledge of the future, as you say, has nothing to do with our ability and freedom to choose. I agree. God is not bound by space and time like you and me, therefore, His knowledge of the past, present, and future has no beginning or ending. We are totally free to choose as we please. Yes, God knows in advance exactly how we will choose, but it in no way means we are not free to choose.

I will never understand why you believe it means our abilty and freedom to choose is altered or limited. You seem to think it doesn't matter who knows how we will choose, that if it is known in advance it means we are not truly free to choose. Perhaps you are right, but the fact is we are talking about God and not just anybody. There are things about our omnicient, omnipresent God we cannot fully grasp. The fact He knows the future like a rerun is amazing. Personally, I'm glad it is true. I know He is totally in control. Amen!

God knows in advance exactly how we will choose, but it in no way means we are not free to choose.

What makes us not free to choose is not God's knowledge of the future, but its essence (i.e., the future as you perceive it to be; there's only one way things can happen). That is, it is an ontological issue, not an epistemological one, which I've pointed out to you quite a number of times now, but you keep responding with the same points, which makes me think you've not gotten the point (which could be my fault; perhaps I'm not communicating it clearly enough)

I will never understand why you believe it means our abilty and freedom to choose is altered or limited.

I think you problem in not being able to understand here is based on your trying to understand something which is not being asserted. You keep phrasing the issue as if it were epistemological as opposed to ontological, but the issue you keep addressing is not one that I am raising.

You seem to think it doesn't matter who knows how we will choose, that if it is known in advance it means we are not truly free to choose.

It doesn't matter in regards to the contradiction I pointed out, which is that if there is only one possible future, then our options are limited to that one possible future. Once again, this is ontological, not epistemological.

Perhaps you are right, but the fact is we are talking about God and not just anybody.

Which is immaterial to the point I've been making.

There are things about our omniscient, omnipresent God we cannot fully grasp. The fact He knows the future like a rerun is amazing.

I'm a bit perplexed as to why you would think this would be amazing. This would be almost infinitely easier to do than what I'm suggesting God actually does.

Personally, I'm glad it is true. I know He is totally in control.

Your conclusion doesn't at all follow your premise here. That is, even if God saw the future like a rerun, that has nothing to do with His "being in control."

I'm a bit disappointed that you haven't addressed the issue I've been raising. You keep going off on tangents. I'm not sure if you're doing this on purpose (because you don't want to discuss the issue I've been raising) or just because you haven't understood it (I'm inclined to believe it's the latter).

In a nutshell, here is the point I've been trying to make:

If there is only one way in which things can happen in the future, then it cannot be the case that we have free will (under the libertarian definition - which asserts that we have the ability to bring about one of more than one possible options at a given moment).

I would be curious as to what your response to this point is. (You may note that there is no mention of "God" in this point. This is because my point is not epistemological -- about God's knowing something -- but ontological -- about the essence of the future).

The future is open. Our choices are unlimited. Nothing prevents us from choosing. Our options are numerous. That's how I see the future. That's how the future is. The fact God knows the outcome in advance, like a rerun, in no way means our choices were reduced to one before we decided on a course of action.

I agree with you that this means the outcome is limited to one future, but I disagree that it means our options, our choices before the fact were limited to one. We are totally free, before the fact, to choose as we please, nevertheless, God knows the outcome like a rerun. His knowing the future like a rerun in no way means our options, before the fact, are limited to one.

Again, we're talking about God, who is not limited by time or space. It does matter that we are talking about God and not just anybody. Only God is everywhere at the same time. No one seems to be bothered by the fact God is omnipresent, that He is everwhere at the same time. Why, then, should we be bothered by the fact God is omnicient, that He knows the future like a rerun?

The future is open. Our choices are unlimited. Nothing prevents us from choosing. Our options are numerous. That's how I see the future.

So are you saying that there is more than one way for things to happen in the future? This is the key question. Is there actually more than one way for things to happen? Or do we just *think* there is more than one, because of our inability to see the future?

That's how the future is. The fact God knows the outcome in advance, like a rerun, in no way means our choices were reduced to one before we decided on a course of action.

Our choices are restricted, logically, if there's only one possible way things can happen in the future. Is it possible for things to happen more than one way in the future?

I agree with you that this means the outcome is limited to one future, but I disagree that it means our options, our choices before the fact were limited to one.

Whoa! Which is it? Is there more than one possible future (which your statement that we have numerous options implies) or just one (which your new statement here implies, "I agree with you that this means the outcome is limited to one future." Which is it? One possible future, or more than one?

We are totally free, before the fact, to choose as we please,

Before what fact? The fact our choosing what we will do, or the fact of God's seeing what choice we will make? Clearly God sees what we will do before we choose what we will do. So this comes down to asking if it is possible for use to do something other than what God sees we will do.

nevertheless, God knows the outcome like a rerun. His knowing the future like a rerun in no way means our options, before the fact, are limited to one.

It does if there's only one possible future! *That's* the question you need to answer. Either there is one possible future (e.g., the one God sees), or there is more than one possible future.

Again, we're talking about God, who is not limited by time or space.

[color]Actually, again, we're talking about the future, which is limited by time and space.[/color]

It does matter that we are talking about God and not just anybody.

No, it doesn't, because the subject matter is not a being, but a time.

Only God is everywhere at the same time. No one seems to be bothered by the fact God is omnipresent, that He is everwhere at the same time. Why, then, should we be bothered by the fact God is omnicient, that He knows the future like a rerun?

Well, I think you're limiting God's omniscience to be much less than what it really is by limiting the future. But, again, how God views things really is immaterial to my point, which is that if there is only one possible way the future can happen, then we do not have free will (under the libertarian definition). You appear to be agreeing with this assertion in saying, "I agree with you that this means the outcome is limited to one future" but then you contradict yourself in saying, "I disagree that it means our options, our choices before the fact were limited to one." Clearly if the outcome is "limited to one future," then our choices are limited to one as well.

Before the fact versus after the fact. By "fact" I mean the choice we made and the outcome. Before the fact our options are many. We are free to choose as we please. But after the fact it is a done deal. We cannot go back and alter the fact. There is only one fact after the fact.

If it is known in advance exactly what we will choose (of the many options available to us) then the future is one future. However, such knowledge, before the fact, does not mean our options were limited to one. But it does mean that the outcome, after the fact, will be one. It also means, in spite of the many options available to us before the fact, that we will certainly choose the one that yields the known outcome.

It should be clear, though, that we were free, before the fact, to choose the one option that yields the known outcome. Knowing the outcome in advance in no way robs us of our options or our ability or freedom to choose as we please. God's knowledge of the future does not rob us of our options. Instead, it reflects the outcome of our freedom to choose as we please. God not only knows in advance all of our options and all of the outcomes, He also knows exactly which option we will choose and the exact outcome.

I've pointed out quite a number of times that the issue is ontological (having to do with being) not epistemological (having do to with knowledge). You correctly deduce, given your hypothesis, "then the future is one future." Then you write, "However, such *knoweldge* ...." The problem is not knowledge!

If the future is one future, then the problem is one of *being*. That is, the reason we can't make more than one choice is because there is "one future." If we could make some other choice, other than the one future choice, then there would be more than one future. One future = one choice.

Really, this should be very easy to see.

One future = one choice.

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

Tom:
First of all, God's knowledge of the future is a bit of a red herring in this question. What is mutually exclusive is free will + future is fixed. It's really the nature of the future that's the problem. Is the future fixed, or is it comprised of possibilities?

Denberg:No, I disagree. God's foreknowledge is not a red herring. For you are trying to tell us by your arguments that God's perfect foreknowledge would mean that the future is "fixed". So God's foreknowledge is not a red herring at all.

No, God's knowledge of the future has nothing to do with it's being fixed. If you think that's what's being argued, you haven't understood the argument.

I know that God's foreknowledge of the future has nothing to do with the future being fixed.

My point is, you claim that if God had perfect foreknowledge of the future, then the future would be fixed. Yet you claim that it being fixed would have nothing to do with our actions (because you say that free will would be out the window) nor God's actions (because you say that God's foreknowledge doesn't fix the future).

So, under that scenario, where God knows the future perfectly, a scenario that you claim would mean that the future is fixed, what would be the cause of it being fixed?!! And you saying, "I haven't commented on causality" doesn't cut the mustard. You must have a reason for ruling out both our actions and God's actions as potential causalities.

So I ask again, If God knows the future perfectly, please tell us how you can claim that our choices/actions and God's choices/actions would have nothing to do with what that future looks like!

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

Tom:
The salient point is that *anybody* could see it, whether God, or any other creature.

DenBorg:What?! Are you trying to tell us that we all omniscient and can see the future?! If so then I must wholeheartedly disagree.

I'm pretty amazed by this response. My point was that it doesn't matter who sees the future. The salient point is that the future is seeable. Pointing out that this is the salient point in no way suggests that anyone is omniscient. I have no idea why you would jump to this conclusion.

No jumping is necessary. Please follow along ...

You said, and I quote: The salient point is that *anybody* could see it, whether God, or any other creature.

If *anybody* could see the future, then *anybody* can see what the winning lottery numbers will be; *anybody* can see who wins the game; *anybody* can see when someone will die. Psychics claim to see the future this way, but only God sees the future like this. This is called "all-knowing", omniscience.

Unless what you were attempting to say was, IF anybody could see the future, then said future is fixed. IOW, it does not matter *who* sees the future, if it is seen then it is fixed (regardless of who did the seeing). But you have not proven this point at all.

