The Contradiction

I can't think of succinct title heading, so I'll just leave it as "The Contradiction."

MM wrote:



to which I responded, "this isn't the problem." I thought I'd explain here why this isn't the problem, and what the problem is. It seemed to that since the title of the topic where this conversation took place is "How Can a Person Know if a Prophecy is Conditional or Unconditional?" that this might be a better spot to discuss this, since this question doesn't really address the question of the topic.

It's obvious that God's knowing whether or not something will happen does not influence whether or not the event will occur (unless, of course, He takes direct action to cause the event to come to pass). When the contradiction between compatible free will and determinism is brought out, often those who hold the deterministic view will respond the way MM did (as quoted above), but this is "itching where it doesn't scratch" as an ex-professor of mine would say. No one thinks or is saying that God's knowing something will happen interferes with free will.

Ok, so if this isn't the problem, what is? The problem is that how we define free will may conflict with reality, depending on our assumptions. Let's assume:

a)A person has free will if he can, at a given point in time, do either of acts A or B (where B is different than A).
b)Only event A can happen at the given point in time.

It should be obvious that this is a contradiction. This is where the problem lies. If only event A can occur, then event B cannot occur. The person in a) cannot do B. He could choose or want to do B, but he can't actually do it. If we define free will differently, this contradiction can be avoided.

Please notice that up until here, God's foreknowledge has not come into the picture. Before introducing God's foreknowledge, I'd like to see if we can all agree that a) and b) are indeed contradictory; that is, a person cannot do either of A or B if only A can occur.

I agree. Since "A" is the only possibility, then "B" is not a possibility.

From the other thread, we have this:



What this means is that if God knows that something will happen in a certain way, it will. So if God knows that A will happen, and not B, then we have:

c)If God knows A will happen and not B, then A will happen, and not B.

From the first thread, we know that the following is a contradiction:

a)A person has free will if he can, at a given point in time, do either of acts A or B (where B is different than A).
b)Only event A can happen at the given point in time.

This is a contradiction because if only A can happen, then the person in a) cannot do B.

From c) we have: If God knows A will happen and not B, then A will happen, and not B.

Thus it follows that if God knows A will happen and not B, then we have a contradiction with a). That is, the following to items are contradictory:

a)A person has free will if he can, at a given point in time, do either of acts A or B (where B is different than A).
c)If God knows A will happen and not B, then A will happen, and not B.

Either a) can be true but not both. Actually I'm saying this a bit imprecisely. It's really the following two things which are contradictory:

a1)A person can do either of A or B.
b1)God knows that A will happen and not B.

I'm responding here, which seems like a more appropriate place.

TE: Ok, let's stop here a moment. If something that God knows how it will play out cannot happen differently than what God knows will happen, then is there anything that can happen differently than what God has already seen? The answer must be no, right?

MM: Right.

Since God knows all things, and all things happen as God knows they will, it should be obvious that no one can do anything different than what God knows will happen. Thus no one has free will using the definition that a person can do either of more than one thing at a given time, since only the thing that God knows will happen can actually happen. One is constrained to define "free will" in some other way than the ability to do either of more than one option at a given time. One can only do an exact thing at any given time; the thing that God knows one will do.

TE: Please notice that up until here, God's foreknowledge has not come into the picture. Before introducing God's foreknowledge, I'd like to see if we can all agree that a) and b) are indeed contradictory; that is, a person cannot do either of A or B if only A can occur.

MM: Is this a good time to discuss God's foreknowledge?

I knew you would ask that.

What other definition of free will could there be?

Main Entry: 1free
Pronunciation: \ˈfrē\
Function: adjective
Inflected Form(s): fre·er; fre·est
Etymology: Middle English, from Old English frēo; akin to Old High German frī free, Welsh rhydd, Sanskrit priya own, dear
Date: before 12th century
1 a: having the legal and political rights of a citizen b: enjoying civil and political liberty <free citizens> c: enjoying political independence or freedom from outside domination d: enjoying personal freedom : not subject to the control or domination of another
2 a: not determined by anything beyond its own nature or being : choosing or capable of choosing for itself b: determined by the choice of the actor or performer <free actions> c: made, done, or given voluntarily or spontaneously
3 a: relieved from or lacking something and especially something unpleasant or burdensome <free from pain> <a speech free of political rhetoric> — often used in combination <error-free> b: not bound, confined, or detained by force
4 a: having no trade restrictions b: not subject to government regulation cof foreign exchange : not subject to restriction or official control
5 a: having no obligations (as to work) or commitments <I'll be free this evening> b: not taken up with commitments or obligations <a free evening>
6: having a scope not restricted by qualification <a free variable>
7 a: not obstructed, restricted, or impeded <free to leave> b: not being used or occupied <waved with his free hand> c: not hampered or restricted in its normal operation
8 a: not fastened <the free end of the rope> b: not confined to a particular position or place <in twelve-tone music, no note is wholly free for it must hold its place in the series — J. L. Stewart> c: capable of moving or turning in any direction <a free particle> d: performed without apparatus <free tumbling> e: done with artificial aids (as pitons) used only for protection against falling and not for support <a free climb>
9 a: not parsimonious <free spending> b: outspoken c: availing oneself of something without stint d: frank, open e: overly familiar or forward in action or attitude f: licentious
10: not costing or charging anything
11 a (1): not united with, attached to, combined with, or mixed with something else : separate <free ores> <a free surface of a bodily part> (2): freestanding <a free column> b: chemically uncombined <free oxygen> <free acids> c: not permanently attached but able to move about <a free electron in a metal> d: capable of being used alone as a meaningful linguistic form <the word hats is a free form> — compare bound 7
12 a: not literal or exact <free translation> b: not restricted by or conforming to conventional forms <free skating>
13: favorable — used of a wind blowing from a direction more than six points from dead ahead
14: not allowing slavery
15: open to all comers

Thomas, the definitions for free will are in theology often split into two types, one called "compatibilistic" and the other "incompatibilistic." "Compatible" has to do with being compatible with determinism.

What the Calvinists argue, and they are correct, is that it is logically inconsistent to have a deterministic view of things and the definition of free will which I've suggested, which is the ability to perform different actions at a given time. They are much more consistent logically than Armenianists on this point (which is to say, they are logically consistent, whereas traditional Armenianists are not).

The Calvinist definition of free will is that one has free will if one is able to do that which one desires to do. Their definition is dependent not upon the ability to actually do different things, but to be able to do that which one wishes to do. This definition of free will is compatible with the notion of a future which only has one option available.

TE: I knew you would ask that.

MM: I am afraid to do anything without your permission. You can be pretty sensitive about it.

Why? I'm just trying to explain things in a step by step way that can be understood.

So everyone ends up doing what they wish, and the saved people wish to do Gods will while the lost wish to do evil, and so Gods predestination is fullfilled...

Yes, that's the idea. This way the Calvinist's avoid the contradiction that is coming up here. God's foreknowledge (as defined in this thread, which is the same as Calvinist's define it) implies that a person can only do A if God sees him doing A. This isn't a problem, logically, for the Calvinist's in terms of free will because they understand that free will means that you can do what you want to do.

The contradiction that's coming up here is that if God the fact that God sees that A will happen means that A must happen, then a person cannot do B, which kills the definition of free will which says that the person with free will can do either A or B.

TE: Why? I'm just trying to explain things in a step by step way that can be understood.

MM: I know. That's part of the problem. Your goal is teach and to persuade - not to be a learner, a fellow Bible student. Thus, when things do not progress according to your plan you are quick to point it out. Also, your tendency to critique and label things as either "irrelevant" or "illogical" is wearisome. It would certainly make things a lot nicer for me if you would simply share what makes sense to you without finding fault with what others share.

Explain what? What are you trying to explain, and why do you feel the need to try and explain it? I have no idea what you are talking about personally, and I see that you skipped a whole lot of information as to what you perceive by using words like:
"compatible free will" and "determinism".

What are those words? Why should I care? Why should anyone care for that matter? What does it mean to you,
Where do you stand on whatever it is the foundation you are trying to lay?
God Bless,
Will

MM, I apologize. How should I make the points in a way which is not offensive? You saw the quote from the Spirit of Prophecy, which points out how important sound arguments are, correct? Tell me what language you'd like me to use when I perceive an argument is not sound because either it's not addressing the point under consideration or because it's illogical, and I'll be happy to use that language.

I'm sorry again if I wrote anything that was personally upsetting. I'm not wishing to say anything about you personally, only your argument. Guide me in the language you'd like me to use, and I'll go along with that.

Thanks.

Will, have you been following the conditional prophecy thread? This is a spin-off from that.

Regarding where I stand on the issue I've been speaking about, I don't believe the future is fixed; I believe it's open. That is, the future is comprised, at least in part, of possibilities until we as self-determining agents act upon the choices that we have.

As to why it's important, it provides a framework to answer such questions as, if God knew Lucifer was going to sin, why did He create him.

As to the what, the what is that the idea that the future is fixed is logically mutually exclusive to the idea that we have free will, if free will is understood to mean the ability to effect either of alternative actions at a given time.

Does that help, Will? You're jumping right in the middle, which makes it a bit difficult to respond to your concerns. Please let me know if this was an adequate answer.

I think this was out of line. Who set you to be judge over my motives?

But since you've commented, I'll tell you. I have no asperations of being able to persuade you of anything. In the three years or so since we've been discussing things, I can't think of anything I've persuaded you of, so it would be delusional of me to expect that I would be able to do so now in this thread, wouldn't it? If my goal were to teach or persuade, I would be better off elsewhere, wouldn't I?

No, MM, my goal is to learn, and I've learned a lot while participating on this forum. As long as I continue to learn and am welcome here, I'll continue to participate.

Now if my tone is off, then you are free, and encouraged, to comment about that, but I don't think you have any call to pontificate about my motives, do you?

TE: Guide me in the language you'd like me to use, and I'll go along with that.

MM: "... your tendency to critique and label things as either "irrelevant" or "illogical" is wearisome. It would certainly make things a lot nicer for me if you would simply share what makes sense to you without finding fault with what others share."

TE: Now if my tone is off, then you are free, and encouraged, to comment about that, but I don't think you have any call to pontificate about my motives, do you?

MM: "Your goal is teach and to persuade - not to be a learner, a fellow Bible student. Thus, when things do not progress according to your plan you are quick to point it out."

Oops! I forgot to add "it seems to me that your goal is ..." Sorry about that. Again, it would makes things a lot nicer for me if you would simply share your thoughts without finding fault with what others share.

Labeling what others share as "irrelevant" or "illogical" does not encourage dialogue. Nor does it sound kind and loving. It also comes across, to me, as controlling and insensitive. It makes it seem like you have an agenda and that you are unwilling to allow anyone to derail it.

A little bit, not a whole lot, but enough to see a few things there, which prompted me to ask you the questions I did.



I don't agree, but thats Ok. I believe that God knows the end from the beginning, its very simple for me.



Thats easy. God gives everyone a choice. Your decision will affect the outcome either good or bad.



Is that God talk or man talk? Sounds like man talk to me.



It helps. If I have more questions I'll ask
God Bless & Happy Sabbath,
Will

MM, you're not offering any help on what words you'd like me to choose. I'm labeling the elements of your arguments. It's not personal. I'm not labeling you in any way. If you present an argument which is unsound, how should I regard it? How about "unsound"?

You're suggesting that I share what I think without labeling your arguments, but I have to respond to the argument in some way. Would you prefer it if I just said, "I disagree. This is why."? Or would you prefer that I not respond to your arguments at all, and just share what I think as if I hadn't read what you wrote?

I'm not sure what you're wanting MM. Please elaborate, and I'll try to go along with your wishes.

Thanks.

I don't agree, but thats Ok. I believe that God knows the end from the beginning, its very simple for me.

Of course God knows the end from the beginning, but how many beginnings are there, one or two? For example, Eve could have eaten from the forbidden tree or not. If she did, God knew what would happen. If she didn't, God knew what would happen there too. The fact that God knows the end from the beginning does not mean that the future isn't open. God can know an open future, and know the end from the beginning, just as well with an open future as with a determined one.

Tom: As to why it's important, it provides a framework to answer such questions as, if God knew Lucifer was going to sin, why did He create him.

Will: Thats easy. God gives everyone a choice. Your decision will affect the outcome either good or bad.

I'm going to switch from Lucifer to Eve, because there's a well defined event to consider for Eve, the eating of the fruit.

If God knows that a given event will happen, say A and not B, is it possible for B not to happen? So far everyone participating here has said no, it's not possible for B to happen.

Let's apply this to the eating of the forbidden fruit. If God saw that Eve would eat the forbidden fruit, then, from the previous paragraph, it was not possible for her to not eat the forbidden fruit. Does this make sense to you?

This seems sarcastic too. A lot of sarcasm lately. You'll probably deny it, but it's pretty easy to recognize.

Since you've brought up my appearing not to want to learn as a fellow Bible student, allow me to ask you a question. Have you learned anything from me? I've learned from you.


Tom

if he knows A will happen, then it will happen.



Makes absolutely no sense to me, a lot of hypothesizing and way too much thinking into what is a moot point, she ate it, Adam follow soon after, God gave His only begotten Son to redeem us, He was crucified, He was risen from the grave by The Father, He came to destroy the works of the devil, and to set us free.God was manifest in the flesh, justified in the Spirit, seen of angels, preached unto the Gentiles, believed on in the world, received up into glory.Christ will come, and take us home.
A persons decision affects the outcome, God has given us a choice, we make those choices based on our faith or lack of faith. All things work together for good to them that love God.
God Bless & Happy Sabbath,
Will

What you say here, is that God knew Eve would eat the fruit, and Eve did eat the fruit, and thats it. Fine, God knows what will happen and thats whats going to happen and "Free will" is a sham, a hoax, a lie.

Good to have that cleared out.Considering your previous sentence, do you mean to say that God has given us a choise, except in those cases where He has forseen what that choise will be, in which cases there is no choise but the one which has been forseen? Becourse if we at all times have a choise, then your previous answere can not be true that if A is forseen, then only A can happen, becourse if only A can happen, then there is no choise involved. If there is a choise, Eve could have choosen not to listen to the serpant, she could have choosen not to eat the fruit. But if God knew that Eve should eat the fruit, and becourse God knew it, it must happen, then Eve never had a choise.

I too wish this was simple but I can see no simple way to understand how I both could have a free choise while God at the same time would know exactly what I will not chose, at all time, forever.

Thomas

If there was a genuine choice available (that affects the outcome) in the eyes of God, and not just in my imagination, then in the mind of God the outcome is not fixed, because there is a choice.
Right?

A choice is not a choice unless it is a choice that God has given, therefore it is a choice in the mind of God. Right?

Otherwise it is just an illusion. Right?

Does God have a choice?

TE: MM, you're not offering any help on what words you'd like me to choose. I'm labeling the elements of your arguments. It's not personal. I'm not labeling you in any way. If you present an argument which is unsound, how should I regard it? How about "unsound"?

MM: By using words like “unsound” or “illogical” to label elements of an argument you are expressing an opinion. Opinions are, by nature, personal. Labeling something “irrelevant” is also a personal opinion. Such opinions are inherently insulting. It smacks of – “Whoever shared such an illogical idea must be unsound.” Which, as you can imagine, does not encourage dialogue. Nor does it sound kind and loving.

TE: You're suggesting that I share what I think without labeling your arguments, but I have to respond to the argument in some way. Would you prefer it if I just said, "I disagree. This is why."?

MM: Sure. Or, “I’m not sure how it relates to the topic” or, “It doesn’t make sense to me” or, “I see what you’re saying, but this makes more sense to me”.

TE: Or would you prefer that I not respond to your arguments at all, and just share what I think as if I hadn't read what you wrote?

