T:You're not mentioning the simplest and obvious alternative, which is simply to create free moral agents (FMAs) who wouldn't sin.
D: If God created them so they could not sin they would not be Free Moral Agents.
Not who couldn't sin, but who He foresaw wouldn't sin. They could still sin if they wanted to, just like now. There's no difference.
T:You appear to suggesting the idea that creating an FMA means that the FMA must sin. But this is obviously false,since not even 1 in a million of them do.
D: That is pushing this too far. No, a free moral agent does NOT have to sin. Of course they don't. And true multitudes didn't. But all it takes is one.
And sooner or later one would, and did.
If sooner or later one would sin, with certainty, then I'm not pushing this too far.
T:You're saying that if God saw that one FMA wouldn't sin, say Lucifer, and God didn't create him, some other one would. But God, with the future being fixed and His perfect foreknowledge, would see that, and simply not create that one either. So unless you wish to assert that *any* FMA would sin, given an eternity in which to do so, your assertion here is easily seen to be false.
D:This is where I disagree with your premise.
The future of a free moral agent IS NOT FIXED -- to be a free moral agent means the CHOICE is yours!
It's logically impossible to determine a future that's already been determined (or fixed). If God sees the future as determined (or fixed), then it must be so. But the fact that the FMA really does make the choice (we agree on this point), means the future has NOT been determined, which means that God must see the future as not determined, but open. This is what I've been asserting, that God sees an open future.
D:This is where it seems there is a block in communication between us.
I've had this conversation many times. I understand exactly where you're coming from. It's difficult for me to explain the logical problem from what some have called the "blueprint" perspective, but I'm doing the best I can.
What usually happens is people confuse the concept of logical impossibility with causation. That is, the fact that God knows what will happen does not cause one to choose what He has foreseen. But this isn't the problem.
To put it another way, the problem is not epistemological but ontological. Iow, it's not about the knowledge (or vision) of the future, but the nature (essential essence, character) of the future.
If God sees the future as single-threaded, then His knowledge of the future is such that the future must be single-threaded. This means at any moment of time, it's only logically possible for a given FMA to be doing exactly one thing, which is the thing which God has foreseen. Therefore it's logically impossible for that being to be doing some other thing. This means the FMA cannot logically do more than one thing, which contradicts the incompatibilistic definition of free will, which is our tradition as Armianists.
Compatibilitistic free will defines free will in a way that is compatible with determinism, which means there is no logical contradiction between a deterministic view of the future and free will. The compatibilistic definition of free will is that a person is free to do what he chooses to do (i.e., the person is not forced to do something against his will). The incompatibilistic defition is broader, saying that it must actually be possible, at a given point in time, to effect different options. So if a person is at a cross road, it's not simply the case that he chooses Road A because that's what he wants to do, but he could choose Road A or choose Road B.
What you are suggesting (at least, what I'm hearing) is logically inconsistent, as it has a determined future (this is what God sees; not the possibility of an action, but the certainty of it) with the incompatibilistic idea of free will (the person really could choose between the two options, one God sees being chosen, and one God sees not being chosen.)
A simple way to see the logical inconsistency is simply to ask the question if it's logically possible to do something which God has seen with certainty will not happen.
Yes, ANY Free moral agent COULD have sinned, this doesn't mean he had to sin, or even that he would sin, but any free moral agent COULD sin.
I understood that you were asserting it was certain that some moral agent WOULD sin.
T:This is why I asked you the question regarding Gabriel. If God had only created one being in the universe, Gabriel, would it be inevitable that he would have sinned? This is the logical conclusion of your idea; any FMA would sin.
D: correction --
any FMA COULD sin, not "would sin".
No, not could, but would. This is what you said. If not Lucifer, some other FMA would have sinned.
Quite possible if God had created only one, sin would not have raised its ugly head. But I don't think God wanted to create just one -- he wants to fill the universe with intelligent beings who love and worship Him from free choice.