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

DenBorg: Some choices are mutually exclusive .. it is impossible to do both. For example, you can either take a drink, or you can not take a drink. But you cannot both drink and not drink. That is a choice between two mutually exclusive activities. It is a physical and logical impossibility to do both!

Of course. Why are you making this point?

Because you claim that this is one definition of free will, and the other definition of free will is having multiple choices which are not mutually exclusive.

I am telling you that your two definitions of free will are nonsense.

Your nonsensical definition:

 Quote:

There are two main ways, theologically, that free will can be defined. One is that you are free to choose to do one of more than one mutually exclusive events (e.g., you can spill water on your shirt or not). The other is that you are free to do that which you choose to do.

Now, follow along ...

According to you, two definitions of free will:

1. choice between two mutually exclusive options
2. free to do that which you choose to do

If a person is faced with a choice to either drink or not to drink (two mutually exclusive choices ... cannot both drink and not drink), you are saying that free will is defined one way. (definition #1). So, tell me then, why doesn't definition #2 apply? How is this person not free to do which he chooses to do (i.e. drink or not drink).

Now that same person is faced with a different choice ... the choice of wearing a white shirt, a blue shirt, or a red shirt. Furthermore, will this person wear the black tie, the blue tie, or the grey tie? Now these choices are not mutually exclusive, therefore we must be looking at definition #2, so now you are now suggesting that somehow the true definition of free will has somehow changed, just by virtue of the type of choices the person is faced with!

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

DenBorg: Just because God sees the future perfectly for what it will be, does not mean that the future is predetermined by God.

Or course not. This has not been asserted.

But you have asserted that it means that the future "is predetermined".

The only possible agents that cause the future to be what it is are:

1) our choices/actions; and,
2) God's choices/actions.

But you say that our free will would be out the window, so that would mean we have no affect on the future. And logically the only remaining cause of the future is God's choices/actions.

Unless you can identify and substantiate a third agent that causes the future to be what it is. But, WOW! What could be more powerful than God?

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

If God knows the future perfectly, and if it isn't our free will nor God's foreknowledge which determines/fixes the future, then what does fix it in this case?

Nothing fixes it. It's not fixed. It's open.

I know nothing fixes, that it is open.

But YOU have claimed numerous times that if God knew the future perfectly, then the future would have to be fixed. And it was from this context that my comment was made, and you know it. So don't suddenly try to "play dumb".

So according to you, Tom, assuming that God knows the future perfectly, what fixed the future?!

And unless you have evidence of some third party, you cannot arbitrarily claim that it was neither us (because we would have no free will) nor was it God (because His foreknowledge does not fix the future), that it must be some sort of unidentified more-powerful-than-God entity for which you have no evidence.

You cannot rule out both our own choices/actions, and also God's choices/actions as determining agents on what the future looks like without any evidence that shows some third agent coming into play.

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

I have not previously said that God's foreknowledge requires the future to be fixed. Actually I think I know what you mean, but you're not being very precise in stating it. It would probably be a good idea to quote something directly, then comment on that, rather than repeatedly make assertions that I've said things I haven't said.

Yes you have, Tom. Quit playing dumb.

You know full well that you have repeatedly made statements that claim that if God knew the future perfectly (as if He could see it as a rerun), then we have no choice concerning our future actions and the future is fixed.

Are you wishing to recant all such statements of yours?

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

Even the Gospel writers don't agree as to the details of the story. Surely the important thing isn't how many times the cock would crow, but that Peter would deny Christ. How did Christ know Peter would deny Him? Because He knew his character.

Why are you making this point about how many times the cock would crow?! No one was talking about that!!

And knowing Peter's character cannot tell you how many times Peter would deny Him. Character cannot tell you that. Neither can character tell you that it would happen before the cock crowed. All character would tell you is that when/if given the opportunity, Peter would deny Jesus. Character cannot give you all the prophetic details that Jesus prophesied.

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

Say there are a trillion possible futures, as of the time Jesus was speaking to Peter. In all of those trillion futures, God saw that Peter would deny Christ before the cock crowed some number of times. There is no logical problem with God's being able to predict the future, and there being more than one possible future.

It would not matter how many possible futures there could be ... if Peter denied Jesus in all of them, the future would be just as fixed as if there were only one future.

If, as according to you, the future would have to be fixed if God knew exactly how it would play out as if He could see Peter denying Jesus on a TV rerun, then Peter's denying Jesus would be just as fixed for Peter even with a trillion futures, all of which have him denying Jesus.

What difference is there between:

A) One single "fixed" future in which Peter denies Jesus and has no choice in the matter because (according to you, Tom), free will is out the window.

and,

B) Having an "open" future and having free will and being faced with choosing between the following possible futures:

1. Deny Jesus
2. Deny Jesus
3. Deny Jesus
4. Deny Jesus
5. Deny Jesus
6. Deny Jesus
7. Deny Jesus
8. Deny Jesus
9. Deny Jesus
10. Deny Jesus
...
...
...
1 trillion. Deny Jesus

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

I've never argued that God cannot see the future perfectly,

Sure you have ... that is what this whole thread has been about.

You argue that if God knew the future perfectly (sometimes likened unto seeing it as a TV rerun), then the future must be fixed (but not by God's foreknowledge), and that free will is out the window (i.e. we would have no affect on the future).

Are you getting senile on us?

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

I've never argued that God cannot see the future perfectly, only that the future is not fixed,

But no one (except for you) ever said anything about the future being fixed. You've been trying to use the fact that the future is not fixed to prove that God does not know the future perfectly, that He is only a very good guesser when He makes these exacting, precise, prophecies.

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

... which is to say, there is no one future. There are many possible futures, which is exactly what God sees. He doesn't see the one future of what will happen, because there is no such thing.

So, there is not just one future ... hmmm ... so then there are parallel universes or time lines, one for each possibility.

I mean no disrespect by this, but I must ask: Do you watch a lot of StarTrek?

I like to watch it too, but I don't believe that there are multiple futures, one in which I chose to take a drink, and another in which I chose not to take a drink.

No, I don't claim this. I claim God *does* have prefect foreknowledge of the future. I claim that the future is not a single-threaded thing, comprised of just certainties, but is instead more complicated, being comprised of possibilities as well as certainties.

Where we disagree is in regards to the nature of the future, not the nature of God's foreknowledge. We both agree that God has perfect foreknowledge.



No, I don't claim this either. Actually I'm not following this, since you say, parenthetically, that I say that free will would be out the window. If I'm saying free will would be out the window, then clearly the future being fixed has something to do with our actions, right?



No, I don't claim that God's knowing the future perfectly would mean the future is fixed. As I've pointed out many, many times, I believe God does know the future perfectly. God knows the future perfectly, just as it is, which is not fixed. Once again, our difference of opinion is regarding the nature of the future, not regarding God's foreknowledge.



I'm not following you here. At any rate, your question seems to be predicated on things I haven't been claiming, so there's probably no need for me to comment further, regarding this question, than that.

Because you claim that this is one definition of free will, and the other definition of free will is having multiple choices which are not mutually exclusive.

I am telling you that your two definitions of free will are nonsense.

Your nonsensical definition:
Quote:
There are two main ways, theologically, that free will can be defined. One is that you are free to choose to do one of more than one mutually exclusive events (e.g., you can spill water on your shirt or not). The other is that you are free to do that which you choose to do.


Now, follow along ...

According to you, two definitions of free will:

1. choice between two mutually exclusive options
2. free to do that which you choose to do

If a person is faced with a choice to either drink or not to drink (two mutually exclusive choices ... cannot both drink and not drink), you are saying that free will is defined one way. (definition #1). So, tell me then, why doesn't definition #2 apply? How is this person not free to do which he chooses to do (i.e. drink or not drink).

Now that same person is faced with a different choice ... the choice of wearing a white shirt, a blue shirt, or a red shirt. Furthermore, will this person wear the black tie, the blue tie, or the grey tie? Now these choices are not mutually exclusive, therefore we must be looking at definition #2, so now you are now suggesting that somehow the true definition of free will has somehow changed, just by virtue of the type of choices the person is faced with!

These are not my definitions. They are standard. One is a definition of incompatible (also called libertarian) free will, and the other of compatible free will.

Here's a place to take a look which presents the definitions I've been referring to in more detail:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will

Why are you making this point about how many times the cock would crow?! No one was talking about that!!

I don't remember. It's been quite a while since I posted this.

And knowing Peter's character cannot tell you how many times Peter would deny Him. Character cannot tell you that. Neither can character tell you that it would happen before the cock crowed. All character would tell you is that when/if given the opportunity, Peter would deny Jesus. Character cannot give you all the prophetic details that Jesus prophesied.

Ok, I think I see the point now. Even the gospel writers do not agree amongst themselves regarding the detail of the story, so how many times the cock crowed, or how many times Peter would deny Christ, was evidently not the important point. The important point was that Peter would deny Christ.

As to how Christ knew that, I'm sure God revealed this to Him. As to how God knew this, God has perfect foreknowledge, and saw what Peter would do.

Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall
Say there are a trillion possible futures, as of the time Jesus was speaking to Peter. In all of those trillion futures, God saw that Peter would deny Christ before the cock crowed some number of times. There is no logical problem with God's being able to predict the future, and there being more than one possible future.
It would not matter how many possible futures there could be ... if Peter denied Jesus in all of them, the future would be just as fixed as if there were only one future.