MM: Sometimes that works, too.

TE: I'm not sure what you're wanting MM. Please elaborate, and I'll try to go along with your wishes.

MM: By all means, do as you please. I am not telling you what to do. I shared my personal preferences, but you are free to do as you please. You asked me to share more details. I simply responded to your request. Again, I am not telling you how to post your thoughts and ideas. God forbid!

TE: If God knows that a given event will happen, say A and not B, is it possible for B not to happen? So far everyone participating here has said no, it's not possible for B to happen.

MM: When you factor God into the equation there is no “B”. Since God knows the future like history there is only one truth, there is no “B”. There is no such thing as “B”. There is only what actually and factually happened. With God it is not what "will" or "might" happen, but it is what "has" happened.

TE: Let's apply this to the eating of the forbidden fruit. If God saw that Eve would eat the forbidden fruit, then, from the previous paragraph, it was not possible for her to not eat the forbidden fruit. Does this make sense to you?

MM: “If God saw” implies God did not see. Which does not make sense to me. God knows “the” end from “the” beginning – not “an” end from “a” beginning. God does not report what might happen. Instead, He reports what has happened. There is no question in God’s mind what will happen. He has already seen it happen.

TE: This seems sarcastic too. A lot of sarcasm lately. You'll probably deny it, but it's pretty easy to recognize.

MM: I do not understand why you are so convinced that I am being sarcastic. It saddens me. Nothing could be further from the truth. It indicates a lack of trust. Which also makes me sad. I wish you could believe me.

TE: Since you've brought up my appearing not to want to learn as a fellow Bible student, allow me to ask you a question. Have you learned anything from me? I've learned from you.

MM: Yes! Absolutely. The most important thing I have learned from studying with you is how Sister White viewed human probation, namely, that sinners and saints alike owe their temporal existence to the death of Jesus on the cross.

TV: I too wish this was simple but I can see no simple way to understand how I both could have a free choise while God at the same time would know exactly what I will not chose, at all time, forever.

MM: Thomas, God has already watched it play out, which is not the same as figuring it out before it happens. Again, He has already watched it happen. He simply reports what has happened, not what will happen. The fact God reports it to us before it happens is a matter of perspective. From God’s perspective it has already happened, but from our perspective it hasn’t happened yet.

JB: Does God have a choice?

MM: God cannot choose to not know the future like history. He is God, thus He cannot stop knowing the future like history. It’s not a problem, though. It’s why He can guarantee that “affliction shall not rise up the second time”. (Nahum 1:9) Such a promise is not hopeful thinking, or one of many possible outcomes. It’s the truth, a truth based on God’s divine ability to see "the" future ( as opposed to "a" future) with 20/20 hindsight.

There is no choise, for God there is no future, only history, in other words, there is no choise. God did not create choise. It is now a clear view. One I reject. There is choise, there is a future. Even for God.

Now that I know what this topic here is all about, I quoted the following post by Tom from the other topic with my own comments below the quoted section:


He can choose either A or B. Even though God knows what ultimate choice the person is going to make, the choice is still his' or her's to make. Freewill isn't affected at all. God doesn't decide the choice between A or B. The person decides the choice. God knows in advance what choice the person is going to freely decide to make. I don't know what's so hard to understand about that.

If God does not have a choice, he cannot give one to us.

God chose, by His own freedom of choice, to also give His created beings the freedom to make their own choices and He hasn't removed that freedom from us, even though He could, if He so chooses, however, I do not think He will ever make such a choice, as it would be out of character for Him to do so.

Of course, there are consequences in the choices we make, such as the consequences in the choice both Eve and Adam made.

Thomas,
Can you explain what you are saying by this:

Where did you get that idea from, let alone who said it was a sham, and a hoax, and a lie?
God Bless,
Will

We have to guess because or knowledge and intelligence is limited. God is not limited in either knowledge nor intelligence, hence there is no need for Him to guess.

Thomas,
After reading your post, post#85199.
YOu said:


#1 Keep in mind that Jesus was the Lamb that was slain before the foundation of the world. The plan for salvation was in place before a bird flew in the air in the earth's history.
Make of it what you feel like.


Thats exactly what I said, no except, no if's and or but's about it. We have 2 choices, obey , or not. Its easy as that, only people make it more difficult than it is.


Uhh.. Ok..



No if's, its a fact, she chose to eat it, or did the devil put a gun to her head, or tie her up and force feed it to her? She took and ate, you have to reach out, and put it in your own mouth. Doesnt sound to complicated to me.



Because it must happen? No it it did not have to happen, but it did.
God Bless & Happy Sabbath,
Will

Right! How could it be otherwise?

In the mind of God, the outcome is not fixed, because it isn't. That is, the mind of God reflects the reality of our choice not being fixed.

In the case of Eve and then Adam, God told them not to eat that forbidden fruit, which we can refer to as choice A. To disobey and eat that fruit we can refer to as choice B.

God also told them that, if they did eat it (Choice A), there would be devastating consequences in that they would surely die.

It was God's revealed will to both Adam and Eve that they do NOT eat that fruit. Adam and Eve chose to use their freedom of choice by choosing against the will of God.

God in His foreknowledge knew in advance that Adam and Eve would go against His will and eat that fruit. This is why the Plan of Salvation was conceived by the Godhead. Christ, at the right time, died the death that Adam and Eve should have died. He also died the death that we should die of, "For all have sinned and come short of the glory of God" (Romans 3:23).

Here is a case where God didn't want Adam and Eve to choose choice A, but rather wanted them to choose Choice B. God, however, knew Adam and Eve would choose Choice A over Choice B, even before they chose it, and even responded in advance (Plan of Salvation) even before Choice A took place.

Will, you are right, it is quite simple.

#1, Jesus was the lamb slain before the foundation of the world. This is a act of God. Of course God can make things happen.

#2, I have no problem with God giving us a choise. None at all. In fact, that is the point I am trying to promote.

#3, I could accept God knowing the future as surely as if it was a rerun, written down black on white in a book, burned in stone by the very finger of God.

#4, What I cannot agree with is #2 and #3 both being true at the same time. If these words I have written in this post where known, as if written in stone, by God from before the foundation of the world, then I had no choise in writing them. I could not NOT have written them. If God knew I would write this from before Adam drew his first breath, then I am merely fullfilling what must happen when I write this and post it. As far as I can see, to be honest, I must choose between #2 and #3, to try and argue both at the same time would be a lie, at least for me.

Thomas

There is a big problem with you saying the they "would" sin, it implies that God knew that the outcome was biased, not only biased but assured. Meaning that Adam and Eve were not equipped to meet the challenge, moreover meaning that they were rather set-up to fail.

I am saying no such thing.

God knowing what would happen is very different from God making it happen.

It's because of God's giving us freedom to choose that God let it happen. To do otherwise, would be His removing our freedom of choice.

To give them freedom of choice could by no means assure that they "will" sin, but only create a possibility that they "could" sin.

Could in what knowledge we have as finite human beings, but will in what was then God's foreknowledge, which humans do not have, unless revealed to us by God through His prophet/s.

Tom, Thomas, and John:

Does God know if you will be saved or doesn't He know?

Unless a choice is a choice in the mind of God, it is not a choice at all, only our imagination.

If there is knowledge to be had by anyone, there has to be material for such knowledge to be. for God to know that they "will" sin is to say that it was preset.

Tom,

Plese explain the following passage to me:

"GOD knows the end from the beginning. He knew, before the birth of Jacob and Esau, just what characters they would both develop. He knew that Esau would not have a heart to obey Him. He answered the troubled prayer of Rebekah and informed her that she would have two children, and the elder should serve the younger. He presented the future history of her two sons before her, that they would be two nations, the one greater than the other, and the elder should serve the younger." {SR 87.1}

Never said God had to make it happen. It would be that he just did not provide the ability to them so that it could be that it would not have to happen.

In other words if we think we have a choice and God sees only one outcome, then we are kidding ourselves.

Rosangela asked for an explanation of an excellent EGW quote that she quoted in her last post here.

I am interested in Tom's and whoever else's explanation also of what that quote is saying in relation to this topic.

Establishing, or stating the characteristics of what one is, is not the issue. We have no choice in how we come into this world. That does not have to do with salvation. Salvation has to do with what God will make of us regardless of what we are (by inheritance or otherwise) if we let him.

Does, in the mind of God, everyone have that choice?

Imported from a different thread:

TE: If the person in my example must to A, then the fact that he doesn't know he must to A (because the future is hidden to him) doesn't make it any less the case that he can't do B. The fact that he thinks he can do B when he can't doesn't change the fact that he can't do B.

MM: The words “must do” and “can’t do” do not make sense to me, Tom. We’re talking about God’s divine hindsight, His ability to view the future like history. Words like “must do” or “can’t do” do not make sense to me since God is describing something that someone has already done. I think He would use words like “will do” and “has done” and “did not do”.

TE: Now if you're dealing with some prophetic event, then of course what God says forms a huge percentage of what we know about that future event.

MM: What does our percentage consist of?

TE: But if you're dealing with something like what you think will happen tomorrow, like whether it will rain or not, God's divine ability to view the future doesn't come into play much if at all.

MM: Unless we’re talking about Noah. This discussion is, at least I thought it was, dealing with God’s ability to foretell future events like reporting history. Not what could or might happen – but what has already happened.


TE: You're really not even touching the point I have been making. I have pointed out repeatedly that God's foreknowledge isn't important to the argument. It's just cloudying up the water. Let's keep things simple, then add complexity later.

MM: “Thus, we cannot divorce God’s ability to foretell the future from this discussion.” (Please see context above)

TE: If a person can do either A or B, then the future cannot be such that only A can happen. Does this make sense to you?

MM: Only if we divorce God’s foreknowledge and hindsight from the equation. From our perspective, if God says nothing about it, the future is unknown. We cannot know with certainty what will or will not happen.

Yes, only God knows the future and what choices we will choose of our own freewill to make.

God in His foreknowledge doesn't dictate our choices, but rather allows us to make those choices that He knows we are going to make. He may warn us of the consequences of such choices, but He doesn't force us into making a different choice.

DF: Rosangela asked for an explanation of an excellent EGW quote that she quoted in her last post here. I am interested in Tom's and whoever else's explanation also of what that quote is saying in relation to this topic.

MM: I believe it demonstrates God’s divine ability to see the future like history. He knows exactly how things will play out because He has already watched them play out. The following quotes demonstrate the same truth:

DA 22
From the beginning, God and Christ knew of the apostasy of Satan, and of the fall of man through the deceptive power of the apostate. God did not ordain that sin should exist, but He foresaw its existence, and made provision to meet the terrible emergency. {DA 22.2}

AG 129
But the defection of man, with all its consequences, was not hidden from the Omnipotent, and yet it did not deter Him from carrying out His eternal purpose; for the Lord would establish His throne in righteousness. God knows the end from the beginning. {AG 129.2}

TMK 18
The fall of man, with all its consequences, was not hidden from the Omnipotent. Redemption was not an afterthought, a plan formulated after the fall of Adam, but an eternal purpose, suffered to be wrought out for the blessing not only of this atom of a world, but for the good of all the worlds that God had created. {TMK 18.2}

If we think we have a choice and God sees only one outcome, then we are kidding ourselves.

This is an interesting conversation! I'd like to get back to the point I was making before, which Thomas and John have been echoing using other words. So far I think everyone has agreed with the following point:

a)If God knows that A will happen, and not B, then A will happen and not B.

If we call Eve's eating of the forbidden fruit A, then God knew *before He created Eve* that the event of her eating the fruit would happen. God knew that the event of her not eating the fruit would not happen.

So the question is, how could Eve have eaten of the fruit?

The key point that think is being missed here is that God knew Eve wouldn't eat of the apple BEFORE she made her choice. That means that the event that Eve would eat of the fruit was DETERMINED BEFORE Eve made her choice.

And this is the problem. If the event of Eve's eating the fruit was determined before she made her "choice," then she didn't determine the event. She could not have not eaten of the fruit, because that was an event which could not happen.

This is why, to be logically consistent, one must use a definition of free will that does not imply that a person can actually do A or B. A definition that a person could have done B if (s)he wanted to, but God knew (s)he wouldn't, is logically consistent.

But to assert that both the following are true, is logically impossible:

a)It was certain that Eve would eat of the forbidden fruit
b)Eve could have either eaten of the fruit or not.

I can feel someone saying, "Eve could have chosen not to eat of the fruit, but if that had been the case, God would have known that." But the problem is that Eve's eating of the fruit was determined *before* she made her choice, not after.

As Thomas put it:



or as John succinctly put it:

Regarding the quote Rosangela provided, here are some quotes which provide a balancing perspective:







Regarding the question if God knows if we will be saved, He didn't even know if Christ would be saved! And God had a lot more reason to believe in what He would choose than us.

The fact is that God gives us the power to determine our future, and until we do so, the future is undetermined. God cannot see as determined something which is undetermined; that would be seeing something wrong. God sees things the way they are.

The above quotes point out that God undertook a risk in sending Christ, as did Christ (who also had perfect foreknowledge). So evidently perfect foreknowledge and risk are not mutually exclusive. However, risk and a certain outcome is.

We can either say:

a)God was 100% certain that Christ would be successful.

or

b)God sent His Son at the risk of failure and eternal loss.

But not both.

We can either say:

a)Christ was 100% certain that He would be successful.

or

b)Christ risked all for our redemption.

But not both.

Regarding the quote Rosangela mentioned, the future is comprised of certain elements which are determined, and others which are undetermined. That is, to some extent it is fixed, and to some extent it is comprised of possibilities. Also there is the point that God works in human history, so He can bring out things that He wants to accomplish (although He will not counteract His own principles to do so, such as violating free will).

So God was able to see the character that Esau and Jacob would develop, which is not surprising, since God knows everything. God knew every chromosome of Jacob and Esau. He knew the character of their parents. He knew the upbringing they would have. He knew how their parents would treat them. Remember that God is unlimited in intelligence. God's understanding of the future is based upon His unlimited intelligence and knowledge.

Regarding Christ the lamb slain from the foundation of the world, the following quote has been helpful for me:



"Before sin created the need, God had provided the remedy." Had sin not created the need, the remedy would still have been available, just as our body's ability to heal itself exists regardless of whether the need arises.

Christ, the lamb slain from the foundation of the world, is a statement regarding God's character, not the inevitability of sin. It was never God's plan, design, or intent that sin would arise. Sin was not inevitable (or even likely).

It's nice that God allows us to make those choices that He knows that we will make, but what about the choices He knows we won't make?

The problem is we can't do something God knows we won't do. So it's not a real choice. It's a theoretical choice, not an actual one.

Say God knows on Monday I will take the quick, non-scenic route to work instead of the longer scenic route. Do I have the ability to take the scenic route? No, because if I took the scenic route then when God knew I would do would be wrong, and God can't be wrong. So I don't really have the ability to take the other route. My "choice" is theoretical, not actual. I can't actually do anything different than what God knows I will do.

It's not that I can't, but that I won't.

Look at the premises which are being proposed here:

A- God knows everything
B- God doesn't know if I will be saved or lost, because if He knew, my salvation or perdition would be fixed

A and B are mutually exclusive and, therefore, contradictory. Does God know everything or doesn't He? If He doesn't, the word "ominiscient" can't be applied to Him.

Tom, either our personal future is fixed or it isn't. Your statement that it is partly fixed does not make sense to me. My position is that God's foreknowledge of my future doesn't in any way fix it; my future is fixed by my choices.

Besides, could you please explain how God can know beforehand the character a person will develop? First, not even identical twins develop the same character, although they share the same genetic inheritance and the same upbringing. Second, our character is affected by the Holy Spirit's action, therefore, for someone to know what kind of character I will develop, he will have to know how I will respond to the Holy Spirit's working in my life (which, of course, is determined by my choice). And third, if God knew the character a person would develop, the person's character would be fixed, according to your position, and so would be his salvation or perdition, which are determined by the character.