OK, if it's possible for one not to sin, then it's possible for two not to sin. Similarly, it's possible for 10 trillion not to sin (or however many FMA's there are in the universe).
Out of the many trillions, or quadrillions, of FMA's there are, only a few billion have sinned. Had Lucifer not been created, it's quite possible none would have, perhaps even likely none would have.
And yes, -- sooner or later amongst so many free moral agents one of them would want to try something apart from God -- thinking his way was better than God's way.
This seems like just an opinion, which, to me, doesn't seem logical. From a logical standpoint, you have beings who were created perfectly, to love God, and be loved by Him. Why would anyone choose to "try something apart from God"? They would have no motivation to do so.
God's full character and righteous ways were not fully appreciated when the opposite was not known.
Are you saying that apart from sin, it's not possible to fully know and appreciate God's full character and righteous ways?
T:Regarding 1SM 250, that's one quote to consider, but there are others, namely DA 49, DA 131, COL 196, and EW 125-127 which make it clear that the no risk idea of the future isn't correct. That is, if the future is fixed, given God's perfect foreknowledge, there can be no risk for God. Risk means uncertainty. Fixed future = no uncertainty. These are mutually exclusive concepts.
D:Again, you seem to have this fixation of "fixed".
Not at all. There are different words that can be used. I've tried three did ways of expressing the concept: "fixed", "determined" and "single-threaded." The concept is that the future consists of things which are certain to happen, the things which God has seen will happen, as opposed to being consisted of, say, a net, or web, of possible things that might happen, with God seeing all of the possibilities.
I don't know how to try to explain - many have tried as this debate seems to go on for months on end -- so it's rather pointless to think I could add anything to change the "fixed" concepts held.
I'm saying that if the future is epistemologically fixed from God's perspective (i.e., God knows, or view, the future as fixed, meaning He knows, or views, exactly what will happen) then it is ontologically fixed. Why? Because God sees (or knows) things as they actually are.
Somehow the whole emotional element is missing -- yes, God knew the plan of redemption would be successful.
He knew it would be if Christ succeeded. But He sent Christ at a risk, the "risk of failure and eternal loss."
But He still has to experience every bit of the process to reach that end.
He would have experienced it all from the moment He decided to start creating things, as in His mind, it would already have been certain.
We experience things as possibilities turn into realities. That can happen earlier or later. It happens when we know the possibility has become a reality. In the case of God, under the scenario you are suggesting, the reality would have been from the beginning.
It's not just a "fast forward" the events, painless leap into the perfect eternity.
When Christ was on earth, it was a REAL battle against Satan. He spent hours in prayer for strength to remain in God's will. It was REAL pain, REAL temptations, real opportunities to fail.
Under the scenario you are suggesting, it would have been a "real" battle with a certain outcome. So it's "real" in the sense that Christ actually had to exert Himself, but not "real" in the sense that there could have been any other outcome than what happened. There would have been no risk of failure, since it's not possible for something God is certain to happen not to happen.
When Christ was on earth, the "foreknowledge" sometimes grew very dim and He could barely see beyond the immediate conflict with sin.
It was *God* who took a risk in sending His Son. It wasn't simply an apparent risk that Christ felt He was taking, because of His foreknowledge growing dim, but a very real risk that both took. This is how it's presenting in inspiration. COL 196 discusses it from Christ's standpoint, as well as DA 131, saying that Christ took a risk ("Christ risked all"). DA 49 puts it from God's perspective, God's permitting His Son to come at the risk of failure and eternal loss. COL 196 tells us that all heaven was imperiled for our redemption. In order for this to be true, it cannot be the case that God was certain heaven was in no danger. Iow, there had to be a real risk involved. That is, it had to have been actually possible for Christ to have failed, in God's mind. If, in God's mind, there was no chance of Christ's failing, then there was no actual risk, only an apparent one.
It's this reality of battle to make victory secure that seems to be dismissed in your interpretation of what I mean when we say God knew Christ would be victorious.
It's not the reality of the battle that's being dismissed, but the possibility of a different outcome.