If, as according to you, the future would have to be fixed if God knew exactly how it would play out as if He could see Peter denying Jesus on a TV rerun, then Peter's denying Jesus would be just as fixed for Peter even with a trillion futures, all of which have him denying Jesus.

What difference is there between:

A) One single "fixed" future in which Peter denies Jesus and has no choice in the matter because (according to you, Tom), free will is out the window.

and,

B) Having an "open" future and having free will and being faced with choosing between the following possible futures:

1. Deny Jesus
2. Deny Jesus
3. Deny Jesus
4. Deny Jesus
5. Deny Jesus
6. Deny Jesus
7. Deny Jesus
8. Deny Jesus
9. Deny Jesus
10. Deny Jesus
...
...
...
1 trillion. Deny Jesus

Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall
I've never argued that God cannot see the future perfectly,
Sure you have ... that is what this whole thread has been about.

You argue that if God knew the future perfectly (sometimes likened unto seeing it as a TV rerun), then the future must be fixed (but not by God's foreknowledge), and that free will is out the window (i.e. we would have no affect on the future).

Are you getting senile on us?

I don't think you're understanding what I'm saying, and you're not being very kind. If you're really wanting to discuss this in a civilized manner, I'll be happy to oblige. I can also point you to references on line where you can read more about the subject. This isn't something I've made up.

Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall
I've never argued that God cannot see the future perfectly, only that the future is not fixed,
But no one (except for you) ever said anything about the future being fixed. You've been trying to use the fact that the future is not fixed to prove that God does not know the future perfectly, that He is only a very good guesser when He makes these exacting, precise, prophecies.

Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall
... which is to say, there is no one future. There are many possible futures, which is exactly what God sees. He doesn't see the one future of what will happen, because there is no such thing.
So, there is not just one future ... hmmm ... so then there are parallel universes or time lines, one for each possibility.

I mean no disrespect by this, but I must ask: Do you watch a lot of StarTrek?

I like to watch it too, but I don't believe that there are multiple futures, one in which I chose to take a drink, and another in which I chose not to take a drink.

I'm sorry you're having difficulty understanding me. Perhaps reading someone else would be easier. If you google "partly open future" you can find some good material.

I skipped this one inadvertently, so I'm responding to it out of order.

DenBorg: Just because God sees the future perfectly for what it will be, does not mean that the future is predetermined by God.

Or course not. This has not been asserted.
But you have asserted that it means that the future "is predetermined".

The only possible agents that cause the future to be what it is are:

1) our choices/actions; and,
2) God's choices/actions.

But you say that our free will would be out the window, so that would mean we have no affect on the future. And logically the only remaining cause of the future is God's choices/actions.

Unless you can identify and substantiate a third agent that causes the future to be what it is. But, WOW! What could be more powerful than God?

I'm not really following you here. For one thing, it's been quite a while since I originally posted this, so it's difficult to remember my train of thought from that far back. I'll repost what my argument is, and if you wish, we can discuss that.

If we accept the libertarian definition of free will, a person can be said to have free will if he has the ability to "do this" or "do that". That is, if there is a fork in the road, they have free will if they have the ability to take either fork.

If the future is fixed, then that means it is certain that they will, for example, bear left (not go right). If it is certain that they will bear left, then they do not have the ability to bear left (it's not possible to do something different from what is certain to happen). This is what causes free will (under the libertarian definition, which is the one commonly used by SDA's) to go "out the window."

Please notice that this argument is not dependent upon God's foreknowledge (in fact, I didn't reference God at all in the argument).

Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall
If God knows the future perfectly, and if it isn't our free will nor God's foreknowledge which determines/fixes the future, then what does fix it in this case?

Nothing fixes it. It's not fixed. It's open.
I know nothing fixes, that it is open.

But YOU have claimed numerous times that if God knew the future perfectly, then the future would have to be fixed. And it was from this context that my comment was made, and you know it. So don't suddenly try to "play dumb".

I have never claimed this. You've gotten the wrong idea somehow, and keep repeating it, but I've never said this.

So according to you, Tom, assuming that God knows the future perfectly, what fixed the future?!

This is assuming a premise that is untrue.

And unless you have evidence of some third party, you cannot arbitrarily claim that it was neither us (because we would have no free will) nor was it God (because His foreknowledge does not fix the future), that it must be some sort of unidentified more-powerful-than-God entity for which you have no evidence.

You cannot rule out both our own choices/actions, and also God's choices/actions as determining agents on what the future looks like without any evidence that shows some third agent coming into play.

Again, this whole line of reasoning is predicated on something I have never claimed.

Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall
I have not previously said that God's foreknowledge requires the future to be fixed. Actually I think I know what you mean, but you're not being very precise in stating it. It would probably be a good idea to quote something directly, then comment on that, rather than repeatedly make assertions that I've said things I haven't said.
Yes you have, Tom. Quit playing dumb.

You know full well that you have repeatedly made statements that claim that if God knew the future perfectly (as if He could see it as a rerun), then we have no choice concerning our future actions and the future is fixed.

Are you wishing to recant all such statements of yours?

No, but I would like it if you were kinder in tone. Also I think you could be read my posts more attentively. Before attacking a point of view you may not have properly understood, I think it would be better to start off by ask clarifying questions.

TE: I claim God *does* have prefect foreknowledge of the future. I claim that the future is not a single-threaded thing, comprised of just certainties, but is instead more complicated, being comprised of possibilities as well as certainties.

MM: Tom, you mean something very much different than the rest of us when you say "God has perfect knowledge of the future". We believe it means God knows in advance precisely how things will play out; whereas you believe it means God knows all of the ways it could play out but that He doesn't know in advance precisely which way it will play out.

I don't remember what you believe about prophecies which pinpoint precise details in advance. If memory serves me well, you believe such prophecies reflect details about the future which cannot, given the circumstances, play out any other way. Please correct me if I've misrepresented your view.

For example, I seem to recall you saying the unfulfilled prophecies of Rev 13 will play out exactly as described in the GC, and that the reason God knows these details in advance is because He has perfect knowledge of how the key players will behave. What I don't remember is how God knows this 2,000 years in advance. How do you explain it?

TE: I claim God *does* have prefect foreknowledge of the future. I claim that the future is not a single-threaded thing, comprised of just certainties, but is instead more complicated, being comprised of possibilities as well as certainties.

MM: Tom, you mean something very much different than the rest of us when you say "God has perfect knowledge of the future". We believe it means God knows in advance precisely how things will play out; whereas you believe it means God knows all of the ways it could play out but that He doesn't know in advance precisely which way it will play out.

What "God has perfect knowledge of the future" is that God knows the future perfectly, just as it is in reality. God's knowledge of the future corresponds perfectly to the reality of the future.

You, or others of like ilk, may be reading into the phrase what you believe the content of the future to be, but this does not belong there. That is, what we disagree about is the content of the future that God perfectly knows. But we both agree that God knows and sees that content perfectly.

I don't remember what you believe about prophecies which pinpoint precise details in advance. If memory serves me well, you believe such prophecies reflect details about the future which cannot, given the circumstances, play out any other way. Please correct me if I've misrepresented your view.

Here's a better description than I can provide of the view in general: http://www.twtministries.com/articles/9_openness/open.html

Regarding pinpointed prophecies, these can fall in different categories, so I'll cover just one.



This speaks of the Lord declaring what will happen ahead of time.



God did this to demonstrate that He was the one bringing the things to pass, and not an idol.



This brings out the Lord does that which He says He will do. One type of prophecies with pinpoint accuracy fall into this category, which is the Lord says ahead of time what He will do, and then does it. It should be easy to see that God can easily foresee what He Himself will do, regardless of whether we view the future to be open or not.


For example, I seem to recall you saying the unfulfilled prophecies of Rev 13 will play out exactly as described in the GC, and that the reason God knows these details in advance is because He has perfect knowledge of how the key players will behave. What I don't remember is how God knows this 2,000 years in advance. How do you explain it?

Let's consider first of all why the events of Rev. 13 take place.

God, from the beginning, has been working to bring sin to an end. One step, the most important step, was for Jesus Christ to come and reveal that truth about God, whom Satan had misrepresented in order to get converts to his side. Although the truth about God has been revealed by Jesus Christ, not everyone (i.e. not all human beings) are aware of this truth, or even that there is an issue. In order for Christ to come again, it is necessary that a message must be presented to the world.

As a part of the process, according to the principle "By beholding we become changed," those who adhere to the truth are changed into the same image of the One they behold, and the statement, "When His character is perfectly reproduced by His people, then Christ will come and claim them for His own (COL 69, from memory) will come to pass.

What is Satan doing while this is happening?

He's fighting against this taking place, because he knows the sooner the gospel is proclaimed, and the sooner Christ's character is reproduced in His people, the less time he will have.

How specifically does he fight against what's going on? By way of the papacy, the mark of the beast, the lamb-like beast, etc.

All of the parts are in place (the papacy, the United States, etc.), and it would not have been difficult for foresee that the new world would be discovered, that the papacy would come about and so forth. So given that these principles are known by God, (i.e., the principle players) it would not be difficult to know how Satan would work.

Regarding the specifics of how this would happen, we know that as early as the 1850's it could have happened, because that is when Ellen White began to write that Christ could have come before now. We know Christ was disappointed not to have come in the 1888 era (this is from a 1903 comment of EGW, I think the date was). Christ's coming is still future, so that right there accounts for three possible futures that God would have had to see way back from Revelation was written.