Tom:I can't actually do anything different than what God knows I will do.

Rosangela:It's not that I can't, but that I won't.

Look at the premises which are being proposed here:

A- God knows everything
B- God doesn't know if I will be saved or lost, because if He knew, my salvation or perdition would be fixed

A and B are mutually exclusive and, therefore, contradictory. Does God know everything or doesn't He? If He doesn't, the word "ominiscient" can't be applied to Him.

Can God make a rock so big He can't lift it? If He can't, then the word "omnipotent" can't be applied to Him. Your argument is equivalent to this one. You're proposing that God must be able to do something which is logically impossible.

Actually, the question of whether or not it is logically impossible is the whole issue. Is it possible for God to see a future as fixed which is not fixed? If the answer to this is "no," then your argument morphs into the can God make a rock so big He can't life it one.

Tom, either our personal future is fixed or it isn't. Your statement that it is partly fixed does not make sense to me. My position is that God's foreknowledge of my future doesn't in any way fix it; my future is fixed by my choices.

That our future is partly fixed and partly not makes perfect sense. In toto, our future is not fixed, so in regards to either it's fixed or it isn't, the answer is that it isn't. But that doesn't mean that certain parts of it aren't determinable.

For example, certain aspects of our personalities are fixed in stone. We are to a certain exent limited by our genetics and our environment. Within those limitations we have the ability to make choices.

If the future is not fixed, it cannot be known as fixed. It can be known, but not as fixed, if it is not fixed.

If we assume God can foresee you doing a certain fixed thing, then that means there is a fixed thing that exists for God to foresee. He can't foresee something which doesn't exist as fixed that is not fixed.

Anyway, I think this is a more difficult way to look at things than the way I've been trying to present it. People keep scooting off the point I've made. Noone has addressed it, so I'll try again.

Here's the easy way to see it.

Let's suppose that God can foresee a certain thing happening, an event A. So God sees that A will happen, and not B. It follows from this that A will happen, and not B. So far everyone has agreed to this. This means that, before I even have a chance to make a decision, it is known that A will happen and not B. A is 100% certain to happen.

Given this is the case, there is no chance I can do B. Now if I can't do B, it's evident that I don't have free will, if free will is defined as the ability for me to do either A or B. Furthermore, it's also clear that I did not determine whether or not I would do A or B because it was determined before I had an opportunity to make a choice.

Besides, could you please explain how God can know beforehand the character a person will develop? First, not even identical twins develop the same character, although they share the same genetic inheritance and the same upbringing. Second, our character is affected by the Holy Spirit's action, therefore, for someone to know what kind of character I will develop, he will have to know how I will respond to the Holy Spirit's working in my life (which, of course, is determined by my choice). And third, if God knew the character a person would develop, the person's character would be fixed, according to your position, and so would be his salvation or perdition, which are determined by the character.

I agree that in the sense of being saved or not saved it would not make sense to say that this could be foreknown.

As I said before, our genetics and upbringing have a lot to do with what our character will be. Now God knows all things. He is not limited in intelligence or knowledge. Given this is the case, there is much that can be known about one's character. That shouldn't be a difficult thing to accept.

In the example of identical twins, just to point out an easy example of how one could know about character which would be developed, one twin is older than the other. This leads him or her to be treated differently than the other. This has an impact on the character, or personality, that this twin will develop as opposed to the other.

Another example of something which could be foreknown about how twins could develop is that they form patterns of behavior even in the womb. That's something that could be known by a Being with infinite knowledge and intelligence, which is bound to have an impact on future development.

There may be factors related to genetics which we don't understand, but which God understands, which have to do with how one's personality or character will develop. This seems extremely likely to me. That is, there may be reasons that twins would develop differently that God knows about that we haven't discovered yet.

So those are a few possibilities.

This way of approaching the issue seems less clear cut to me than the other. That is, what I've been pointing out is that either it's the case that in the future event A is certain to happen, or it's the case that either of A or B can happen. What's being proposed is a logically inconsistent system whereby on the one hand A is certain to happen, but on the other hand, either A or B could happen.

That is, if we accept the proposition that if God knows that A will happen, then A must happen, then it cannot be the case that I could do either of A or B. This should be obvious. Either A is certain to happen, or it isn't. If it is, then B can't happen. If B can't happen, then I can't do it. Changing "can't" to "won't" doesn't change the logical impossibility of my being able to do something which can't possibly happen. If it can't happen, I can't do it.

Tom,
Several things here before I stop participating on this thread.
#1 you said: This is why, to be logically consistent,

Logically consistent according to who? Who makes the rules? You or God?

#2. one must use a definition of free will that does not imply that a person can actually do A or B.

No one has to do anything at all, thats why its called "faith"


#3 A definition that a person could have done B if (s)he wanted to, but God knew (s)he wouldn't, is logically consistent.

Perhaps according to you.


I am saying this from the perspective of a Christian.
#1 What does it do for me in my walk with Christ, absolutely nothing.
#2 How does it strengthen my faith, it doesn't.
#3How does it help me to achieve in knowing more about God, it doesn't.
In fact I find more harm being done by trying to use man made logic to figure out God when the Bible is filled with gems about His knowledge, Wisdom, and how He is, and the fulfilled prophecies about The Messiah, Jesus Christ and His soon return.

It is man and their flawed ideas that cause so many problems we find today in religion, even within our own denomination.
Some people enjoy this stuff for glorifying in the flesh, its quite obvious.
I find it discouraging and counterproductive to growing in Christ, seriously. Nothing wrong with asking questions, but then again I guess its the motive for the questions, which you clearly state and believe that God doesn't know the future. Bold words for someone who decays slowly each and everyday.
There are things I have read on forums that make me ask myself "With what authority do they question God in such a manner". Stuff I wouldn't share with anyone, but would admonish them and suggest, to keep on praying, walk by Faith in Christ, and he will lead you, and never take your eyes off of Him. Everything else is vanity.
Thats my 25¢
God Bless,
Will

This says that Adam could have written Genesis by dictation from God. Noone could have deviated from it anyways.

God makes the rules, and He has provided for us to learn the rules.True, anyone can do whatever he wants. Thats why people who have seen UFOs or believe they are Napoleon Bonaparte arent thrown into institutions anymore...The underlined part could easily be missunderstood. Perhaps you want to specify what you mean by it.

Also, while this question isnt one of concern for you. That is not true for the great majority of people as can be seen in the long disagreement between Lutherans and Calvinists regarding predestination. To know wether God has choosen for me to be saved or lost or wether I choose that for myself is to me a quite profound question. But of course you do not have to share my questions.

Also, I do think that all ideas that are going to be presented has been so. Nothing new has surfaced in a while now, only new ways to repackage what was already said. And it is not likely that anyone posting is going to change position. I think this is perhaps ripe to RIP. (Or if it is supposed to move forward towards something, let it do so now.)

May the Holy Spirit teach.

Thomas

It’s completely different. Your question is flawed because it poses a contradiction between God’s attributes. God can’t create a rock He can’t lift exactly because there is nothing He can’t do and, therefore, no rock He can’t lift. So omnipotence can’t contradict omnipotence. It's the same as saying that God is not omnipotent if He can't be bad.

On the other hand, if God didn’t know the future, He wouldn’t be omniscient. Besides, the argument that God's foreknowledge and man's free will are incompatible is also completely flawed.
The fact that God knows the future doesn’t fix it. Someone gave a good example about this. Let's say I use a time-machine to travel forwards in time to next week. I write down all your actions on Thursday in a book, seal the book and travel back again. I present you with the sealed book and tell you not to open it until the end of Thursday. When you read it, you see that I had prior knowledge of all your actions. Did I remove your free will? No, because I simply observed. I did not set in motion all the events leading up to your actions.
In the same way, if you travel to the future, watch a horse race and then travel back, you know what the result of that horse race will be, but did you make that specific horse win the race?

Now, while you tried to answer my first argument, I saw no answer for the following two:

1) our character is affected by the Holy Spirit's action, therefore, for someone to know what kind of character I will develop, he will have to know how I will respond to the Holy Spirit's working in my life (which, of course, is determined by my choice).

2) If God knew the character a person would develop, the person's character would be fixed, according to your position, and so would be his salvation or perdition, which are determined by the character. While the same might not be said about your personality, your character is entirely determined by your free will. Is your character fixed by God’s foreknowledge?

Lets say I travel with the time machine to the future and check out the horse race. Upon arriving at home again, would I be able to do anything which would eliminate that winning horse from the race, such as breaking its legg? Or would me knowing the horse will win prevent me from doing such a thing (by other means than greed)?

Thomas,

Moses wrote Genesis, after these things had already happened. But God made this prophecy to Rebekah while the children were yet in her womb. How could God know beforehand that Jacob would follow Him but Esahu wouldn't?

I think in God's case He can and does sometimes intervene (sometimes warning the person, like in the case of Peter and Judas), as long as by that He doesn't violate anyone's free will.

If God knows something is going to happen, and then intervene and by this intervention cause something else to happen (by for instance the human heeding the warning, then Gods forknowledge wasnt the last word in the matter. Such is agreeable.

TE: I can feel someone saying, "Eve could have chosen not to eat of the fruit, but if that had been the case, God would have known that." But the problem is that Eve's eating of the fruit was determined *before* she made her choice, not after.

MM: Determined? What do you mean? Sister White said nothing about it being determined. Divine hindsight determines nothing. It simply reports the facts.

“From the beginning, God and Christ knew of the apostasy of Satan, and of the fall of man through the deceptive power of the apostate. God did not ordain that sin should exist, but He foresaw its existence, and made provision to meet the terrible emergency.” (DA 22)

TE: Regarding the question if God knows if we will be saved, He didn't even know if Christ would be saved!

MM: None of the quotes you posted agree with this idea. You are assuming it.

TE: God sees things the way they are.

MM: God also sees things the way they were before they are. He "calleth those things which be not as though they were." (Rom 4:17)

TE: God's understanding of the future is based upon His unlimited intelligence and knowledge.

MM: And yet you believe God does not know the future with certainty. Is God just a good guesser, or does He base of His knowledge of the future on hindsight?

TE: Christ, the lamb slain from the foundation of the world, is a statement regarding God's character, not the inevitability of sin. It was never God's plan, design, or intent that sin would arise. Sin was not inevitable (or even likely).

MM: How could Sister White have stated it more plainly? There is nothing ambiguous about it, nothing tentative. She plainly says God knew Lucifer and man would sin. Period! No doubt about it. God's knowledge of the future is based on hindsight - not guess work.

DA 22
From the beginning, God and Christ knew of the apostasy of Satan, and of the fall of man through the deceptive power of the apostate. God did not ordain that sin should exist, but He foresaw its existence, and made provision to meet the terrible emergency. (DA 22)

TV: If God knows something is going to happen, and then intervene and by this intervention cause something else to happen (by for instance the human heeding the warning, then Gods forknowledge wasnt the last word in the matter. Such is agreeable.

MM: His "interventions" are part of it, not an afterthought. When God watches the future like history He sees Himself interacting with FMAs. It's not like He goes back and does something different than He saw. That would be impossible.

That means that God can do nothing about what he knows.

Will, I suppose you may not read this if you are not participating in the thread anymore, but I didn't read your post past the point that said that you won't be participating in the thread anymore. I didn't see the point.

If you wish to post something with the goal of carrying on a conversation, I'll be happy to read and respond to anything you'd care to write.

It’s completely different. Your question is flawed because it poses a contradiction between God’s attributes. God can’t create a rock He can’t lift exactly because there is nothing He can’t do and, therefore, no rock He can’t lift.

"God can't create a rock He can't lift because there is nothing He can't do, and therefore no rock He can't lift." This is self-contradictory. One the one hand you say there's nothing God can't do, and on the other you say that God can't create a rock He can't lift. You even give as the reason that which makes your statement self-contradictory. You can't have "God can't do A" followed by "because there's nothing God can't do". That's not arguing from premise to conclusion in a valid way.

So omnipotence can’t contradict omnipotence.

There's nothing in the argument involving omnipotence contradicting omnipotence. The point of the statement is simple. It's simply stating that God cannot do something which is logically impossible. He can't create round squares, or both condemn and save someone, or both create the earth and not create it.

It's the same as saying that God is not omnipotent if He can't be bad.

It's not in any way the same as this. I have no idea how you came to this conclusion.

On the other hand, if God didn’t know the future, He wouldn’t be omniscient.

Agreed.

Besides, the argument that God's foreknowledge and man's free will are incompatible is also completely flawed.

Agreed. I'm not arguing that.

The fact that God knows the future doesn’t fix it.

Also agreed. I haven't been arguing this either. You seem not to have been understanding what I've been writing. I haven't written anything along the lines of what you are arguing against.

Someone gave a good example about this. Let's say I use a time-machine to travel forwards in time to next week. I write down all your actions on Thursday in a book, seal the book and travel back again. I present you with the sealed book and tell you not to open it until the end of Thursday. When you read it, you see that I had prior knowledge of all your actions. Did I remove your free will? No, because I simply observed. I did not set in motion all the events leading up to your actions.

This is supposing such a thing is possible, which is what our whole conversation is about. That is, this whole example is presupposing that the future is fixed. If the future weren't fixed, it wouldn't be possible to time travel forward to see what it is, and then come back and report on it, would it?

In the same way, if you travel to the future, watch a horse race and then travel back, you know what the result of that horse race will be, but did you make that specific horse win the race?

This is scratching where it doesn't itch. No one is arguing about for a causual link between knowledge and the perforamnce of an action. Everyone knows that my knowing that you will do something doesn't force you do it. That is not, and has never been, the subject of the conversation. The point under consideration is not knowledge of the future, but the nature of the future. Is it fixed or open? Does it consist of events which are as real as the past, except for us who have a foggy view? Or is there an ontological difference between the past and the future? That's really what's under discussion.

MM is arguing for an ontological equivalence for the past and future, which position one is free to take. But one should adopt points of view which are logically consistent with this position, as the Calvinists have, if that's the premise one wishes to start from.

Now, while you tried to answer my first argument, I saw no answer for the following two:

1) our character is affected by the Holy Spirit's action, therefore, for someone to know what kind of character I will develop, he will have to know how I will respond to the Holy Spirit's working in my life (which, of course, is determined by my choice).

At what age do you think our character is developed to an extent that one could comment on what it will be like? My guess would be at around age 3. I don't see a problem with God to know what one will basically be like before being born.

2) If God knew the character a person would develop, the person's character would be fixed, according to your position, and so would be his salvation or perdition, which are determined by the character. While the same might not be said about your personality, your character is entirely determined by your free will. Is your character fixed by God’s foreknowledge?

I don't believe our character is fixed at all. I think you're taking to rigid a view of what's involved in God's knowing someone's character. This isn't speaking to whether one will be saved or not. Esau could have been saved, and Jacob could have been lost. The things God said about their characters would still have been true. For example, Esau, after spending most of his life not having a heart to follow God, could have, later in life, responded to the pleading of the Holy Spirit, which He was no doubt making, just as Manassah responded at the end of his life. If God had prophesied regardeing Manassah that he would have a heart that would not follow God, that would be true, wouldn't it? Yet Manassah was not lost.

I didn't see any comment on the many EGW statements which bring out the God took a risk in sending Christ. The Scriptures are full of such statements as well, indicated that God takes risks. Now risk implies the opposite of a fixed future which can be reported on. If God was 100% certain Christ would succeed, He could hardly have told us He took a risk in sending Him. Similarly, if Christ was 100% certain that He would succeed, it could hardly have been said of Him that He "risked all."

Risk, by definition, means the possibility of failure. In fact, to make this clear, Ellen White wrote "at the risk of failure." The possibility of failure contradicts the idea of a future comprised of nothing but certainties.

When considering what Ellen White wrote, we need to take into consideration all that she wrote on a topic.

TV: If God knows something is going to happen, and then intervene and by this intervention cause something else to happen (by for instance the human heeding the warning, then Gods foreknowledge wasn't the last word in the matter. Such is agreeable.

MM: His "interventions" are part of it, not an afterthought. When God watches the future like history He sees Himself interacting with FMAs. It's not like He goes back and does something different than He saw. That would be impossible.


John:That means that God can do nothing about what he knows.

Right! This is another problem with this idea. According to this idea, God can view the future, but is powerless to do anything about it.

I haven't seen anyone deal with the argument I presented first on page 1, and have presented repeatedly since. Here it is again.

So far, everyone has agree that if God knows that A will happen, and not B, then A will happen, and not B. So A is 100% certain to happen. Given that this is the case, it is not possible for a person to do B, since one can't do something which cannot happen. Therefore any definition of free will which implies that a person can to either of A or B is logically inconsistent.

TE: I can feel someone saying, "Eve could have chosen not to eat of the fruit, but if that had been the case, God would have known that." But the problem is that Eve's eating of the fruit was determined *before* she made her choice, not after.

MM: Determined? What do you mean? Sister White said nothing about it being determined.
Divine hindsight determines nothing. It simply reports the facts.

You're misunderstanding the meaning of my last sentence. I'm not sure if you can understand it. There might be some other way I can put it that would allow you to understand the thought. If I can think of something, I'll write it.

This argument is more difficult to understand than the one I started this topic with. I'd suggest taking a look at it (I've recently repeated it) and deal with it.



“From the beginning, God and Christ knew of the apostasy of Satan, and of the fall of man through the deceptive power of the apostate. God did not ordain that sin should exist, but He foresaw its existence, and made provision to meet the terrible emergency.” (DA 22)



TE: Regarding the question if God knows if we will be saved, He didn't even know if Christ would be saved!

MM: None of the quotes you posted agree with this idea. You are assuming it.

All of them stated that Christ took a risk. None of them were an assumption on my part, but were instead direct statements of Ellen White's.

TE: God sees things the way they are.

MM: God also sees things the way they were before they are. He "calleth those things which be not as though they were." (Rom 4:17)

God sees the future the way it is. The future is different than the past. This is your fundamental assumption, and it's not correct. If it were the same as the past, we could not have free will under the libertarian definition (i.e. we can do either of A or B).

TE: God's understanding of the future is based upon His unlimited intelligence and knowledge.

MM: And yet you believe God does not know the future with certainty.

No, I don't believe this. God does know the future with certainty. He knows the future as it is. Until FMA's take actions to convert possibilities into realities, possibilities are an essential characteristic of the future.

Is God just a good guesser, or does He base of His knowledge of the future on hindsight?

Hindsight? His knowledge of the future is foresight. "Foresight" means to look ahead.

TE: Christ, the lamb slain from the foundation of the world, is a statement regarding God's character, not the inevitability of sin. It was never God's plan, design, or intent that sin would arise. Sin was not inevitable (or even likely).

MM: How could Sister White have stated it more plainly? There is nothing ambiguous about it, nothing tentative. She plainly says God knew Lucifer and man would sin. Period! No doubt about it. God's knowledge of the future is based on hindsight - not guess work.

DA 22
From the beginning, God and Christ knew of the apostasy of Satan, and of the fall of man through the deceptive power of the apostate. God did not ordain that sin should exist, but He foresaw its existence, and made provision to meet the terrible emergency. (DA 22)



How could Sister White have stated it more plainly. There is nothing ambiguous about it, nothing tentative. She plainly says God took a risk in sending Christ. He foresaw the possibility that Christ would fail, but took the risk anyway.

JB: That means that God can do nothing about what he knows.

MM: God is not a man. His ability to know the future like history is beyond our comprehension. Saying that “God can do nothing about what He knows” implies He would change things if He could. But such an implication suggests God didn’t do it right the first time. That is impossible.

TE: That is, this whole example is presupposing that the future is fixed.

MM: The future is not fixed – history is fixed. God sees the future like history. He does not predict what will happen; instead, He reports what has happened.

TE: In fact, to make this clear, Ellen White wrote "at the risk of failure." The possibility of failure contradicts the idea of a future comprised of nothing but certainties.

MM: The word “risk” cannot mean the Father did not know if Jesus would fail or succeed on the cross. To insist He didn’t know is to imply God does not know the end from the beginning. This begs the question – How can God know “affliction shall not rise up the second time”?

TE: According to this idea, God can view the future, but is powerless to do anything about it.

MM: You are assuming there is something about it that needs correcting, which implies God did not get it right the first time. God does not make mistakes.

TE: So far, everyone has agree that if God knows that A will happen, and not B, then A will happen, and not B. So A is 100% certain to happen. Given that this is the case, it is not possible for a person to do B, since one can't do something which cannot happen. Therefore any definition of free will which implies that a person can to either of A or B is logically inconsistent.

MM: There is no such thing as “B”. What has happened is “A”. It is based on God’s ability to see the future like history. Only “A” will happen because it is what happened.

TE: But the problem is that Eve's eating of the fruit was determined *before* she made her choice, not after.

MM: Again, there was nothing “determined” about it. God knew she would eat it because He already saw it happen.

TE: God sees the future the way it is. The future is different than the past. This is your fundamental assumption, and it's not correct. If it were the same as the past, we could not have free will under the libertarian definition (i.e. we can do either of A or B).

MM: God "calleth those things which be not as though they were." (Rom 4:17) From God’s perspective history and future are one and the same thing. God “inhabits eternity”. (Isa 57:15) Time and space does not apply to God in the same way it applies to FMAs.

TE: God does know the future with certainty. He knows the future as it is. Until FMA's take actions to convert possibilities into realities, possibilities are an essential characteristic of the future.

MM: This doesn’t make sense to me. You seem to be arguing that God knows the future with certainty but He doesn’t know what will happen in the future.

TE: Hindsight? His knowledge of the future is foresight. "Foresight" means to look ahead.

MM: It’s both. He knows the end from the beginning. God is God, therefore, hindsight and foresight are one and the same thing.

TE: He foresaw the possibility that Christ would fail, but took the risk anyway.

MM: I vehemently disagree. God did not know Jesus “would” fail. He knew Jesus would succeed. He never once doubted it. God does not doubt. He doesn't have to - He knows the end from the beginning.

Surely if it is beyond (y)our comprehension, then you should not assert what you do not know and what is not comprehensible.

But I do not hold your view about his knowledge. God and all the beings created in his image, utilize knowledge as an ingredient in the formation of judgment, decisions, and choices, as to what they will do. Your view of God's knowledge does not allow him that priviledge. Such a view of the knowledge of God is in an abstract (incomprehensible) sense. Further such a concept of knowledge and righteousness is completely technical or mechanical. It does not allow for a God of personal judgment.

God is a God of judgment; the ability which he also gave us. The judgment of God is not mechanical; is not based on what he watched on his TimeViewer-TV. God's judgment is personal utilizing elements to which there is no law; that is, not by means whereby such judgments can be formulated into a repetitive result. Knowledge is only one part that is utilized in the process of judgment to generate the desired result. Knowledge is not the judgment; and judgment is not knowledge.

God's Personal judgment is an activity that can only transpire in time and place.

TE: That is, this whole example is presupposing that the future is fixed.

MM: The future is not fixed – history is fixed. God sees the future like history. He does not predict what will happen; instead, He reports what has happened.

You're contradicting yourself. If God is reporting what has happened, then it's fixed. That's obvious. If it weren't fixed, then it could change, and something which God "reported" could happen differently than what He said.

TE: In fact, to make this clear, Ellen White wrote "at the risk of failure." The possibility of failure contradicts the idea of a future comprised of nothing but certainties.

MM: The word “risk” cannot mean the Father did not know if Jesus would fail or succeed on the cross.

That's all it can mean. It can't NOT mean that. Risk means "possibility of loss or injury". A synonym is "peril," which Ellen White also uses to explain the risk. "All heaven was imperiled for our redemption." What do you think this means?

To insist He didn’t know is to imply God does not know the end from the beginning.

No, it's not. That's not what the phrase to know the end from the beginning means. What the phrase means is what it says. It means to know the end from beginning; that is, if you go down this road (i.e. this beginning), then this end will follow. It doesn't mean that there's only one possible end. The end of the path depends upon which path you take. God knows the end of the path from its beginning. But until you choose the path, the end is just a possibility, and God knows it as such.

This begs the question – How can God know “affliction shall not rise up the second time”?

God sees every possible outcome, and in none of the possible outcomes does affliction arise a second time.

TE: According to this idea, God can view the future, but is powerless to do anything about it.

MM: You are assuming there is something about it that needs correcting, which implies God did not get it right the first time. God does not make mistakes.

No, this assumption is not made. Nor is this assumption pertinent to the observation. John's point was correct, and this is a well-known point regarding the point of view you are suggesting, which isn't even controverted by those who hold it. It's just a logical consequence of the view.

TE: So far, everyone has agree that if God knows that A will happen, and not B, then A will happen, and not B. So A is 100% certain to happen. Given that this is the case, it is not possible for a person to do B, since one can't do something which cannot happen. Therefore any definition of free will which implies that a person can to either of A or B is logically inconsistent.

MM: There is no such thing as “B”. What has happened is “A”. It is based on God’s ability to see the future like history. Only “A” will happen because it is what happened.

There is not such thing as B? Well if that is the case, then free will (in the sense of being able to do A or B) does not exist. Since B does not exist, I can only do A. If can only do A, then I do not have free will (if free will is defined as the ability to do A or B).

Surely you must see this.

So do you have some other definition of free will you would like to suggest?

John, what does judgment have to do with it? I simply said God knows the future like history. He knows the end from the beginning. God is not bound by time and space like we are. He "inhabits eternity". (Isa 57:15) He "calleth those things which be not as though they were." (Rom 4:17) God views the future with 20/20 hindsight. And He sees that He has done every right. He has no regrets. There is nothing to change.

TE: But the problem is that Eve's eating of the fruit was determined *before* she made her choice, not after.

MM: Again, there was nothing “determined” about it. God knew she would eat it because He already saw it happen.

That's what "determined" means. If it weren't determined, God couldn't see it. He can't see things that haven't been determined as things which have been determined, since that's not what they are.

TE: God sees the future the way it is. The future is different than the past. This is your fundamental assumption, and it's not correct. If it were the same as the past, we could not have free will under the libertarian definition (i.e. we can do either of A or B).

MM: God "calleth those things which be not as though they were." (Rom 4:17) From God’s perspective history and future are one and the same thing. God “inhabits eternity”. (Isa 57:15) Time and space does not apply to God in the same way it applies to FMAs.

Logic applies equally to God as well as to man. No matter how you define how God experiences space and time, it will ever be the case that if only A can happen, and not B, then B cannot happen. Therefore I cannot do either A or B, but only A.

TE: God does know the future with certainty. He knows the future as it is. Until FMA's take actions to convert possibilities into realities, possibilities are an essential characteristic of the future.

MM: This doesn’t make sense to me. You seem to be arguing that God knows the future with certainty but He doesn’t know what will happen in the future.

The future is comprised of possibilities. God knows all the possibilities. God knows the future with certainty, such as it is, comprised of possibilities.

TE: Hindsight? His knowledge of the future is foresight. "Foresight" means to look ahead.

MM: It’s both.

No, it's not. It is defined as "perception of the nature of an event after it has happened."

He knows the end from the beginning. God is God, therefore, hindsight and foresight are one and the same thing.

As explained above, this is not what knowing the end from the beginning means.

TE: He foresaw the possibility that Christ would fail, but took the risk anyway.

MM: I vehemently disagree. God did not know Jesus “would” fail. He knew Jesus would succeed. He never once doubted it. God does not doubt. He doesn't have to - He knows the end from the beginning.

You're contradicting the inspired testimony that says that God took the risk of failure and eternal loss. You're free to disagree with this if you wish, though.

TE: If God is reporting what has happened, then it's fixed. That's obvious. If it weren't fixed, then it could change, and something which God "reported" could happen differently than what He said.

MM: There is nothing “fixed” about it. It’s a done deal. It has already happened.

TE: "All heaven was imperiled for our redemption." What do you think this means?

MM: It does not mean God did not know if Jesus would fail or succeed.

TE: God sees every possible outcome, and in none of the possible outcomes does affliction arise a second time.

MM: I disagree. There is only one possible outcome – the one God watched happen already. That’s why unconditional prophecy does not suggest numerous possible outcomes. God knows exactly how t is going to play out.

TE: According to this idea, God can view the future, but is powerless to do anything about it.

MM: You are assuming there is something about it that needs correcting, which implies God did not get it right the first time. God does not make mistakes.

TE: No, this assumption is not made. Nor is this assumption pertinent to the observation.

MM: Then why do you insist God is powerless to do anything about it? Why would God change anything? Is He powerless to change history? The question doesn’t even make sense.

TE: There is not such thing as B? Well if that is the case, then free will (in the sense of being able to do A or B) does not exist. Since B does not exist, I can only do A. If can only do A, then I do not have free will (if free will is defined as the ability to do A or B).

MM: Your equations assume God does not know the future like history, like watching a rerun. Reporting what has already happened does not rob us our ability and freedom to choose. It simply states the facts. It has nothing do with alternate endings. According to God's divine hindsight, there is only one ending.

TE: But the problem is that Eve's eating of the fruit was determined *before* she made her choice, not after.

MM: Again, there was nothing “determined” about it. God knew she would eat it because He already saw it happen.

TE: That's what "determined" means. If it weren't determined, God couldn't see it. He can't see things that haven't been determined as things which have been determined, since that's not what they are.

MM: Reporting the facts after the fact has nothing do with it being determined. For example, God did not determine before the fact that Eve must sin. He simply report things after the fact.

TE: Logic applies equally to God as well as to man. No matter how you define how God experiences space and time, it will ever be the case that if only A can happen, and not B, then B cannot happen. Therefore I cannot do either A or B, but only A.

MM: Again, hindsight is not concerned with what could have happened, it simply reports what did happen. “B” does not even enter the equation. It’s not an issue.

TE: The future is comprised of possibilities. God knows all the possibilities. God knows the future with certainty, such as it is, comprised of possibilities.

MM: How is it any better than a bunch of smart people predicting the future? Or, Satan predicting the future? Based on this idea, God cannot truly foretell the future. Unconditional prophecy, instead of being one, would consist of several possible outcomes. But that’s not how it is. God prophesies only one outcome.

TE: As explained above, this is not what knowing the end from the beginning means.

MM: Sure it is. It means God knows the end. It doesn’t mean He only knows the beginning. The starting point is the end. He knows everything in between.

TE: You're contradicting the inspired testimony that says that God took the risk of failure and eternal loss.

MM: Nowhere does it say God knew Jesus “would” fail. The expression “at the risk of failure and eternal loss” does not mean God knew Jesus “would” fail. God knew Jesus would succeed.

DA 49
The heart of the human father yearns over his son. He looks into the face of his little child, and trembles at the thought of life's peril. He longs to shield his dear one from Satan's power, to hold him back from temptation and conflict. To meet a bitterer conflict and a more fearful risk, God gave His only-begotten Son, that the path of life might be made sure for our little ones. "Herein is love." Wonder, O heavens! and be astonished, O earth! {DA 49.2}

MM: If Jesus had failed, the “path of life” would not have been made sure for our little ones. If Jesus had failed, everyone would be lost, including Enoch, Moses, and Elijah, and all the holy angels. And God would be the biggest loser for allowing 4,000 years of sin and suffering for naught.