So basically, to answer your question, God could prophesy what would happen in Rev. 13 by understanding the principles involved, knowing the character of Satan, and by being able to perfectly know all the possible futures.

TE: What "God has perfect knowledge of the future" [means] is that God knows the future perfectly, just as it is in reality. God's knowledge of the future corresponds perfectly to the reality of the future.

MM: In other words, you believe God knows perfectly the many different ways the future could play out, right? And that He doesn't know in advance which one of these many ways it will play out, right?

 Originally Posted By: Mountain Man

TE: What "God has perfect knowledge of the future" [means] is that God knows the future perfectly, just as it is in reality. God's knowledge of the future corresponds perfectly to the reality of the future.

MM: In other words, you believe God knows perfectly the many different ways the future could play out, right? And that He doesn't know in advance which one of these many ways it will play out, right?

To say that God has no clue as to what will happen in the future, but can only know that "if this choice is made, then this will happen; but if a different choice, then something else will happen" ... doesn't exactly convey the idea of "perfect knowledge of the future", does it?!

It also begs the question, which Tom persistently ignores: If God cannot know the future because it does not yet exist, and no one can know something that does not exist, then how did God know that Peter would deny Christ three times that very night?!

First of all, while knowing ones character may indicate that he would deny Christ if given the chance, it cannot tell you exactly when nor tell you exactly how many times. Tom brushes this off and says that the point is that God knew Peter would deny Him ... but then why would Christ say how many times Peter would deny Him?!

Second of all, if Tom's claim is true that God cannot know exactly what will happen in the future, because until the person actually makes the choice, nothing exists to know, then how could God have absolutely known that Peter would deny Christ?! The choice had not yet been made, and according to Tom's comments earlier, there is no future to know because Peter's choice to deny or not deny Christ had not yet been made!

Tom is trying to have it both ways.

Thirdly, Tom comments that if the future is fixed, then free will is out the window, because if there is only one possible future that must play out that way, then the person cannot but make those choices.

But when Tom tries to explain how God knew Peter would deny Christ, he suggested that perhaps there was a trillion possible futures, in all of which Peter denies Christ.

My question to this is (another that Tom refused to answer): What difference is there between there being only one fixed future in which Peter denies Christ, and a trillion possible futures and all trillion of them have Peter denying Christ?!!!

In either case, Peter is doomed to deny Christ with no option (i.e. free will) to stand for Christ instead of denying Him.

Tom is trying to have it both ways: 1) God cannot know the future because it has not yet been actualized ... He can only know what can possibly happen, and 2) God knew the future absolutely that Peter would deny Christ (despite Peter not having made that decision yet) because He knew Peter's character.

It is self contradictory. Either God knows the future, or He only knows what could happen (i.e. the possible futures) ... it cannot be both.

These are good observations and questions, Den. As of yet, Tom has been unable to explain how God can know all of the future choices and outcomes available to FMAs. If God isn't sure how the future will play out, how can He know all of the possibilities? Such uncertainty infers infinite possibilities. Not even God can make a complete list of something that is unknown and infinite, limitless.

The other thing that Tom is wrestling with right now is - What were the factors that enabled God to know, in the beginning, that perfect and sinless FMAs might choose to rebel, whereas, in the end, God knows that perfect and sinless FMAs will never choose to rebel. What were the factors that enabled Him to know, in the beginning, rebellion might happen, and what are the factors that will enable Him to know, in the end, rebellion will never happen again. In both cases, God is dealing with perfect and sinless FMAs.

These are good observations and questions, Den. As of yet, Tom has been unable to explain how God can know all of the future choices and outcomes available to FMAs.

God is omniscient. He sees everything that can happen. This seems to me to be very easy to understand. I've explained this many times.

If God isn't sure how the future will play out, how can He know all of the possibilities? Such uncertainty infers infinite possibilities.

Not infinite. A large number, but way smaller than infinity.

Not even God can make a complete list of something that is unknown and infinite, limitless.

It's not even close to limitless or infinite. Even if it were infinite, that wouldn't necessarily be unknowable to God (for example, there are infinite sets that are countable), but that's a different subject. But, to reiterate, the number of possibilities would be finite.

The other thing that Tom is wrestling with right now is - What were the factors that enabled God to know, in the beginning, that perfect and sinless FMAs might choose to rebel, whereas, in the end, God knows that perfect and sinless FMAs will never choose to rebel.

I'm not wrestling with this. I've explained several times now that God sees all the possible futures. The possible futures before included the possibility of sin. But now, after the Great Controversy has played out, the universe has been secured from sin. This seems to me to be very easy to understand, not at all something I'm "wrestling" with.

What were the factors that enabled Him to know, in the beginning, rebellion might happen, and what are the factors that will enable Him to know, in the end, rebellion will never happen again. In both cases, God is dealing with perfect and sinless FMAs.

I've explained this quite a few times, now, MM. I really don't understand why you are wrestling with this.

What enables God to see what will happen is His omniscience. As to why there was a possibility for sin when creation started, and there won't be after the judgment, in between these two events was the cross, the perfect revelation of God by Jesus Christ, in short, the Great Controversy. So it's not at all surprising that the before and after should be different. Indeed, it would be surprising if this difference didn't exist.

TE: What "God has perfect knowledge of the future" [means] is that God knows the future perfectly, just as it is in reality. God's knowledge of the future corresponds perfectly to the reality of the future.

MM: In other words, you believe God knows perfectly the many different ways the future could play out, right? And that He doesn't know in advance which one of these many ways it will play out, right?

It's not quite that simple, but that's the basic idea. One reason it's not this simple is because God is involved in the future. He won't violate anyone's free will, but, even with that constraint, there is a great deal that God can do to influence the future to be as He wants it to be. So it's not like God simply stands idly by and watches what will happen.

If God knew which future would play out in every circumstance, that would be exactly equivalent to what you believe. In this case, there wouldn't be any possible futures. There would just be the future. This future would be certain to occur. This idea leads to the problems I've pointed out in the past (e.g. violating the idea of libertarian free will, of risk, of heaven being in peril, why God chose to create Lucifer, etc.)

To say that God has no clue as to what will happen in the future,

I never said this.

but can only know that "if this choice is made, then this will happen; but if a different choice, then something else will happen" ... doesn't exactly convey the idea of "perfect knowledge of the future", does it?!

I think you're right. To say that God has no clue as to what will happen would not convey the idea of "perfect knowledge of the future." But then, I've never said that.

It also begs the question, which Tom persistently ignores: If God cannot know the future because it does not yet exist, and no one can know something that does not exist, then how did God know that Peter would deny Christ three times that very night?!

You should be more careful, much more careful, in how you characterize things. Please! You've only written two paragraphs, and there's already two mischaracterizations. First of all, I never said God had no clue as to the future, and secondly, I never, even once, ignored how God could know what Peter would do. Each and every time this question has been asked, I've answer the question. In fact, I spent several paragraphs answering the question. Just because you don't like an explanation, or disagree with it, in no way means that I have "ingnored" the question.

First of all, while knowing ones character may indicate that he would deny Christ if given the chance, it cannot tell you exactly when nor tell you exactly how many times.

Peter would have continued to deny Christ, over and over again. Isn't that obvious? All that was needed was an opportunity, of which there is no reason God should have any difficulty foreseeing.

If we assume that God knew Peter would want to be near Christ, yet not openly associate with Him, then from there it is simple to infer how Peter would react if pointedly questioned.

Tom brushes this off and says that the point is that God knew Peter would deny Him ... but then why would Christ say how many times Peter would deny Him?!

He did this for Peter's sake, so Peter would recognize what he did, and be led to repent, which is what happened.

Second of all, if Tom's claim is true that God cannot know exactly what will happen in the future, because until the person actually makes the choice, nothing exists to know, then how could God have absolutely known that Peter would deny Christ?!

There are two ways. One is by knowing Peter. There are things I am absolutely certain my wife will do in certain situations, because I know her. This is without having any special knowledge of the future at all, let alone perfect.

Secondly God sees every possible future. If every possible future has Peter denying Christ twice before the cock crows three times, or whatever the scenario was, then it is simplicity itself for Him to foretell what will happen.

The choice had not yet been made, and according to Tom's comments earlier, there is no future to know because Peter's choice to deny or not deny Christ had not yet been made!

It looks to me like you are misunderstanding something I said here. There is no *certain* future until the free will choice is made. That doesn't mean there isn't any future at all.

Also, again, the free will choice may be the same for all the possible scenarios (e.g. Peter always denies Christ), so even though the choice is a free will choice, it can still be known. It's not in every case that a free will choice cannot be known definitively; it's only when the being with the free will will possibly choose to do one thing, and possibly another. If the free will being will always choose to do the same thing, of course that can be definitively known.)

Tom is trying to have it both ways.

This statement is based on a false premise.

Thirdly, Tom comments that if the future is fixed, then free will is out the window, because if there is only one possible future that must play out that way, then the person cannot but make those choices.

This is true, isn't it? If something is certain to happen, it's not possible for someone to do something different than what will certainly happen, is it?

But when Tom tries to explain how God knew Peter would deny Christ, he suggested that perhaps there was a trillion possible futures, in all of which Peter denies Christ.

Right.

My question to this is (another that Tom refused to answer):

Please stop doing this! I haven't "refused" to answer any question. Not a single one. If you think so, please point one out, and unless I simply overlooked something you wrote, I can guarantee that after your question you will find an answer.

I take pains to quote everything you write, just like I'm doing here, and address every issue you raise point by point, so please don't accuse me of "refusing" to answer your questions.

What difference is there between there being only one fixed future in which Peter denies Christ, and a trillion possible futures and all trillion of them have Peter denying Christ?!!!

In one case there is one possible thing that can happen, and in the other, a trillion possible things. You're only dealing with one detail, which is whether Peter would deny Christ. But there are many other things going on while this is happening, all throughout the world. Millions or billions of people were making decisions. What they would or could do would create many different possible scenarios.

In either case, Peter is doomed to deny Christ with no option (i.e. free will) to stand for Christ instead of denying Him.

He was only "doomed" to do so because he had made choices to set his character to be such that it was.

Tom is trying to have it both ways: 1) God cannot know the future because it has not yet been actualized ... He can only know what can possibly happen,

You're using the phrase "the future" differently than I am. For you, "the future" means that one scenario that will play out. For me, "the future" means collectively all the possible scenarios that could play out. So God, by seeing everything possible scenario, is in so doing precisely seeing the future, because that's what the future is (all the possible scenarios).

This is something I've been pointing out, which is that our difference of opinion is not in regards to God's ability to see what will happen, but in regards to what the content of the future is. You perceive the future to be what will actually happen. I believe this is inaccurate. I believe the future actually is the union of all the possible scenarios that can happen.

This agrees with physics, by the way. (for example, what will happen to a sub-atomic particle is described along the lines of what I'm describing).

and 2) God knew the future absolutely that Peter would deny Christ (despite Peter not having made that decision yet) because He knew Peter's character.

Not only that, but God also saw every possible future, and in all of them Peter denied Christ.

It is self contradictory. Either God knows the future, or He only knows what could happen (i.e. the possible futures) ... it cannot be both.

Again, you seem to be equating one specific detail, which is that Peter would deny Christ, to the entirety of the future. But this is just one issue.

Here's another example. Say there is a person who is addicted to smoking. Say you have the ability to see every possible future. You see that in the next 24 hours there is nothing that would lead to the smoker possibly quitting (like being exposed to a stop smoking plan, or dying). You see a zillion different futures. In every different future, the smoker smokes. So you know that this person will smoke tomorrow.

Does this mean you know exactly what will happen tomorrow? No. But do you know this person will smoke? Yes.

For another explanation of these concepts, you might wish to look at http://www.twtministries.com/articles/9_openness/open.html

 Originally Posted By: Mountain Man

These are good observations and questions, Den. As of yet, Tom has been unable to explain how God can know all of the future choices and outcomes available to FMAs. If God isn't sure how the future will play out, how can He know all of the possibilities? Such uncertainty infers infinite possibilities. Not even God can make a complete list of something that is unknown and infinite, limitless.

I don't think the possibilities are necessarily infinite (at least between now and His second coming), but certainly extremely numerous. I think God does certainly know all of the possibilities.

But wait ... since we'll be living for all of eternity (infinite time), and we'll be making choices every day of eternity, we would therefore have infinite choices.

So, perhaps you are right, MM.

 Originally Posted By: Mountain Man

The other thing that Tom is wrestling with right now is - What were the factors that enabled God to know, in the beginning, that perfect and sinless FMAs might choose to rebel, whereas, in the end, God knows that perfect and sinless FMAs will never choose to rebel. What were the factors that enabled Him to know, in the beginning, rebellion might happen, and what are the factors that will enable Him to know, in the end, rebellion will never happen again. In both cases, God is dealing with perfect and sinless FMAs.

I was wondering the exact same thing. Consider the following comment Tom made on 3/15/2007 - 10:00 AM:

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

These are good questions. I've thought a lot about them. I can't say too much, except that I think it's possible to be "sealed in the truth," sort of like the unpardonable sin in reverse. It's not that one can't be lost, because we never lose free will (even in heaven, we could be lost if we wanted to), but that one won't. But I don't believe God ever communicates this to us, because even in the end time the 144,000 do not know that probation has closed. What they do know is they have, above all else, a desire that God's character be known and vindicated.

He acknowledges that in the new earth, we still have free will. Therefore, we must conclude that he believes that the future while living in the new earth is not fixed, just like he believes it is not fixed now.

He acknowledges that we could be lost in the new earth, if we chose (we still have free will, so we still have to choose for ourselves).

He seems to acknowledge that God absolutely knows that sin will not arise again in the future past the founding of the new earth, despite the fact that there are infinite choices which have not yet been made. So the future does not exist, and since it does not exist it cannot be known. So how can God possibly know absolutely that sin will not arise again?! Suddenly, God's absolute knowledge of the future no longer means that it must be fixed/determined.

If you look closely at his comment quoted above, you'll see that Tom is making the exact point that I made earlier in this thread; and I didn't realize until now that Tom had made this point, and had done so before I had made it. Look at the following excerpt from the above quote:

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

It's not that one can't be lost, because we never lose free will (even in heaven, we could be lost if we wanted to), but that one won't.

Even though God absolutely knows the future, that does not mean the future is fixed. We still have free will. It's not that we can't choose differently than what He sees happening in the future, it's that we won't choose differently than what He sees happening in the future.

MM, this is what you, Rosangela, and I (among others) have been saying all along; that God does know with absolute perfection what will happen in the future, not just the possibilities but what will actually will be. And this does not mean that the future must be somehow fixed (otherwise we might choose to do something that God did not foresee in the future thus making Him a liar).

It's not that we can't choose to do differently, it's that we won't choose to do differently.

It's so simple, I don't understand Tom's difficulty with it. And if Tom believes that it is possible for God to know the future after His second coming, why is it impossible for Him to know the future now?!! (it begs the question: does God suddenly acquire some new abilities at His second coming?)

I don't think the possibilities are necessarily infinite (at least between now and His second coming), but certainly extremely numerous. I think God does certainly know all of the possibilities.

But wait ... since we'll be living for all of eternity (infinite time), and we'll be making choices every day of eternity, we would therefore have infinite choices.

So, perhaps you are right, MM.

No, this is wrong. At any given point in the future, there will only have been a finite number of choices available. You are saying that because there is an infinite amount of time, there are an infinite number of choices. But this argument is just as applicable to your position as mine. That is, infinity times one is infinity, just as much as infinity times any other finite number (this finite number being a finite number of individuals making a finite number of choices). Do you see this?

Originally Posted By: Mountain Man
The other thing that Tom is wrestling with right now is - What were the factors that enabled God to know, in the beginning, that perfect and sinless FMAs might choose to rebel, whereas, in the end, God knows that perfect and sinless FMAs will never choose to rebel. What were the factors that enabled Him to know, in the beginning, rebellion might happen, and what are the factors that will enable Him to know, in the end, rebellion will never happen again. In both cases, God is dealing with perfect and sinless FMAs.

I was wondering the exact same thing. Consider the following comment Tom made on 3/15/2007 - 10:00 AM:

Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall
These are good questions. I've thought a lot about them. I can't say too much, except that I think it's possible to be "sealed in the truth," sort of like the unpardonable sin in reverse. It's not that one can't be lost, because we never lose free will (even in heaven, we could be lost if we wanted to), but that one won't. But I don't believe God ever communicates this to us, because even in the end time the 144,000 do not know that probation has closed. What they do know is they have, above all else, a desire that God's character be known and vindicated.
He acknowledges that in the new earth, we still have free will. Therefore, we must conclude that he believes that the future while living in the new earth is not fixed, just like he believes it is not fixed now.

He acknowledges that we could be lost in the new earth, if we chose (we still have free will, so we still have to choose for ourselves).

He seems to acknowledge that God absolutely knows that sin will not arise again in the future past the founding of the new earth, despite the fact that there are infinite choices which have not yet been made.

Unless you are talking about at time infinity (at which point your perspective is just as vulnerable to the argument you are making as mine), this statement is incorrect. There are a finite number of choices that can be made.

So the future does not exist, and since it does not exist it cannot be known.

The future does not exist? What kind of rational argument could be made that ends with "so the future does not exist"? At any rate, your premise is wrong. There are a finite number of choices.

So how can God possibly know absolutely that sin will not arise again?! Suddenly, God's absolute knowledge of the future no longer means that it must be fixed/determined.

I'm curious, from this statement. Do you disagree with the idea that the future is fixed? This is simply saying that there is one possible future, which is the future that will happen. Isn't this what you believe?

If you look closely at his comment quoted above, you'll see that Tom is making the exact point that I made earlier in this thread; and I didn't realize until now that Tom had made this point, and had done so before I had made it. Look at the following excerpt from the above quote:

Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall
It's not that one can't be lost, because we never lose free will (even in heaven, we could be lost if we wanted to), but that one won't.


Even though God absolutely knows the future, that does not mean the future is fixed. We still have free will. It's not that we can't choose differently than what He sees happening in the future, it's that we won't choose differently than what He sees happening in the future.

No, this isn't the same point. This is a different point. I'll explain the difference.

My point is that the righteous could choose to sin if they wanted to, because they have free will. It has nothing to do with the future at all, or with God's foreknowledge. When I said "can't," I was speaking of ability.

When you say that it's not that the wicked won't sin, but they can't, you are speaking of a logical construct. That is, you are claiming that there is a logical difference between stating that a person cannot do something, and that they will not do something. My statement is not addressing this issue at all.