TE: If God is reporting what has happened, then it's fixed. That's obvious. If it weren't fixed, then it could change, and something which God "reported" could happen differently than what He said.

MM: There is nothing “fixed” about it. It’s a done deal. It has already happened.

It's amazing that you can contradict yourself so emphatically in such a small number of words. "There's nothing 'fixed' about it. It's a done deal." Incredible.

TE: "All heaven was imperiled for our redemption." What do you think this means?

MM: It does not mean God did not know if Jesus would fail or succeed.

Could it mean what it says? If so, how? According to your theory, "it was a done deal." Heaven, according to your theory, could hardly have been in any danger, correct?

TE: God sees every possible outcome, and in none of the possible outcomes does affliction arise a second time.

MM: I disagree.

There's no need to point this out. I can figure this out.

There is only one possible outcome – the one God watched happen already.

You asked me a question. I answered it.

That’s why unconditional prophecy does not suggest numerous possible outcomes. God knows exactly how t is going to play out.

If there's only one possible outcome, there's no risk, or peril, or ability to choose more than one option.

TE: According to this idea, God can view the future, but is powerless to do anything about it.

MM: You are assuming there is something about it that needs correcting, which implies God did not get it right the first time. God does not make mistakes.

TE: No, this assumption is not made. Nor is this assumption pertinent to the observation.

MM: Then why do you insist God is powerless to do anything about it?

I'm not "insisting" upon this. Just pointing out (actually John did, and correctly so) that this follows logically from your viewpoint. This is even recognized by those who hold your viewpoint. It's a recognized effect of your premise. For example:



Why would God change anything? Is He powerless to change history? The question doesn’t even make sense.

Perhaps reading the above explanation will help.

TE: There is not such thing as B? Well if that is the case, then free will (in the sense of being able to do A or B) does not exist. Since B does not exist, I can only do A. If can only do A, then I do not have free will (if free will is defined as the ability to do A or B).

MM: Your equations assume God does not know the future like history, like watching a rerun. Reporting what has already happened does not rob us our ability and freedom to choose. It simply states the facts. It has nothing do with alternate endings. According to God's divine hindsight, there is one ending.

You are not addressing what I wrote. You are agreeing with the premise that only A can happen. You accept that. Now all that remains is to accept the very obvious statement that if A must happen, then B can't. Therefore any definition of free will should be logically consistent with your premise. Here it is, point by point:

a.A must happen.
b.Therefore B cannot happen.
c.Our definition of free will should be logically consistent with these facts.

It's difficult to disagree with this.

TE: But the problem is that Eve's eating of the fruit was determined *before* she made her choice, not after.

MM: Again, there was nothing “determined” about it. God knew she would eat it because He already saw it happen.

TE: That's what "determined" means. If it weren't determined, God couldn't see it. He can't see things that haven't been determined as things which have been determined, since that's not what they are.

MM: Reporting the facts after the fact has nothing do with it being determined.

That's what "determined" means.

For example, God did not determine before the fact that Eve must sin. He simply report things after the fact.

He could only report what had been determined. An event which is not determined is not reportable.

TE: Logic applies equally to God as well as to man. No matter how you define how God experiences space and time, it will ever be the case that if only A can happen, and not B, then B cannot happen. Therefore I cannot do either A or B, but only A.

MM: Again, hindsight is not concerned with what could have happened, it simply reports what did happen. “B” does not even enter the equation. It’s not an issue.

B is an issue in free will. Free will, by Armenians, is traditionally defined as the ability to do either A or B. Now you may assert it's not an issue in regards to God's foreknowledge, but it's certainly an issue with free will.

TE: The future is comprised of possibilities. God knows all the possibilities. God knows the future with certainty, such as it is, comprised of possibilities.

MM: How is it any better than a bunch of smart people predicting the future?

Because God is infinite in intelligence and knowledge. You can't compare a "bunch of smart people" to God.

Or, Satan predicting the future?

Or Satan. He's also a finite being.

Based on this idea, God cannot truly foretell the future.

This simply isn't true. Here's a simple example. If you roll a die, there are six possibilities. You can say, with certainty, that a 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 will be rolled. God can do this same sort of thing with quintillions of possibilities, or however many there are. He is just as sure of these possibilities as you are about the 6 of the die.

Unconditional prophecy, instead of being one, would consist of several possible outcomes. But that’s not how it is. God prophesies only one outcome.

It depends upon what you're talking about. Let's consider the coming of Christ, for example. If you consider the outcome of the event that Christ will come, then there's only one possible outcome. Christ will come again. That's certain. But as to *when* Christ will come, that's open (i.e. not determined). For example, Ellen White wrote in the last 1850's that Christ could have come 'ere now, showing that the timing of the event is not fixed, since it could already have happened. God foresaw that possibility, as well as the possibility that Christ could have come in the 1888 era, had the message He sent been accepted, and other possible times as well.

TE: As explained above, this is not what knowing the end from the beginning means.

MM: Sure it is. It means God knows the end. It doesn’t mean He only knows the beginning. The starting point is the end. He knows everything in between.

It means what it says. Given a certain beginning, God knows the end. The prophecies in Deuteronomy involving the blessings and cursings are a perfect illustration of this. Go down this road, and this will happen. Go down the other road, and that will happen.

TE: You're contradicting the inspired testimony that says that God took the risk of failure and eternal loss.

MM: Nowhere does it say God knew Jesus “would” fail.

Of course not, because this isn't true. God knew Jesus could fail.

The expression “at the risk of failure and eternal loss” does not mean God knew Jesus “would” fail.

Of course not. "Risk" means uncertainty. Your mixing risk with "would" is misusing the word "risk."

God knew Jesus would succeed.

He knew He could succeed. Hence the use of the word "risk."

DA 49
The heart of the human father yearns over his son. He looks into the face of his little child, and trembles at the thought of life's peril. He longs to shield his dear one from Satan's power, to hold him back from temptation and conflict. To meet a bitterer conflict and a more fearful risk, God gave His only-begotten Son, that the path of life might be made sure for our little ones. "Herein is love." Wonder, O heavens! and be astonished, O earth! {DA 49.2}

MM: If Jesus had failed, the “path of life” would not have been made sure for our little ones. If Jesus had failed, everyone would be lost, including Enoch, Moses, and Elijah, and all the holy angels. And God would be the biggest loser for allowing 4,000 years of sin and suffering for naught.

You're right that if Jesus had failed, then these bad things would have happened. God had faith in His Son.

This risk explains why it was such a difficult decision for God to send Christ to save us.

Knowledge is not the end-all.

Knowledge is just one of the ingredients used in making a decision, judgment, choice. It is the personal judgment of God that makes him righteous; not his knowledge that makes him righteous. Judgment uses knowledge, but knowledge does not dictate judgment. Knowledge cannot reveal to God the judgment he will make.

Knowledge is only one part of that which is utilized in the process of judgment to generate the desired result. Knowledge therefore is not the determining factor of the future, nor the informing part of the future. It is but one ingredient used in the judgment of God by which he decides the course he will take and what he will do. It is God's judgment that decides and not knowledge.

In knowledge there is no righteousness. So therefore knowledge cannot reveal the future like history. If God were to let the future go according to knowledge, he would not be righteous; nor would righteousness ever be established. It is indeed in judgment that God affects the future to bring forth righteousness.

Judgment always transpires in time and place. Some of the ingredients which God uses in judgment are: knowledge, faith, love, mercy, grace, longsuffering...therefore he is righteous, and hopes for the desired end.

Therefore the future is not fixed, nor can it be viewed in any TV, because God has left some things in "hope".

In this scenario, since everything is history and Gods perspective has no future, God cannot judge us, He can merely look at the judgement episode on the TimeViewer-TV...

TE: No, this assumption is not made. Nor is this assumption pertinent to the observation.

MM: Then why do you insist God is powerless to do anything about it? Why would God change anything? Is He powerless to change history? The question doesn’t even make sense.

Thomas: God would have to operate inside history to be able to change it. If God is outside of time and experiences eternity as something which has already happened (which you have argued here extensively) then He cannot change it. Noticing your argument that God would not change the past (becourse God already done it right), and that all time in His perspective is past, then under these circumstances, Yes, God would be powerless to change history. (Unless of course, you will now argue that there was a time in the distant past when God did not see all time as in the past. Then God would have been able to do something about it at that point in time when time was still full of possibilities.)

Mike, why do you limmit God in this manner?
------------------
MM: Your equations assume God does not know the future like history, like watching a rerun.

Thomas: Exactly!

MM: Reporting what has already happened does not rob us our ability and freedom to choose. It simply states the facts. It has nothing do with alternate endings. According to God's divine hindsight, there is only one ending.

Thomas: ....

There is a hymn in Sweden which says, paraphrasing, we live in a prison built by our own fear. Well, the view which has been presented here suggests that God exists in a prison built by His own foreknowledge. That there truly is a future is indeed a blessing. Anything less than a future where the "B" choise exists would be merely a straitjacket.

Nicely explained. Very good point.

I do not understand all the fuss here about the foreknowledge of God.

Whether or not the future is like a history book to Him doesn't matter, as the future definitely is NOT like a history book to us, therefore, we do not know that God's history book said we had to choose A over B or B over A, therefore, the choice we make, be it A or B, remains our choice.

The fuss is over free will, not God's foreknowledge. If only A can happen, as MM is insisting, then we cannot do B. We do not have the ability to do anything other than A. That has implications for free will, where we only think we can do something other than A, but can't really do it.

I decided to comment a bit further on this, to clarify. What you're saying is that it doesn't really matter what things are really like, only what they appear to be like. In our experience of the future, it's not like a history book. Therefore we have a choice.

But this isn't correct. We *don't* really have the ability to do B. We only *think* we do. God's history book version is the real one. Our foggy, incomplete view is a misrepresentation of reality, based on our lack of knowledge and intelligence. It we only knew more we could see that we really can't do B, but we are duped into believing we can because of our ignorance.

This isn't a very attractive universe to be living in. It's as someone said (maybe Thomas(?)), like the Matrix.

TE: It's amazing that you can contradict yourself so emphatically in such a small number of words. "There's nothing 'fixed' about it. It's a done deal." Incredible.

MM: I am speaking from God’s perspective. Explaining historical facts has nothing to do with “fixing” it.

TE: Could it mean what it says? If so, how? According to your theory, "it was a done deal." Heaven, according to your theory, could hardly have been in any danger, correct?

MM: Again, it does not mean God did not know if Jesus would fail or succeed. Even if Jesus had failed He would not have been lost eternally. The “eternal loss” applies to FMAs.

TE: If there's only one possible outcome, there's no risk, or peril, or ability to choose more than one option.

MM: I disagree.

TE: I'm not "insisting" upon this. Just pointing out (actually John did, and correctly so) that this follows logically from your viewpoint. This is even recognized by those who hold your viewpoint. It's a recognized effect of your premise.

MM: Again, you are assuming God would want to change things, which implies He didn’t get it right. God doesn’t make mistakes. He doesn’t have to correct mistakes. Neither does it imply He is powerless. God does everything right.

TE: You are not addressing what I wrote. You are agreeing with the premise that only A can happen. You accept that. Now all that remains is to accept the very obvious statement that if A must happen, then B can't. Therefore any definition of free will should be logically consistent with your premise.

MM: Again, this idea assumes God does not know the future like history, like a rerun. It assumes God knows what He wants to happen and then forces it to happen. But knowing the end from the beginning allows Him to explain what happened after the fact. Thus, whether or not alternate endings were possible has nothing to do with it. It’s not an issue.

TE: He could only report what had been determined. An event which is not determined is not reportable.

MM: Again, this idea assumes God does not see the future like history, like a rerun.

TE: B is an issue in free will. Free will, by Armenians, is traditionally defined as the ability to do either A or B. Now you may assert it's not an issue in regards to God's foreknowledge, but it's certainly an issue with free will.

MM: Our options are unlimited before the fact. But after the fact it isn’t an issue. Free will is an issue before the fact, not afterwards.

TE: This simply isn't true. Here's a simple example. If you roll a die, there are six possibilities. You can say, with certainty, that a 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 will be rolled. God can do this same sort of thing with quintillions of possibilities, or however many there are. He is just as sure of these possibilities as you are about the 6 of the die.

MM: It doesn’t matter to me if God can think of more possibilities than smart people. What gives me comfort is that God knows the future like history, like a rerun.

TE: It depends upon what you're talking about. Let's consider the coming of Christ, for example. If you consider the outcome of the event that Christ will come, then there's only one possible outcome. Christ will come again. That's certain. But as to *when* Christ will come, that's open (i.e. not determined).

MM: Not true. God knows the day and the hour. “But of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father.” (Mark 13:32)

TE: For example, Ellen White wrote in the last 1850's that Christ could have come 'ere now, showing that the timing of the event is not fixed, since it could already have happened.

MM: The expression “Christ would [not could] have come ere this” does not mean God does not know the day and hour.

TE: It means what it says. Given a certain beginning, God knows the end. The prophecies in Deuteronomy involving the blessings and cursings are a perfect illustration of this. Go down this road, and this will happen. Go down the other road, and that will happen.

MM: Again, this idea assumes God does not know the future like history, like a rerun. God doesn’t have to guess what might happen in the future. He already knows because He has already seen it play out. Whether or not He tells us is another matter. When He does choose to tell us, He tells us exactly how it played out.

TE: Of course not, because this isn't true. God knew Jesus could fail.

MM: It was you who posted God knew Jesus “would” fail. And, yes, Jesus possessed the ability to fail, but God knew He would succeed. There was never a moment of doubt in His mind.

TE: Of course not. "Risk" means uncertainty. Your mixing risk with "would" is misusing the word "risk." He knew He could succeed. Hence the use of the word "risk."

MM: Again, risk does not mean God was uncertain as to the outcome. Risk means Jesus possessed the ability to fail, which He did not possess before His incarnation. But God knew Jesus would succeed. He did not doubt it, not even for a nanosecond.

TE: You're right that if Jesus had failed, then these bad things would have happened. God had faith in His Son.

MM: Amen! Faith disallows doubt. God did not doubt. He knew Jesus would succeed. That’s why He said so numerous times throughout the OT and NT. Nowhere in the Bible is God portrayed as not knowing if Jesus would fail or succeed.

TE: This risk explains why it was such a difficult decision for God to send Christ to save us.

MM: I believe what made it hard for God to approve the plan of salvation is His intense, perfect love for Jesus and FMAs. He loves everyone equally. And the thought of allowing Jesus to suffer on the cross or allowing us to die caused Him unbelievable anguish. There was no risk. Both were inevitable.

JB: If God were to let the future go according to knowledge, he would not be righteous; nor would righteousness ever be established. It is indeed in judgment that God affects the future to bring forth righteousness.

MM: Are we discussing the same issues? I am talking about God knowing the future like history, like a rerun, and then telling us what happened. The information He shares with us includes His righteous involvement. Everything God does is right and righteous.

JB: Therefore the future is not fixed, nor can it be viewed in any TV, because God has left some things in "hope".

MM: I disagree. God does not “hope” things will turn out right. He knows exactly how it ends. And He made sure it ended right.

TV: In this scenario, since everything is history and Gods perspective has no future, God cannot judge us, He can merely look at the judgement episode on the TimeViewer-TV...

MM: In one sense, God does not judge us. We judge ourselves. God merely rewards us according to our judgment. In this sense the word “judgment” means we decide our eternal destiny and reward by how we live our lives.

TV: … all time in His perspective is past, then under these circumstances, Yes, God would be powerless to change history.

MM: Again, there is no need to change it. God got it right. He doesn’t make mistakes.

TV: (Unless of course, you will now argue that there was a time in the distant past when God did not see all time as in the past. Then God would have been able to do something about it at that point in time when time was still full of possibilities.)