MM, this is what you, Rosangela, and I (among others) have been saying all along; that God does know with absolute perfection what will happen in the future, not just the possibilities but what will actually will be. And this does not mean that the future must be somehow fixed (otherwise we might choose to do something that God did not foresee in the future thus making Him a liar).

Ok, you seem to be answering my previous question here. Logically it *does* mean the future is fixed, and this is very easy to see.

Given that God knows exactly what will happen, it is not possible for something to happen which is different than what God knows will happen, correct? So there is only one possible thing which can happen in the future, which is that which God knows will happen. To say there is only one possible thing that can happen in the future is to say that the future is fixed. They mean exactly the same thing. If you preferred, I could exchange "the one possible thing that can happen" for "fixed." This is a bit wordy, but it means the same thing.

For you, there is no such thing as a possible future. There is simply the future; what will be; what God knows will be.

It's not that we can't choose to do differently, it's that we won't choose to do differently.

It's so simple, I don't understand Tom's difficulty with it.

My difficulty with this is the following:

a.It doesn't fit what inspiration reveals to us, either from Scripture or the Spirit of Prophecy.

b.If it were true, then it would not be possible for a person to do something different than what God has seen will happen. I don't mean not physically possible, but not logically possible. If what God sees is certain to happen, then it is not possible to do something different than what God sees will happen, because it is not possible to do something different than what is certain to happen.

This is very simple logic. If you see some error in this logic, I would be interested in what it is.

c.In particular, it raises questions about God's character. For example, why did God create a being that He knew would sin? Why not, instead, create a being He knew wouldn't sin? I haven't seen a satisfactory answer to this question.

And if Tom believes that it is possible for God to know the future after His second coming, why is it impossible for Him to know the future now?!! (it begs the question: does God suddenly acquire some new abilities at His second coming?)

I've consistently maintained that God knows the future perfectly. This doesn't change after the second coming. God knows the future perfectly now, and He will continue to know it perfectly then. God has always perfectly known the future.

I should add that "the future," is not one given thing, the thing that will happen, but the sum of all possible futures. This is where we differ. Not in God's ability to see the future (we both agree God can do this perfectly) but what the content of the future is. You think of the future is just one thing. I think of it as the sum of all possible things which can happen.

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

Are you getting senile on us?

I don't think you're understanding what I'm saying, and you're not being very kind. If you're really wanting to discuss this in a civilized manner, I'll be happy to oblige. I can also point you to references on line where you can read more about the subject. This isn't something I've made up.

... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...

No, but I would like it if you were kinder in tone.

I apologize for you thinking I am being unkind; I really didn't have that attitude, nor was I intending on being unkind. You must remember that in this medium of communication, you do not have the benefit of body language, nor tone inflections, so you must be very very careful in ascertaining the "tone" of someone's written comments. You're likely to get it wrong.


You also could have been perceived as being very unkind with the following comment you made to Rosangela on 3/13/2007:

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

With all due respect, this is about as fine an example of faulty logic that one is apt to find.

And there was another comment of yours in a different thread which I saw yesterday, but can't remember exactly where, that also could be construed as rude, but again, without the aid of body language and voice inflections, it is difficult to determine the true "tone".

Be very very very careful before becoming accusatory at another's "tone", for your assumption may not be correct.

Remaining civilized goes just as much for you as it does for anyone else.

1. You wrote, "I apologize for you thinking I am being unkind". You're apologizing here for something I'm doing, which is a little difficult to understand. I'm sorry if I'm being obtuse here. Did you mean something like "I apologize for writing something you think is unkind?" Or something else?

2. You asked me, "Are you getting senile on us?" I responded "... and you're not being very kind." Do you think you were being kind here? Do you think my saying, "and you're not being very kind" is an unfair observation? Since I'm a biased observer here, you could get the opinion of someone else, but it is my opinion that asking someone "Are you going senile on us" is not very kind, and I don't think my pointing this out is accusatory.

3. Have I in any way been uncivil to you? Or rude? If so, if you will point out where, I would be happy to apologize. I try very hard not to be rude. I almost always read over my posts before sending them, and check specifically for tone. Of course, I'm fallible, so if I've in any way been rude to you, please point it out.

4. I didn't comment on your intention. I simply pointed out that asking "Are you going senile on us?" was not being very kind. I didn't know what your intention was, and wasn't even thinking about that. I believe what you said in this post I'm now responding to, and am glad you were not intending to be unkind.

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

1. You wrote, "I apologize for you thinking I am being unkind". You're apologizing here for something I'm doing, which is a little difficult to understand. I'm sorry if I'm being obtuse here. Did you mean something like "I apologize for writing something you think is unkind?" Or something else?

You may accept the apology, or reject it. It's your call.

I said something, you took it completely wrong, and I apologized for the confusion. If that's not good enough for you, then that is your problem, not mine.

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

2. You asked me, "Are you getting senile on us?" I responded "... and you're not being very kind." Do you think you were being kind here?

About as unkind as you telling Rosangela that her comment "is about as fine an example of faulty logic that one is apt to find."

I comment that you've stated a number of times that if God foreknew the future perfectly and knew exactly what will happen in the future, then you claim that the future would have to be fixed. And from my usage during the past couple months (if not longer) of the phrase "knowing the future perfectly" or "with perfect clarity", you had to know I mean that He knows perfectly what WILL HAPPEN(not what might happen ... not what could happen ... but what will happen) But then you claim you never said that by saying, "This has not been asserted."

But then yesterday you turn around and post the same concept that you had just denied having ever made:

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

Given that God knows exactly what will happen, it is not possible for something to happen which is different than what God knows will happen, correct? So there is only one possible thing which can happen in the future, which is that which God knows will happen. To say there is only one possible thing that can happen in the future is to say that the future is fixed. They mean exactly the same thing. If you preferred, I could exchange "the one possible thing that can happen" for "fixed." This is a bit wordy, but it means the same thing.

So, first you make an assertion. Then you deny having made that assertion, and right on the heals of denying it you make the assertion again.

So you tell me why that is. I am not being unkind; I simply would like to know. Are you forgetful? Are you getting senile? Are you playing games with us? Why would you make an assertion, then later deny having made said assertion, and then right after make that same assertion yet again?

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

it is my opinion that asking someone "Are you going senile on us" is not very kind, and I don't think my pointing this out is accusatory.

I never characterized "your pointing this out" as accusatory. I said your assessment on my "tone" and your resulting commentary and reprimand was accusatory.

Let me remind you again, determining someone's tone, as you've unsuccessfully attempted to do here, is not an easy thing to do in written communication. You don't have the benefit of eye contact, body language, and voice inflection as when you communicate verbally in person, or on the phone even (of course, eye contact doesn't apply when communicating via phone).

It is very easy to misinterpret and end with the wrong assessment of someone else's "tone" (just as you have done here) when you have only written comments to go by.

So, it's your call: Do you wish for us to be civil and continue the discussion at hand? Or are you more interested in bickering? If you want to bicker, I'm out. If you want to discuss the topic at hand, I'm up for it as time affords.

You may accept the apology, or reject it. It's your call.

I said something, you took it completely wrong, and I apologized for the confusion. If that's not good enough for you, then that is your problem, not mine.

I'm surprised that you would answer an attempt to clarify an apology with "If that's not good enough for you, then that is your problem, not mine."

Ordinarily when one apologizes, one apologizes for something one has done, not for something that the person being addressed has done, which is why I asked for clarification. You will notice I wrote, "I'm sorry if I'm being obtuse about this."


Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall
2. You asked me, "Are you getting senile on us?" I responded "... and you're not being very kind." Do you think you were being kind here?
About as unkind as you telling Rosangela that her comment "is about as fine an example of faulty logic that one is apt to find."

What does a post I wrote to Rosangela over 6 months ago have to do with your asking me an insulting question?

I comment that you've stated a number of times that if God foreknew the future perfectly and knew exactly what will happen in the future, then you claim that the future would have to be fixed. And from my usage during the past couple months (if not longer) of the phrase "knowing the future perfectly" or "with perfect clarity", you had to know I mean that He knows perfectly what WILL HAPPEN(not what might happen ... not what could happen ... but what will happen) But then you claim you never said that by saying, "This has not been asserted."

I'm not following you here.

But then yesterday you turn around and post the same concept that you had just denied having ever made:

Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall
Given that God knows exactly what will happen, it is not possible for something to happen which is different than what God knows will happen, correct? So there is only one possible thing which can happen in the future, which is that which God knows will happen. To say there is only one possible thing that can happen in the future is to say that the future is fixed. They mean exactly the same thing. If you preferred, I could exchange "the one possible thing that can happen" for "fixed." This is a bit wordy, but it means the same thing.


So, first you make an assertion. Then you deny having made that assertion, and right on the heals of denying it you make the assertion again.

I was expressing an argument from your perspective. That is, if your perspective were correct, then the things I said would follow. Sorry if it wasn't clear what I was doing.

So you tell me why that is.

Perhaps it's because you are not reading carefully enough. Perhaps it's because I was unclear in what I wrote. Maybe someone following the thread, like MM, could clarify if what I wrote was clear or not. If I wasn't clear, I'm sorry about that.

I am not being unkind; I simply would like to know. Are you forgetful? Are you getting senile? Are you playing games with us?

Prefacing unkind remarks with the comment "I am not being unkind" does not make the remarks unkind. Surely you must realize the misunderstanding could be on your end. Instead of asking insulting questions, why not ask clarifying questions. You could say something like "This is what I'm hearing you say. However, this doesn't make sense to me because of ..." There's no need to be insulting.