MM: God “inhabits eternity”. God does not experience time and space like we do. Past, present, and future are one. You seem to think God cannot know the future like history, like a rerun. If so, then how do you explain unconditional prophecy?

TE: The fuss is over free will, not God's foreknowledge. If only A can happen, as MM is insisting, then we cannot do B. We do not have the ability to do anything other than A. That has implications for free will, where we only think we can do something other than A, but can't really do it.

MM: You misrepresent the view I have embraced.

TE: Could it mean what it says? If so, how? According to your theory, "it was a done deal." Heaven, according to your theory, could hardly have been in any danger, correct?

MM: Again, it does not mean God did not know if Jesus would fail or succeed. Even if Jesus had failed He would not have been lost eternally. The “eternal loss” applies to FMAs.

Thomas: Did I just read you saying that Jesus is not a Free Moral Agent? Or that God is not a Free Moral Agent?

MM, from my perspective you have a perspective which is just full of logical contradictions. For example, you assert:

a)The future is a "done deal."
b)The future is not fixed.

a)There was a risk involved in sending Christ. (I'm assuming you agree with this, since that's what Ellen White wrote).
b)There was no chance that Christ would fail.

a)There is only one option, A.
b)In spite of this there is risk, peril, and the ability to choose between more options than A.

I don't know what I can do other than point out these contradictions.

In regards to this comment:



I quoted from a source dealing with basic theology. What it stated is well known, and has been recognized for a long time. It's simply stating what the logical consequences are of the idea you are espousing.

Finally I've asked this several times:



This doesn't have anything to do with God's foreknowledge. It A must happen, and B can't, then we should have a definition of free will which takes this into account. Anything you could possibly say about God's foreknowledge (or frogs or tulips) would not alter this.

No matter what God knows about the future, or what choice I am going to make, be it A or B, my choice remains my choice.

If only A is possible, you can only choose A.

TV: In this scenario, since everything is history and Gods perspective has no future, God cannot judge us, He can merely look at the judgement episode on the TimeViewer-TV...

MM: In one sense, God does not judge us. We judge ourselves. God merely rewards us according to our judgment. In this sense the word “judgment” means we decide our eternal destiny and reward by how we live our lives.

Thomas: Did you just throw out the IJ doctrine?

TV: (Unless of course, you will now argue that there was a time in the distant past when God did not see all time as in the past. Then God would have been able to do something about it at that point in time when time was still full of possibilities.)

MM: God “inhabits eternity”. God does not experience time and space like we do. Past, present, and future are one. You seem to think God cannot know the future like history, like a rerun. If so, then how do you explain unconditional prophecy?

Thomas: Seem to think? I am at a loss for words, how could I be any more clear on saying that this is exactly my view?
Unconditional prophecy is such prophecy where God steps into history and makes things happen. Such as God telling Joshua that if Israel march around Jerico in such and such way, the city will fall. Well, after the people fullfill the requirements, Gods angles likely made rubble of those walls by their own hands. God says, this will happen and He knows it will happen becouse He will see to it personally.

Thomas

Only one choice, either A or B, is only possible for anybody.

For example, leaving God completely out of the equation, if I choose to do A, then how can I do B?

Choosing A is not the starting point. Choosing A or B is the starting point.

That is, free will, as traditionally defined by Armenianists (such as we SDA's) asserts that a person can choose to do either of A or B. If we take a position that only A is possible, then we need to throw that definition of free will out the window.

TE: The fuss is over free will, not God's foreknowledge. If only A can happen, as MM is insisting, then we cannot do B. We do not have the ability to do anything other than A. That has implications for free will, where we only think we can do something other than A, but can't really do it.

MM: You misrepresent the view I have embraced.

I'm not discussing your view at all. I couldn't possibly be misrepresenting a view I'm not representing at all. I'm just pointing out what the issue is.

I'm the one who brought up the issue. It's in the original post of this topic. This topic is not about your view. It's about my question, which is the contradiction I pointed out, which you refuse to address, instead talking about other things.

If you want to discuss your view, start up a topic. *Then* I can misrepresent it.

This goes along with what Isaiah says:

TE: He could only report what had been determined. An event which is not determined is not reportable.

MM: Again, this idea assumes God does not see the future like history, like a rerun.

No, it doesn't. It has nothing to do with what view one takes of how God sees the future. What makes you think this?

TE: B is an issue in free will. Free will, by Armenians, is traditionally defined as the ability to do either A or B. Now you may assert it's not an issue in regards to God's foreknowledge, but it's certainly an issue with free will.

MM: Our options are unlimited before the fact. But after the fact it isn’t an issue. Free will is an issue before the fact, not afterwards.

Yes, but according to your view, A must happen *before* the fact, because God knows it will happen *before* the fact. So before the fact, our options are limited, according to your view. Only A is possible. You've said this many times now.

(snip)

TE: For example, Ellen White wrote in the last 1850's that Christ could have come 'ere now, showing that the timing of the event is not fixed, since it could already have happened.

MM: The expression “Christ would [not could] have come ere this” does not mean God does not know the day and hour.

It means He could have come at some other time, which means the future is not fixed.

TE: It means what it says. Given a certain beginning, God knows the end. The prophecies in Deuteronomy involving the blessings and cursings are a perfect illustration of this. Go down this road, and this will happen. Go down the other road, and that will happen.

MM: Again, this idea assumes God does not know the future like history, like a rerun.

No, it doesn't assume that. It's just interpreting the words "know the end from the beginning." Regardless of God's vision of the future, the meaning of words does not change.

God doesn’t have to guess what might happen in the future. He already knows because He has already seen it play out. Whether or not He tells us is another matter. When He does choose to tell us, He tells us exactly how it played out.

TE: Of course not, because this isn't true. God knew Jesus could fail.

MM: It was you who posted God knew Jesus “would” fail.

That's preposterous! Only if I made an eggregious typo. Where did I post such a thing?

And, yes, Jesus possessed the ability to fail, but God knew He would succeed. There was never a moment of doubt in His mind.

TE: Of course not. "Risk" means uncertainty. Your mixing risk with "would" is misusing the word "risk." He knew He could succeed. Hence the use of the word "risk."

MM: Again, risk does not mean God was uncertain as to the outcome.

Risk means precisely an uncertainty as to an outcome.

Risk means Jesus possessed the ability to fail, which He did not possess before His incarnation.

This is incorrect. "Risk" has nothing to do with abilities to perform actions. It has to do with certainty and uncertainty.

But God knew Jesus would succeed. He did not doubt it, not even for a nanosecond.

TE: You're right that if Jesus had failed, then these bad things would have happened. God had faith in His Son.

MM: Amen! Faith disallows doubt. God did not doubt. He knew Jesus would succeed. That’s why He said so numerous times throughout the OT and NT. Nowhere in the Bible is God portrayed as not knowing if Jesus would fail or succeed.

Only if the Bible does not agree with Ellen White's statement.



TE: This risk explains why it was such a difficult decision for God to send Christ to save us.

MM: I believe what made it hard for God to approve the plan of salvation is His intense, perfect love for Jesus and FMAs. He loves everyone equally. And the thought of allowing Jesus to suffer on the cross or allowing us to die caused Him unbelievable anguish. There was no risk. Both were inevitable.

You say "there was no risk." Ellen White says, "Remember, Christ risked all. For our redemption, heaven itself was imperiled.(COL 196)" Two different views. We can choose what we wish to believe.

Read my post again.

By saying in my post, "Only one choice, either A or B, is only possible for anybody" I did begin at the starting point, therefore, unless you have a closed mind, I am expecting a different reply from you.

TV: Did I just read you saying that Jesus is not a Free Moral Agent? Or that God is not a Free Moral Agent?

MM: The abbreviation “FMAs” applies to created beings.

TV: Did you just throw out the IJ doctrine?

MM: Nope. Why do you ask?

TV: Seem to think? I am at a loss for words, how could I be any more clear on saying that this is exactly my view?

MM: I am sorry it offended you.

TV: Unconditional prophecy is such prophecy where God steps into history and makes things happen.

MM: Yes, God makes sure things go His way. But how does He know FMAs will do it? That’s the part we disagree on. I believe He knows it because, based on the fact He sees the future like a rerun, He has watched it happen already.

a) The future is a "done deal."
b) The future is not fixed.

MM: This equation does not factor in God’s divine ability to see the future like history, like a rerun. Nobody is accusing God of “fixing” things simply because He knows the future like history, like a rerun.

a) There was a risk involved in sending Christ. (I'm assuming you agree with this, since that's what Ellen White wrote).
b) There was no chance that Christ would fail.

MM: Again, Jesus possessed the ability to sin and die, which He didn’t before His incarnation. The “risk” Sister White wrote about does not include Jesus failing and dying eternally. Divinity cannot die.

5BC 1113
"I am the resurrection, and the life." He who had said, "I lay down my life, that I might take it again," came forth from the grave to life that was in Himself. Humanity died: divinity did not die. In His divinity, Christ possessed the power to break the bonds of death. He declares that He has life in Himself to quicken whom He will. {5BC 1113.6}

a) There is only one option, A.
b) In spite of this there is risk, peril, and the ability to choose between more options than A.

MM: Again, this formula divorces God from the equation.

TE: I quoted from a source dealing with basic theology. What it stated is well known, and has been recognized for a long time. It's simply stating what the logical consequences are of the idea you are espousing.

MM: I do not agree with your quote. It does not represent what I believe.

TE: This doesn't have anything to do with God's foreknowledge. It A must happen, and B can't, then we should have a definition of free will which takes this into account.

MM: Divorcing God from this discussion makes it pointless. There is no context upon which to discuss the future. Nobody, but God, knows the future. Saying “A” will happen and “B” cannot happen is meaningless unless we factor in God’s ability to see the future like history, like a rerun.

TE: The fuss is over free will, not God's foreknowledge. If only TE: If only A can happen, as MM is insisting, then we cannot do B. We do not have the ability to do anything other than A. That has implications for free will, where we only think we can do something other than A, but can't really do it.

MM: You misrepresent the view I have embraced.

TE: I'm not discussing your view at all. I couldn't possibly be misrepresenting a view I'm not representing at all.

MM: "If only A can happen, as MM is insisting, then we cannot do B." This misrepresents the view I have embraced.

The starting point here is "I choose to do A." Clearly if you choose to do A, you can't choose B. The starting point of my question is before choosing A.

What I'm pointing out, which is very simple, is that if A must happen, then, to be logically consistent, a definition of free will must reflect that reality. You agree with that, don't you?

Here is another way of saying it.

I have two choices to make, either choice A, or choice B.

I, of my own freewill, choose to do choice A.

God in His foreknowledge enters into the picture knowing that I will choose choice A instead of choice B, even before I made the choice, however, I was still the one who could either choose A or B. God knew, however, beforehand, that I would choose A over B. My freedom of choice wasn't compromised. If I had chosen choice B, which I could have done, then God in his foreknowledge would have known that I would have chosen B instead of A.

a) The future is a "done deal."
b) The future is not fixed.

MM: This equation does not factor in God’s divine ability to see the future like history, like a rerun.

This doesn't matter. It's like saying "This book is white." "This book is not white." This is a contraction, even if you factor in God's divine ability to see the future like history. Similarly "the future is a done deal" "the futue is not fixed (i.e., NOT a done deal)" is a contradiction.

Nobody is accusing God of “fixing” things simply because He knows the future like history, like a rerun.

Correct. No one is accusing God of fixing things. This isn't being discussed, but it's a correct observation.

a) There was a risk involved in sending Christ. (I'm assuming you agree with this, since that's what Ellen White wrote).
b) There was no chance that Christ would fail.

MM: Again, Jesus possessed the ability to sin and die, which He didn’t before His incarnation.

Not under discussion.

The “risk” Sister White wrote about does not include Jesus failing and dying eternally.

She wrote, "At the risk of failure and eternal life." This includes, I believe, the risk of eternal life.

Divinity cannot die.

She speaks of the stone never being rolled away from the tomb, as I recall.

5BC 1113
"I am the resurrection, and the life." He who had said, "I lay down my life, that I might take it again," came forth from the grave to life that was in Himself. Humanity died: divinity did not die. In His divinity, Christ possessed the power to break the bonds of death. He declares that He has life in Himself to quicken whom He will. {5BC 1113.6}

a) There is only one option, A.
b) In spite of this there is risk, peril, and the ability to choose between more options than A.

MM: Again, this formula divorces God from the equation.

Again, this has nothing to do with things.

TE: I quoted from a source dealing with basic theology. What it stated is well known, and has been recognized for a long time. It's simply stating what the logical consequences are of the idea you are espousing.

MM: I do not agree with your quote. It does not represent what I believe.

The quote is not dealing with what you believe, but with the results of what you believe. It talks about seeing the future like history, which IS what you believe, and then what the consequences of such a belief are.

TE: This doesn't have anything to do with God's foreknowledge. It A must happen, and B can't, then we should have a definition of free will which takes this into account.

MM: Divorcing God from this discussion makes it pointless. There is no context upon which to discuss the future. Nobody, but God, knows the future. Saying “A” will happen and “B” cannot happen is meaningless unless we factor in God’s ability to see the future like history, like a rerun.

This response is like my asking you the question, "Is it true that the density of prime numbers does not change and numbers increase?" with "Divorcing God from this discussion is pointless."

The question of whether the fact that an event A must happen implies that must do A does not require a discussion of God's foreknowledge. You just don't want to discuss it, perhaps because you don't like the obvious conclusion, which is that if we must do A, then we don't have the ability to do B.

TE: The fuss is over free will, not God's foreknowledge. If only TE: If only A can happen, as MM is insisting, then we cannot do B. We do not have the ability to do anything other than A. That has implications for free will, where we only think we can do something other than A, but can't really do it.

MM: You misrepresent the view I have embraced.

I've asked you several times if the fact that God knows with 100% certainty that A will occur means that A will occur. You even went to so far as to say there is no other option; there is only A. How is my saying that you say that only A can occur misrepresenting your view? It's just what you said!

TE: I'm not discussing your view at all. I couldn't possibly be misrepresenting a view I'm not representing at all.

MM: "If only A can happen, as MM is insisting, then we cannot do B." This misrepresents the view I have embraced.

This is just what you said.



If there is no such thing as B, then only A can happen, right? How is this misrepresenting your view?

TE: He could only report what had been determined. An event which is not determined is not reportable.

MM: Again, this idea assumes God does not see the future like history, like a rerun.

TE: No, it doesn't. It has nothing to do with what view one takes of how God sees the future. What makes you think this?

MM: God does not “determine” the future. He simply reports what has happened. He knows the future like history, like a rerun.

TE: Yes, but according to your view, A must happen *before* the fact, because God knows it will happen *before* the fact. So before the fact, our options are limited, according to your view. Only A is possible. You've said this many times now.

MM: “A” cannot happen “before” the fact. “A” happens when it happens. “A” doesn’t happen “because” God knows it will happen. God reports “A” happened because He watched it happen.

TE: It means He could have come at some other time, which means the future is not fixed.

MM: I disagree.

TE: That's preposterous! Only if I made an eggregious typo. Where did I post such a thing?

MM: Here’s what you wrote - “He foresaw the possibility that Christ would fail, but took the risk anyway.” (85288)

TE: Only if the Bible does not agree with Ellen White's statement.

MM: Nowhere in the Bible or the SOP does it say God did not know if Jesus would fail or succeed on the cross. The prophecies repeatedly say He would succeed. Many other prophecies are based on the fact He would succeed.

Daryl, here's my question. If only A can happen, then you can't do B, right? Given that it's true that only A can happen, any definition of free will, to be accurate, should reflect this fact, shouldn't it?

There's no need to introduce God's foreknowledge into things to answer this question.

What comes first, Daryl, you're choosing A or B, or God's foreknowledge of that fact?

Good job, Daryl.

MM: It was you who posted God knew Jesus “would” fail.

That's preposterous! Only if I made an eggregious typo. Where did I post such a thing?

Here’s what you wrote - “He foresaw the possibility that Christ would fail, but took the risk anyway.” (85288)

You don't understand that there's a difference between "God knew Jesus would fail" and "God foresaw the possibility that Christ would fail"? That's hard to believe.

MM, I can't follow your post. You don't include the context of a lot of the comments, and don't mark off where one idea starts and another ends. That is, I don't know where the conversations start and end.

For example, on the previous post, I had to go back to get the comment from you "It was you who posted God knew Jesus 'would' fail". That should be included in your post, as my comment "That's preposterous. Only if I made an egregious typo. Where did I post such a thing?" doesn't have any context.

TE: She speaks of the stone never being rolled away from the tomb, as I recall.

MM: Divinity cannot die. Deity did not die. Are you suggesting Sister White said if Jesus had failed He would have remained in the tomb for eternity?

TE: The question of whether the fact that an event A must happen implies that must do A does not require a discussion of God's foreknowledge.

MM: What is the context of “A”? Does it represent what will happen in the future? If so, then what does “B” have to do with it?

TE: How is my saying that you say that only A can occur misrepresenting your view? It's just what you said!

MM: That’s not what I believe. Again, just because “A” happens, it does not mean “B” was an impossibility. Just because God reports that “A” happened, it does not mean “B” was an impossibility. That is, it does not mean we lacked the ability or freedom to choose differently.

TE: If there is no such thing as B, then only A can happen, right? How is this misrepresenting your view?

MM: Again, I’m talking about what has happened, not what might happen. “A” is what happened. “B” is what could have happened, but didn’t. Thus, when talking about what did happen, “B” does not enter the discussion. When discussing things before they happen, we cannot divorce God from the discussion. Only God knows what happened before it happens.

TE: She speaks of the stone never being rolled away from the tomb, as I recall.

MM: Divinity cannot die. Deity did not die. Are you suggesting Sister White said if Jesus had failed He would have remained in the tomb for eternity?

Yes.

TE: The question of whether the fact that an event A must happen implies that must do A does not require a discussion of God's foreknowledge.

MM: What is the context of “A”? Does it represent what will happen in the future? If so, then what does “B” have to do with it?

The context is as explained from the very first post of this topic. Just re-read the first post.

TE: How is my saying that you say that only A can occur misrepresenting your view? It's just what you said!

MM: That’s not what I believe. Again, just because “A” happens, it does not mean “B” was an impossibility. Just because God reports that “A” happened, it does not mean “B” was an impossibility. That is, it does not mean we lacked the ability or freedom to choose differently.

This is an interesting theory, which we can discuss later, but to be clear, I didn't say you said B was an impossibility. I said you said A was a certainty, which you did say. I did not mispresent your view.

TE: If there is no such thing as B, then only A can happen, right? How is this misrepresenting your view?

MM: Again, I’m talking about what has happened, not what might happen. “A” is what happened. “B” is what could have happened, but didn’t. Thus, when talking about what did happen, “B” does not enter the discussion. When discussing things before they happen, we cannot divorce God from the discussion. Only God knows what happened before it happens.

I didn't say you said anything about B. Please re-read what I said again.

At some point you might wish to deal with the original question of this topic, which has nothing to do with God's foreknowledge. It simply states that if only A can happen (your words!) and not B, then our definition of free will should address this fact. A person cannot do B (assuming A and B are mutually exclusive) if A must happen. How could this not be true?

You profess to know something that you profess you cannot know! Another contradiction!

TV: Did I just read you saying that Jesus is not a Free Moral Agent? Or that God is not a Free Moral Agent?

MM: The abbreviation “FMAs” applies to created beings.

Thomas: Why? Is God lacking in freedom or in morality that He misses out on being a FMA?

TV: Did you just throw out the IJ doctrine?

MM: Nope. Why do you ask?

Thomas: Since you said God doesnt judge. And if He doesnt judge, well... bye bye judgement...

TV: Seem to think? I am at a loss for words, how could I be any more clear on saying that this is exactly my view?

MM: I am sorry it offended you.

Thomas: Correction, frustrated.

TV: Unconditional prophecy is such prophecy where God steps into history and makes things happen.

MM: Yes, God makes sure things go His way. But how does He know FMAs will do it? That’s the part we disagree on. I believe He knows it because, based on the fact He sees the future like a rerun, He has watched it happen already.

Thomas: And I say that if in Gods perspective it has happened already, neither He nor we do anything at all but what fate has portioned out to us.

MM: Divorcing God from this discussion makes it pointless. There is no context upon which to discuss the future. Nobody, but God, knows the future. Saying “A” will happen and “B” cannot happen is meaningless unless we factor in God’s ability to see the future like history, like a rerun.

Thomas: Correction, Divorcing the false image of God (who He is) presented above from this discussion makes it pointless.

I’m not having much time to follow the discussion, but what Mike is trying to say is, using the illustration of the horse race: you travel to the future and watch the horse race, and see that horse A wins the race. Since you saw that horse A wins, how can horses B, C, D or E win? In this sense we say that only horse A can win, and not horses B, C, D or E. Of course you had five possibilities (any of the horses could win the race) - but once you saw the result, the other possibilities are discarded. Unless, of course, you intervene and, for instance, break the leg of horse A, like Thomas suggested. Applying this to God: He saw that if He created Lucifer, Lucifer would sin at some specific point in time, so He could have opted for not creating Lucifer.

That would be impossible!
That would be impossible!
That would be impossible!

Yes, I am talking about knowledge and free will. Listen well.

There is much more that would be impossible. Like it would be impossible that God could make a choice; that God could render judgment; that God could make a decision; that God could consider… It would be impossible!

Thomas has well recognized what I was saying. You see, given the kind of “knowledge” you assert God has. God will never be able to … oops; God is never able to … oops; God was never able to … hmmm … well anyway – God was never, is never and will never be able to choose, consider, make a decision, and render judgment; just to list some things.

You see that the moment God would ever think to consider; his knowledge would already tell him that he has considered it. The moment God would think to make a judgment, his knowledge would inform him that his judgment is already made and what it was, and no matter how far back in time he would go, he could never go far enough back to actually do the consideration, make the judgment or the choice which his knowledge tells him he has made (he has seen himself make). His knowledge, as you say, would tell him what he has already done. For in this knowledge there is no future, there is no present, no past, only the “past perfect”. Since in this knowledge the future, the present, and the past is all “past perfect” God is himself never able to do anything his knowledge tells him he has done.

Therefore the knowledge is false, because what it says he has done he has not done. And by telling him that he has done it makes him incapable of doing it. Incapable, because to know the consideration and the results of the consideration makes it impossible for one to actually do the consideration. Incapable, because to consider something takes a knowledge which is different than the one you assert; because to render judgment takes a different knowledge than the one you assert. The purpose and result of consideration and judgment is therefore to alter the course, but this is impossible; THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE; for his knowledge, according to you, has already told him the resultant course. So to consider and to render judgment is impossible. It is impossible for God to make a choice for his knowledge tells him the choice he has already made, which he never made, for it has not happened, but is already “past perfect”.

Certain things are just impossible!

MM, you have put knowledge in the place of God. You have made knowledge God and God knowledge. Such knowledge renders the holder of it completely impotent to do anything about it. Not because to do anything about it would say that the previous was wrong, but because such knowledge makes one incapable of doing the very thing it says he did. The knowledge is unalterable; yet the things it says have never transpired and never can transpire because the holder of this knowledge can never do the things the knowledge says he does.

This reminds me awfully of the original deception at the tree of knowledge: that by having “knowledge” we can be as God.

MM: The abbreviation “FMAs” applies to created beings.

Thomas: Why? Is God lacking in freedom or in morality that He misses out on being a FMA?

Thomas is right. You need to use the designation "CFMA" to designate created free moral agents.

Why not do this? Or, better yet, create a version of Lucifer that wouldn't sin?

Well done, JB. But given that the following is not understood:

"If only A can happen, we cannot do B."

good luck with what you wrote being understood.

Here we are on page 14, and I still haven't gotten an answer to my original post. I'll excerpt a portion:



Given a) and b) are true, doesn't it follow that there is a contradiction here? If not, why not? (Please don't change the assumptions, as my question assumes the assumptions are true. Actually, go ahead an change the assumptions if desired, but please do so *after* answering the question if these two assumptions, a) and b), are contradictory.

MM: Are you suggesting Sister White said if Jesus had failed He would have remained in the tomb for eternity?

TE: Yes.

MM: Interesting? Please share the quote. Thank you.

…………………………

MM: What is the context of “A”? Does it represent what will happen in the future? If so, then what does “B” have to do with it?

TE: The context is as explained from the very first post of this topic. Just re-read the first post.


MM: Again, what is the context? Why is it that only “A” can happen? How did we come by such knowledge?

………………………….

TE: How is my saying that you say that only A can occur misrepresenting your view? It's just what you said!

MM: That’s not what I believe. Again, just because “A” happens, it does not mean “B” was an impossibility. Just because God reports that “A” happened, it does not mean “B” was an impossibility. That is, it does not mean we lacked the ability or freedom to choose differently.

TE: This is an interesting theory, which we can discuss later, but to be clear, I didn't say you said B was an impossibility. I said you said A was a certainty, which you did say. I did not mispresent your view.

MM: Here is what you said:


MM: I never said we “do not have the ability to do anything other than A.” The fact we will not do “B” has nothing to do with it being an impossibility. In other words, we possess the ability and freedom to do “B”, but we will not do it. Instead, we will do “A”. Do we know in advance what we will do? Unless God reveals it to us, we have no idea what we will and will not do before we do it. Only God knows the future like history, like a rerun.

…………………………..

TE: If there is no such thing as B, then only A can happen, right? How is this misrepresenting your view?

MM: Again, I’m talking about what has happened, not what might happen. “A” is what happened. “B” is what could have happened, but didn’t. Thus, when talking about what did happen, “B” does not enter the discussion. When discussing things before they happen, we cannot divorce God from the discussion. Only God knows what happened before it happens.

TE: I didn't say you said anything about B. Please re-read what I said again.

MM: Again, here is what you said:



MM: Since you said I said “we cannot do B” it seemed necessary to make it clear I do not believe it.

.......................

TE: At some point you might wish to deal with the original question of this topic, which has nothing to do with God's foreknowledge. It simply states that if only A can happen (your words!) and not B, then our definition of free will should address this fact. A person cannot do B (assuming A and B are mutually exclusive) if A must happen. How could this not be true?

MM: It is true that I was willing to go along with your original equation by agreeing with it, which, against my wishes, divorced God from the picture. And then, without fair warning, you accused me of insisting on something I don’t believe.

Again, it is imperative to understand how and why we know in advance that “A” will happen and not “B”. What is the basis of our knowledge of the future? Answering these questions will help us understand the truth about the future and the role free will plays.

The definition of free will, as I understand it, is that we possess the ability and freedom to do as we please. In reality, though, we are conceived and born in sin. Thus, we are naturally, instinctively the slaves and servants of sin, self, and Satan. Separated from Jesus, we “can do nothing but evil.” (3SM 196)

Consequently, our options are really only one – choose Jesus. If we do not choose Jesus, we are, by default, lost and unable to be like Him. Our only true option is to choose to be born again and to abide in Jesus. The results are twofold: 1) we will not sin, and 2) we will mature in the fruits of the Spirit, we will become more and more like Jesus.

Nevertheless, being born again and abiding in Jesus does not mean we lose the ability and freedom to sin. In fact, we are not truly free to sin until we are free from sin. However, and praise the Lord, so long as we are abiding in Jesus, we will not sin, we will be like Him.

To commit a known sin, therefore, we must neglect to consciously choose to abide in Jesus. If we are not, even for a nanosecond, abiding in Jesus - we will sin. Separated from Jesus, all we can do is sin.

Of course, repentance restores the relationship our sin severed. God does not abandon us. We don’t stop being born again. The Holy Spirit woos us until He wins us. Then we resume abiding in Jesus. So long as we are walking in the Spirit and mind of the new man, so long as we are partaking of the divine nature, so long as we are abiding in Jesus - we are maturing in the fruits of the Spirit.

MM: Are you suggesting Sister White said if Jesus had failed He would have remained in the tomb for eternity?

TE: Yes.

MM: Interesting? Please share the quote. Thank you.

I couldn't find it. It said something like if Jesus had sinned, the stone would never have been removed from the tomb. I'm quite sure it's not in the Desire of Ages (which isn't very helpful, I know).
…………………………

MM: What is the context of “A”? Does it represent what will happen in the future? If so, then what does “B” have to do with it?

TE: The context is as explained from the very first post of this topic. Just re-read the first post.

Quote:
a) A person has free will if he can, at a given point in time, do either of acts A or B (where B is different than A).

b) Only event A can happen at the given point in time.

MM: Again, what is the context? Why is it that only “A” can happen? How did we come by such knowledge?

For the purpose of my question, it doesn't matter. Why only A can happen isn't important. *That* only A can is all that's necessary to respond to my point. Now whether or not some pre-condition implies that A must happen can be discussed at a future time, but why A must happen in no way affects the logic that *if* A must happen, then certain conclusions follow.

………………………….

TE: How is my saying that you say that only A can occur misrepresenting your view? It's just what you said!

MM: That’s not what I believe. Again, just because “A” happens, it does not mean “B” was an impossibility.

As I've stated twice, I didn't say anything about B in regards to your view. Only A.

Just because God reports that “A” happened, it does not mean “B” was an impossibility. That is, it does not mean we lacked the ability or freedom to choose differently.

TE: This is an interesting theory, which we can discuss later, but to be clear, I didn't say you said B was an impossibility. I said you said A was a certainty, which you did say. I did not mispresent your view.

MM: Here is what you said:

Quote:
If only A can happen, as MM is insisting, then we cannot do B. We do not have the ability to do anything other than A.

The "as MM is insisting" applies to "If only A can happen,"

MM: I never said we “do not have the ability to do anything other than A.”

I said that! You said that only A can happen.

The fact we will not do “B” has nothing to do with it being an impossibility.

The fact that B cannot happen has to do with it being an impossibility.

In other words, we possess the ability and freedom to do “B”, but we will not do it.

If B cannot happen, we cannot do it.

Instead, we will do “A”. Do we know in advance what we will do? Unless God reveals it to us, we have no idea what we will and will not do before we do it. Only God knows the future like history, like a rerun.

…………………………..

TE: If there is no such thing as B, then only A can happen, right? How is this misrepresenting your view?

MM: Again, I’m talking about what has happened, not what might happen. “A” is what happened. “B” is what could have happened, but didn’t. Thus, when talking about what did happen, “B” does not enter the discussion. When discussing things before they happen, we cannot divorce God from the discussion. Only God knows what happened before it happens.

TE: I didn't say you said anything about B. Please re-read what I said again.

MM: Again, here is what you said:

Quote:
If only A can happen, as MM is insisting, then we cannot do B. We do not have the ability to do anything other than A.


MM: Since you said I said “we cannot do B” it seemed necessary to make it clear I do not believe it.

No, I didn't say that. I said that you said only A can happen. I can see how you could misread what I wrote, but the "as MM is insisting" is only in reference to "If only A can happen".

.......................

TE: At some point you might wish to deal with the original question of this topic, which has nothing to do with God's foreknowledge. It simply states that if only A can happen (your words!) and not B, then our definition of free will should address this fact. A person cannot do B (assuming A and B are mutually exclusive) if A must happen. How could this not be true?