Why would you make an assertion, then later deny having made said assertion, and then right after make that same assertion yet again?

Why indeed. It's surely much more likely that you've misunderstood something than that I am forgetful, or senile, or playing games with you. Recognizing that, why not ask for clarification regarding what it is you are misunderstanding?

Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall
it is my opinion that asking someone "Are you going senile on us" is not very kind, and I don't think my pointing this out is accusatory.

I never characterized "your pointing this out" as accusatory. I said your assessment on my "tone" and your resulting commentary and reprimand was accusatory.

I looked and the only think I found that it looked to me that you could be referring to was this:



You think this is "accusatory"? Or was it some other comment I made?

Let me remind you again, determining someone's tone, as you've unsuccessfully attempted to do here, is not an easy thing to do in written communication.

I'm sorry, but I'm not seeing where I wrote something that determined your tone, unless you have in mind the above comment where I wrote that I would appreciate it if you were kinder in tone. Is that what you have in mind?

You don't have the benefit of eye contact, body language, and voice inflection as when you communicate verbally in person, or on the phone even (of course, eye contact doesn't apply when communicating via phone).

It is precisely for this reason that I would appreciate it if you were kinder in tone. I *don't* have the ability to see your body language, or hear your voice, which is why I'd like things toned down.

It is very easy to misinterpret and end with the wrong assessment of someone else's "tone" (just as you have done here) when you have only written comments to go by.

So, it's your call: Do you wish for us to be civil and continue the discussion at hand? Or are you more interested in bickering? If you want to bicker, I'm out. If you want to discuss the topic at hand, I'm up for it as time affords.

You wrote, "Are you being senile?" I don't see why you would think that your reader would not take this as an insult. I responded by saying that you weren't being very kind. I don't understand how this is "bickering".

I'm simply responding to your posts. I wrote a long post responding to your arguments, which dealt at length with the points that you made. I made two incidental comments, one that I didn't think you were being very kind in asking if I was senile, and the other that I would appreciate it if you would tone things down.

What we talk about is up to you. If you wish to keep talking about this, we can talk about this. If you wish to discuss the other items in my post, we can talk about that.

ADMINISTRATIVE HAT ON!!!

Please focus on the post and not on the person.

Calling a person dumb and senile isn't the best way to discuss a topic.

Posts centering on this is also NOT the best way to go, therefore, please get back onto the topic itself.

ADMINISTRATIVE HAT OFF!!!

1. It was assumed that the many possible future outcomes you talk about include God playing an active part.

2. From God's perspective, the future is history. It has already happened. When He reports on what will happen, it is identical to someone reporting on what will happen in a movie he has already watched.

3. Such reporting does not rob the actors of their freedom or ability to choose as they please. It simply reports the choice they made after the fact.

1. It was assumed that the many possible future outcomes you talk about include God playing an active part.

I'm not understanding why you're making this point.

2. From God's perspective, the future is history.

No, from God's perspective, the future is the future, something which has not yet happened. The future is different than the past. God perceives things as they are. The future really is different than the past, and God's perceptions are in tune with this reality.

It has already happened.

No, the future has not already happened. The past has already happened.

When He reports on what will happen, it is identical to someone reporting on what will happen in a movie he has already watched.

No, it must be different. If it weren't, if it were like a movie that already happened, as you are suggesting, then someone in the movie could not do anything different than what the movie shows, correct? Then free will goes out the window, since someone being observed would have no more ability to do something different than what has been observed than the movie character.

3. Such reporting does not rob the actors of their freedom or ability to choose as they please.

In the sense of logic, it does. Clearly the movie characters cannot do something different than what they have already been observed to do.

Let's say you were observed to eat broccoli tomorrow, and you were told that you had been so observed. Could you do anything about it? Could you choose not to eat broccoli? Clearly not, because you have been observed to do something that has already happened, according to your scheme of things, so for you to choose not to eat broccoli would be for you to change something which has already happened. So unless you want to assert that it's possible to change the past, you're stuck here. That is, logically, your assertion is unsound.

It simply reports the choice they made after the fact.

I wrote - In other words, you believe God knows perfectly the many different ways the future could play out, right? And that He doesn't know in advance which one of these many ways it will play out, right?

In response to this, you wrote - It's not quite that simple, but that's the basic idea. One reason it's not this simple is because God is involved in the future.

Which is something I assumed. It goes without saying. Of course it involves God's active participation.


I like what C.S. Lewis says about it in Mere Christianity (taken from the chapter entitled - Time and Beyond Time):

"[God] does not 'foresee' you doing things tomorrow; He simply sees you doing them: because, though tomorrow is not yet there for you, it is for Him. You never supposed that your actions at this moment were any less free because God knows what you are doing. Well, He knows your tomorrow's actions in just the same way - because He is already in tomorrow and can simply watch you."


God isn't talking about what will happen tomorrow, rather, He is talking about what did happen. As such, the actors have no foreknowledge of it, nothing to complicate their options. They simply do what they please, without the burden of foreknowledge. And, God simply reports the facts as they truly are, not necessarily how it will be.

I wrote - In other words, you believe God knows perfectly the many different ways the future could play out, right? And that He doesn't know in advance which one of these many ways it will play out, right?

In response to this, you wrote - It's not quite that simple, but that's the basic idea. One reason it's not this simple is because God is involved in the future.

Which is something I assumed. It goes without saying. Of course it involves God's active participation.

That fact impacts how one puts things. It's one of the reasons it's not quite as simply as you put it, which is why I pointed that out. Obviously if God is actively participating, He knows which of the ways He foresees that the future will play out.

Regarding C. S. Lewis, I like him a lot. I think he had a very positive view of God's character. In particular, I like his view on why Christ had to die.




Here you didn't address my argument, which demonstrates the logical problem with what you're saying here. Rather than just repeat the argument, I'll ask you to please consider it.

By the way, MM, I'm sorry to ask this again, because I know I've asked it several times, but what is your answer to the question as to why God chose to create a being He was certain to sin over one He was certain would not sin. I know you've set that it did not deter Him from establishing His throne in righteousness, but that doesn't really answer the question. Saying this only addresses that God was not deterred, but not suggest a positive reason as to why God would make such a choice.

You would agree that God could have created a different being, other than Lucifer, correct? Why choose Lucifer over some other being? I'm not understanding this.

TE: Obviously if God is actively participating, He knows which of the ways He foresees that the future will play out.

MM: This sounds like you are agreeing with me, that God does indeed know in advance which one of the many ways He foresees will play out.

TE: Regarding C. S. Lewis, I like him a lot.

MM: Do you agree with his view of God's foreknowledge (quoted above)? The reason I ask is because his view reflects what I believe.


Here's the whole context:


Tom, your argument against this view assumes God's omnipresence robs us of our ability and freedom to choose. The fact He is not bound by our time and space, that He can watch us do things tomorrow as if we did it yesterday, that He can watch us do things yesterday as if we are doing them now, in no way robs us our ability and freedom to choose. Please consider C.S. Lewis' explanation. Do you disagree with him?

1. God made both. He made FMAs He knew in advance would not sin, and FMAs He knew would sin. I realize you do not think the answer to your question is valid or positive, but to me it is. I can live with it. I suspect, however, that when we get to heaven He will provide a more satisfying answer. I could not live with your answer, that is, that God was pretty sure FMAs wouldn't sin, that the chance of them sinning was so small that it made the risk worth it.

2. I don't think creating a different being in place of Lucifer was an option. However, I do believe He could have chosen not to create Lucifer (and the angels who rebelled with him).

3. I do not believe God had to choose between Lucifer and some other being who would not sin.

That's why I said it is not so simple as you were saying. The link I provided does an excellent job of explaining the concept. Did you take a look at it?



Actually his view is a different than yours. C. S. Lewis believed in an eternal soul, and other ideas left over from Catholicism. This colored his view of foreknowledge, which is more Catholic than yours is.

I don't agree with either yours or his.

Tom, your argument against this view assumes God's omnipresence robs us of our ability and freedom to choose.

I assume you mean omniscience? No, it doesn't. Many make this mistake. I've explained this to you many times.

What God knows does not impact our choices. The nature of the future logically has an impact on our choices. If there is only one future, then logically (not because someone or some thing forces us, but logically; "logically" is the key word here) it is not possible to choose some other option than what will happen in that one future.

As I've repeatedly pointed out, what God knows about the future is irrelevant to this point. What is relevant is the nature of the future.

I've explained this several dozen times to you, MM. I'm curious, do you feel like you're understanding what I've been trying to explain any better through our discussions?

Maybe this is just something you can't understand, or maybe it's something I can't explain to you in a way that you can understand. (I'm saying the shortcoming here may be mine, not yours).


The fact He is not bound by our time and space, that He can watch us do things tomorrow as if we did it yesterday, that He can watch us do things yesterday as if we are doing them now, in no way robs us our ability and freedom to choose. Please consider C.S. Lewis' explanation. Do you disagree with him?

Again, I've never claimed that God's omniscience robs us of our ability and freedom to choose. The fact that you are pointing this out to me is a bit concerning, since I've explained this to you so many times.

 Originally Posted By: Mountain Man

TE: Obviously if God is actively participating, He knows which of the ways He foresees that the future will play out.

MM: This sounds like you are agreeing with me, that God does indeed know in advance which one of the many ways He foresees will play out.

MM, it seems impossible to discuss this rationally with Tom since he keeps moving the target. You tire yourself out running from target to target as he gives contradicting statements as to his views of God's foreknowledge. You run back and forth: Does Tom believe that God knows what will happen in the future? No he does not. ... Wait! Yes he does ... No, wait! he doesn't. It wears you out!

He'll tell you that God does not know what will happen in the future ... how can He since it does not exist to know! And furthermore, if He knew the future, then free will is out the window, because if someone chose to do something different than what He foresees happening, then God would be a liar. But it isn't God or His foreknowledge that fixes the future if this were true, and since (according to Tom) free will would be out the window, neither is it us FMA's that fix the future; so what else is there other than us FMA's and God which can affect what will happen in the future?!!!!!!!!! He won't say. (There isn't anything else besides FMA's and God that determine what will happen in the future ... I believe Tom does not want to acknowledge this fact because it would shoot down his "must-be-fixed-and-free-will-is-out-the-window" argument)

Yet, despite that Tom's point that the real future does not exist for Him to see, somehow all of these possible futures that will not actually happen actually do exist (according to Tom), and God can see all of these candidate futures that will not happen (He just cannot see the real one that will happen.)

Then he turns 180 degrees, denies that he ever said any such thing (as he has recently done with me), and then say as he did to you, "Obviously if God is actively participating, He knows which of the ways He foresees that the future will play out."

See? First Tom says that God does not know, and cannot know, because the future does not exist to know.

Now Tom moves the target and says that since God is actively participating, He does know which future will play out.

And he does not even seem to realize that "God knows the future" and "God does not know the future 'cuz it doesn't exist to know" are two irreconcilable conflicting statements.

Either God knows what will happen, or He does not ... it cannot be both, except according to Tom.

It is impossible to discuss or debate anything like this when the other person is constantly moving the target. You argue against the one position, and he later denies that position. Then when you mention that you then agree, he switches yet again and reverts back to his first position.

In this kind of situation, you could not win if the objective was to lose (you can't win for losing).

At any rate, this is what I see happening in this thread.

MM, it seems impossible to discuss this rationally with Tom since he keeps moving the target. You tire yourself out running from target to target as he gives contradicting statements as to his views of God's foreknowledge. You run back and forth: Does Tom believe that God knows what will happen in the future? No he does not. ... Wait! Yes he does ... No, wait! he doesn't. It wears you out!

DenBorg, you're dealing with a view that you are unfamiliar with. Rather than assume I'm doing something irrational, why not take the position that you may not be understanding what's being communicated? Also, I'm right here. Addressing me in the third person in a public forum in a thread I'm actively participating in is a bit odd.

He'll tell you that God does not know what will happen in the future ... how can He since it does not exist to know! And furthermore, if He knew the future, then free will is out the window, because if someone chose to do something different than what He foresees happening, then God would be a liar.

I think it would be better if you quoted things that were said, and asked clarifying questions about them.

But it isn't God or His foreknowledge that fixes the future if this were true, and since (according to Tom) free will would be out the window, neither is it us FMA's that fix the future; so what else is there other than us FMA's and God which can affect what will happen in the future?!!!!!!!!! He won't say.

I really don't understand what you're trying to say here. I'll repeat what I've said.

Our basic disagreement does not involve God's knowledge of the future. We both agree that God knows and sees the future perfectly, just as it is. Where we differ has to do with the context of the future. You perceive the future to be a single thing, the one thing that will actually happen. So when you speak of "the future," this is what you have in mind. At times, I have used your meaning to communicate to you, and at times I have used mine. That is why my comments regarding the future have been confusing to you.

I have tried to clarify when I'm am presenting an argument from your perspective and when I've been presenting one from mine. The reason you see me as being contradictory is you are taking my statements, from two different perspectives, as if they were from the same perspective. But my statements are not contradictory, because sometimes I take your perspective in order to present an argument, to show the conclusions that perspective would lead to.

The reason for free will being out the window, so to speak, has to do with the idea of future that only has one possibility. If an event A is certain to happen (e.g., the event that you will do this, as opposed to that, an event B) then, logically, you cannot do event B.

The logical problem with free will has to do with the nature of the future. If one takes the position that God has a certain knowledge of the future, and that position leads logically to the conclusion that the future is settled, then that indirectly leads to a logical argument that God's knowledge of the future implies certain problems with free will. But this is a logical argument. The argument is not that there is a direct cause between God's knowing the future and a person's being forced to do a certain thing. As I've pointed out, that God knows the future isn't relevant to this argument. Some other being could know the future, and the argument would logically follow just as well. It's the fact that the future is exhaustively settled, and knowable as such, that causes the logical problem.

Regarding the question as to if the future is settled, then who settled it, it doesn't seem to me we have really gotten into that. My view is that creatures with free will, to some degree, settle the future, and that it is not exhaustively settled before these creatures act. If the future is exhaustively settled, there are arguments that have been made that it must have been God who settled it. This is the Calvinist position, and if you do some research on the web, you can find these arguments. The argument by Jonathan Edwards is particularly well known.

(There isn't anything else besides FMA's and God that determine what will happen in the future ... I believe Tom does not want to acknowledge this fact because it would shoot down his "must-be-fixed-and-free-will-is-out-the-window" argument)

I don't know what you're thinking here. Please present a well formed argument, and we can discuss it.

Yet, despite that Tom's point that the real future does not exist for Him to see, somehow all of these possible futures that will not actually happen actually do exist (according to Tom), and God can see all of these candidate futures that will not happen (He just cannot see the real one that will happen.)

Clearly the future that will actually happen is one of the candidate futures, so obviously God does see the real one that will happen.

Then he turns 180 degrees, denies that he ever said any such thing (as he has recently done with me), and then say as he did to you, "Obviously if God is actively participating, He knows which of the ways He foresees that the future will play out."

This is considering a specific class of events, in answer to a specific question. For example, if God prophesies about something He Himself will do, clearly He can foresee what the result of that will be.

See? First Tom says that God does not know, and cannot know, because the future does not exist to know.

Cannot know as settled.

Now Tom moves the target and says that since God is actively participating, He does know which future will play out.

In certain circumstances.

And he does not even seem to realize that "God knows the future" and "God does not know the future 'cuz it doesn't exist to know" are two irreconcilable conflicting statements.

Not taken in the context I provided, they aren't.

Either God knows what will happen, or He does not ... it cannot be both, except according to Tom.

Again, you're mixing statements made from different perspectives to create a contradiction that doesn't exist.

If you have some question about something I've said, why not quote it, and ask your question?

It is impossible to discuss or debate anything like this when the other person is constantly moving the target. You argue against the one position, and he later denies that position. Then when you mention that you then agree, he switches yet again and reverts back to his first position.

Actually what I'm doing is asking you to quote something I've actually said, and ask questions about that.

In this kind of situation, you could not win if the objective was to lose (you can't win for losing).

At any rate, this is what I see happening in this thread.

Again, I'd suggest actually quoting things you have questions about, and then asking questions, and making points, about those things. This is what MM and I do with each other, and we've been able to carry on successfully conversations for years like this. Sometimes we agree (e.g. on Christ's human nature), sometimes we disagree, but we have been able to dialog at great length using this technique on a wide variety of subjects.

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

DenBorg, you're dealing with a view that you are unfamiliar with.

Says you, but you don't know what I am or am not familiar with. Don't be so presumptuous as to think you know what I am or am not familiar with.

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

Rather than assume I'm doing something irrational, why not take the position that you may not be understanding what's being communicated?

I am not making any assumptions. You've stated certain things a number of times. I'm just going by your previous statements.

Besides, have you ever stopped to think that perhaps, just perhaps, the problem may not be with me or the others here?

 Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall

Also, I'm right here. Addressing me in the third person in a public forum in a thread I'm actively participating in is a bit odd.

I was not addressing you. I was addressing MM, not you.

Are you trying to deny me permission to reply to other posters in this thread? Are you the only one I am allowed to address and have a discussion with? I don't think so.

I know you are right here ... I am not blind. And I have addressed you directly several times.

As to your request that I quote you directly ... besides the fact that have done just that many many many many times, I will yet again as time avails.

I will show you your quotes where I hear you saying exactly what you tried denying earlier. I will also, once again, show you your quotes where you make contradictory statements, and you can make whatever clarifications you think necessary.

Give me time ... I do have work to attend to for my employer.

Yes, I did read the article. But are you saying you believe God knew which way the future would play out because He foresaw His active participation?


Based on what he wrote (in the quote I posted above), how does his view differ from mine?

I meant omnipresence, not omniscience. God is omnipresent, therefore, for God, the future does not exist. Yesterday and tomorrow are, for God, now and always. As such, it doesn't affect our freedom or ability to choose. Nor does it affect the nature of our future. The future is what it is - a thing that belongs to our time and space continuum. The fact God is omnipresent does not destroy or alter our future, our time line.

Den: MM, it seems impossible to discuss this rationally with Tom since he keeps moving the target. You tire yourself out running from target to target as he gives contradicting statements as to his views of God's foreknowledge. You run back and forth: Does Tom believe that God knows what will happen in the future? No he does not. ... Wait! Yes he does ... No, wait! he doesn't. It wears you out!

MM: Elsewhere Tom has admitted that his views are not yet set in concrete. I'm not certain he has been waffling back and forth. That's why I try to ask clarifying questions. Thank you for trying to help me understand these things.