MM: It is true that I was willing to go along with your original equation by agreeing with it, which, against my wishes, divorced God from the picture. And then, without fair warning, you accused me of insisting on something I don’t believe.

No, you just misunderstood what I wrote.

Again, it is imperative to understand how and why we know in advance that “A” will happen and not “B”. What is the basis of our knowledge of the future? Answering these questions will help us understand the truth about the future and the role free will plays.

This doesn't change the logic in any way. We can deal with that after we've dealt with the logic. If you think the logic does change, then postulate the scenarios in which the logic changes and explain why it changes.

The definition of free will, as I understand it, is that we possess the ability and freedom to do as we please.

This is the compatibilistic definition of free will, which the Calvinsits use. This definition is logically consistent with the concept of God's foreknowledge that you hold. So you are holding to a logically consistent system of thought. (this sure took a long time to get to!).

What I suggested was a different definition for free will (referred to as "incompatibilisitic" or "libertarian" free will, which is what Armenianists use, of which SDA's are by tradition). The libertarian definition of free will is not that we have the ability to do as we please, but that we are able to choose and actually different things, which may or may not please us. For example:



You will notice that I defined free will differently than what you suggested. I wrote:



This is saying more than a person can do what he pleases. It is saying that he has the ability to actually do either of mutually exclusive acts, regardless of what he pleases. This definition requires that there actually be more than one event which can happen; your definition does not. In your defintion, only A needs to be possible, given that A is what the person wishes to do.

In reality, though, we are conceived and born in sin. Thus, we are naturally, instinctively the slaves and servants of sin, self, and Satan. Separated from Jesus, we “can do nothing but evil.” (3SM 196)

Consequently, our options are really only one – choose Jesus.

This is consistent with the Calvinistic viewpoint, and consistent with the compatibilistic definition which you gave above.

(snip)

JB: You profess to know something that you profess you cannot know! Another contradiction!

MM: Knowing what I don’t know doesn’t mean I know it!

TV: Why? Is God lacking in freedom or in morality that He misses out on being a FMA?

MM: For whom is God an agent?

TV: Since you said God doesnt judge. And if He doesnt judge, well... bye bye judgement...

MM: I qualified what I meant. God is judge in the sense He rewards us according to our self-judgment. There is nothing arbitrary about it.

TV: And I say that if in Gods perspective it has happened already, neither He nor we do anything at all but what fate has portioned out to us.

MM: What makes it “fate”? Is it “fate” when a historian records what happened? Does it mean the characters he wrote about can only do what he penned?

TV: Correction, Divorcing the false image of God (who He is) presented above from this discussion makes it pointless.

MM: And divorcing the correct image of God from this discussion is pointless, too.

JB: You see that the moment God would ever think to consider; his knowledge would already tell him that he has considered it.

MM: John, I do not pretend to be able to explain or understand how God knows the future like history, like a rerun. I just know He does. Unconditional prophecy is evidence of it. Neither do I understand how God can be everywhere at once. I just know that He is. I do not have to be able to explain to believe it.

JB: The knowledge is unalterable; yet the things it says have never transpired and never can transpire because the holder of this knowledge can never do the things the knowledge says he does.

MM: Does this apply to unconditional prophecy, too? That is, did Esau and Cyrus have a choice? Did knowing the future prevent them from doing it? If you answer, No, then is it appropriate to assume God cannot know the future because it would prevent Him from doing it?

John's not asking you to explain how God does anything. He's pointing out a logical problem with your viewpoint, which is that God cannot consider or judge.

And John is correct. This aspect of God is recognized by Calvinists, who are logically consistent in their viewpoint.

You can know that you do not know something that God knows. But you cannot know what that knowledge is, that you do not know.

You cannot know that he knows it like that; but you can know that he does not know it like that, as I have plainly shown. And, you can know that he knows things that you don’t know.

Esau and Cyrus have never been the holders of such knowledge. He who has such knowledge (as you profess) is God. The holder of such knowledge can never perform the judiciary activity that such knowledge tells him he has done; his knowledge incapacitates him to ever accomplish the judiciary activity.

Therefore such knowledge is false, because what it says he has done he has not done. And by telling him that he has done it makes him incapable of doing it. Incapable, because to know the consideration and the results of the consideration, makes it impossible for one to actually do the consideration. Incapable, because to consider something takes a knowledge which is different than the one you assert; because to render judgment takes a different knowledge than the one you assert. The purpose and result of consideration and judgment is therefore to alter or set the course, but this is impossible; THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE; for his knowledge, according to you, has already told him the resultant course. So to consider and to render judgment is impossible. It is impossible for God to make a choice for his knowledge tells him the choice he has already made, which he never made, for it has not happened, but is already “past perfect”.

Certain things are just impossible!

TV: Why? Is God lacking in freedom or in morality that He misses out on being a FMA?

MM: For whom is God an agent?

Thomas: For Himself.

Main Entry: agent
Pronunciation: 'A-j&nt
Function: noun
Etymology: Middle English, from Medieval Latin agent-, agens, from Latin, present participle of agere to drive, lead, act, do; akin to Old Norse aka to travel in a vehicle, Greek agein to drive, lead
1 : one that acts or exerts power
2 a : something that produces or is capable of producing an effect : an active or efficient cause b : a chemically, physically, or biologically active principle
3 : a means or instrument by which a guiding intelligence achieves a result
4 : one who is authorized to act for or in the place of another: as a : a representative, emissary, or official of a government <crown agent> <federal agent> b : one engaged in undercover activities (as espionage) : SPY <secret agent> c : a business representative (as of an athlete or entertainer) <a theatrical agent>

TV: Since you said God doesnt judge. And if He doesnt judge, well... bye bye judgement...

MM: I qualified what I meant. God is judge in the sense He rewards us according to our self-judgment. There is nothing arbitrary about it.

Thomas: Our self judgement? Then we are all dead.

TV: And I say that if in Gods perspective it has happened already, neither He nor we do anything at all but what fate has portioned out to us.

MM: What makes it “fate”? Is it “fate” when a historian records what happened? Does it mean the characters he wrote about can only do what he penned?

Thomas: It is fate since it has no FMA author/actor involved. (Including God as a FMA).
That the characters written about can only do what He penned is one of the fundamentals of your argumentation thus far.

Calvinistic free will, we choose to do what pleases us.

Arminian free will, we may choose to do something wether it pleases us or not.

A person detests even the smell of garlic. In the arminian view, this person can choose to eat the garlic despite finding it utterly revolting. What about the calvinistic view?

Then there is no hope for you MM; for God has no hope, and no judgment.

But God does hope; and his hope is our hope, or we have no hope.

• Rom 8:20 For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the same in hope,
  Rom 15:13 Now the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that ye may abound in hope, through the power of the Holy Spirit.

No, God does not hope “things” will turn out right. “Things” do not have anything to do with right. His hope is not for “things”. But his hope is for those he created in his own image, that they may have faith and render righteous judgment.

TE: I couldn't find it. It said something like if Jesus had sinned, the stone would never have been removed from the tomb. I'm quite sure it's not in the Desire of Ages (which isn't very helpful, I know).

MM: It doesn’t make sense to me. I will reserve judgment, though, until you post the quote.

TE: For the purpose of my question, it doesn't matter. Why only A can happen isn't important. *That* only A can is all that's necessary to respond to my point. Now whether or not some pre-condition implies that A must happen can be discussed at a future time, but why A must happen in no way affects the logic that *if* A must happen, then certain conclusions follow.

MM: Then I’ve already answered the question. Please see the second post on this thread.

TE: No, I didn't say that. I said that you said only A can happen. I can see how you could misread what I wrote, but the "as MM is insisting" is only in reference to "If only A can happen".

MM: Thank you for clarifying.

TE: The fact that B cannot happen has to do with it being an impossibility. If B cannot happen, we cannot do it.

MM: But why we cannot do it is key to this discussion. So, again, why can’t it be done?

TE: This doesn't change the logic in any way. We can deal with that after we've dealt with the logic. If you think the logic does change, then postulate the scenarios in which the logic changes and explain why it changes.

MM: If we cannot do “B” because it is physically impossible, then it is logical. For example, if “B” represents a human flying to the moon and back in the buff, flapping his arms like a bird, then it stands to reason “B” cannot be done.

TE: This is the compatibilistic definition of free will, which the Calvinsits use. This definition is logically consistent with the concept of God's foreknowledge that you hold. So you are holding to a logically consistent system of thought.

MM: Okay.

TE: This definition requires that there actually be more than one event which can happen; your definition does not. In your defintion, only A needs to be possible, given that A is what the person wishes to do.

MM: Again, I believe we are born in slavery to sin, self, and Satan. We are not free to sin until we are free from sin. Sinning is our legacy and, unless we are born again and choose to abide in Jesus, sinning is our destiny.

A) Before we experience the miracle of rebirth and choose to abide in Jesus we “can do nothing but evil.” (3SM 196)

B) After we experience the miracle of rebirth and choose to abide in Jesus we are free to sin or not to sin.

C) Whether we sin or not depends on whether or not we continue to abide in Jesus.

D) God knows if we will abide in Jesus or not.

JB: You cannot know that he knows it like that; but you can know that he does not know it like that, as I have plainly shown.

MM: I disagree. Unconditional prophecy is evidence God knows the future like a rerun. Otherwise, He would be able to foretell it.

JB: Esau and Cyrus have never been the holders of such knowledge. He who has such knowledge (as you profess) is God. The holder of such knowledge can never perform the judiciary activity that such knowledge tells him he has done; his knowledge incapacitates him to ever accomplish the judiciary activity.

MM: Both men knew of the prophecies concerning themselves. Such knowledge did not prevent from fulfilling their respective prophecies.

JB: No, God does not hope “things” will turn out right. “Things” do not have anything to do with right. His hope is not for “things”. But his hope is for those he created in his own image, that they may have faith and render righteous judgment.

MM: Nice twist. But I still disagree. God does not doubt or wonder or question if we will be like Jesus – He already knows if we will or not.

……………………….

MM: For whom is God an agent?

TV: For Himself.

MM: Interesting! I wonder how the trinity doctrine factors into this idea?.

TV: Our self judgement? Then we are all dead.

MM: “Jesus answered, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.” (John 3:5)

TV: It is fate since it has no FMA author/actor involved. (Including God as a FMA). That the characters written about can only do what He penned is one of the fundamentals of your argumentation thus far.

MM: Not “can do”, but “has done”. FMAs will do exactly what God watched them do. From God's perspective the future is like watching a rerun.

Yes, in the compatibilistic view, one could also eat the garlic. "Please" doesn't mean something that's pleasing; it means something you want to do. In this view, you are free to do what you want to do. So even though you only have one choice available, it's still free will, because that choice is what you want to do. They argue that what you do is your greatest will, or overriding desire. So even though you find garlic revolting, you may decide to to eat it anyway (e.g. you think it will help your health). You desire to improve your health overrides your desire not to eat it.

They believe there is always an explanation for anything you do; there's always something determining your choice. Any choice can be explained, if you knew enough information and could determine the ultimate or greatest will.

Jonathon Edwads "Freedom of the Will" goes into great detail regarding this theory. You can find it on line.

The libertarian notion is that you can do one of two or more mutually exclusive events. In the compatibilistic notion you can only do what God knows you will do.

The distinction I made between Armenian and Calvinistic was a bit inaccurate. Compatibilistic and libertarian is more accurate, where compatibilistic free will is a view of free will which is compatible with determinism. That is, it's a definition of free will which is consistant with (or compatible with) the idea that our future choices have been determined.

To say it in simple terms, there's only one possible option, A, which one can do. However, this doesn't violate the notion of free will (as defined in the compatibilistic view) because A is what you wanted to do. You were free to do what you wanted. So the idea of free will (doing what you want to do) is compatible with the idea that you did what you wanted to do (A). That A was the only thing you could do does not diminish your free will in any way under this definition.

Now the incompatilisitic definition of free will is that one can do either A or B (not actually want to do one or other, but actually do one or the other). This view is not compatible with the idea that only A can occur.

Actually, even this isn't completely accurate.



What I've been calling incompatibilistic free will is 1a above. Compatilistic free will is actually stronger than the idea that we only have one choice availabe, which 1b also asserts. Really we've been arguing 1a) vs. 1b) on this thread.

What I've been saying is that the definition of free will as being able to do A or B logically contradicts the idea that only A is possible.

You and John and I have been arguing from the 1a) perspective. The others have been arguing 1b). The argument the 1b) people have been making is that God's foreknowing the future does not mean Hs is forcing us do what He foreknew. The 1a) people don't care. Calvinists would care, and would argue that the 1b) people are wrong, but 1a) people agree with 1b) people on this point, but would say that it doesn't make any difference, because they've never claimed otherwise. This is where the 1b) people scratch where it doesn't itch.

Every conversation I've ever had with a 1b) person falls into this pattern. The 1a) people argue that the future is open and not fixed and the 1b) people respond that just because God knows what we will do doesn't mean He is forcing us to do it.

TE: I couldn't find it. It said something like if Jesus had sinned, the stone would never have been removed from the tomb. I'm quite sure it's not in the Desire of Ages (which isn't very helpful, I know).

MM: It doesn’t make sense to me. I will reserve judgment, though, until you post the quote.

If Rosangela reads this, maybe she can find it. She's good at that.

TE: For the purpose of my question, it doesn't matter. Why only A can happen isn't important. *That* only A can is all that's necessary to respond to my point. Now whether or not some pre-condition implies that A must happen can be discussed at a future time, but why A must happen in no way affects the logic that *if* A must happen, then certain conclusions follow.

MM: Then I’ve already answered the question. Please see the second post on this thread.

That says, "I agree. Since "A" is the only possibility, then "B" is not a possibility." This doesn't say anything about the fact that since B is not a possibility, a definition of free will which says that one can do A or B is logically consistent, which is the whole point of the topic. (thanks for addressing this, btw)

TE: No, I didn't say that. I said that you said only A can happen. I can see how you could misread what I wrote, but the "as MM is insisting" is only in reference to "If only A can happen".

MM: Thank you for clarifying.

Sorry about the misunderstanding.

TE: The fact that B cannot happen has to do with it being an impossibility. If B cannot happen, we cannot do it.

MM: But why we cannot do it is key to this discussion. So, again, why can’t it be done?

I haven't gotten to why. Before discussing why, I wanted to establish agreement on what seems to me to be extremely obvious. If A must happen, then B cannot. Therefore a definition of free will which depends upon both A and B being doable is logically inconsistent. I don't see why it's taken so long for people to agree to this.

TE: This doesn't change the logic in any way. We can deal with that after we've dealt with the logic. If you think the logic does change, then postulate the scenarios in which the logic changes and explain why it changes.

MM: If we cannot do “B” because it is physically impossible, then it is logical. For example, if “B” represents a human flying to the moon and back in the buff, flapping his arms like a bird, then it stands to reason “B” cannot be done.

They why we cannot do B does not change the logic. What matters is if the assertion that we cannot do B is true or not, but we haven't gotten to that point yet. All we're discussing now is if, given the assertion that A must happen, if the following two things follow:

a)B cannot happen (you've agreed to this)
b)A definition of free will which states that both A and B must be doable is logically inconsistent.

You have sort of addressed this by suggesting a definition of free will which is logically consistent with your viewpoint that only A is possible.

TE: This is the compatibilistic definition of free will, which the Calvinsits use. This definition is logically consistent with the concept of God's foreknowledge that you hold. So you are holding to a logically consistent system of thought.

MM: Okay.

TE: This definition requires that there actually be more than one event which can happen; your definition does not. In your defintion, only A needs to be possible, given that A is what the person wishes to do.

MM: Again, I believe we are born in slavery to sin, self, and Satan. We are not free to sin until we are free from sin. Sinning is our legacy and, unless we are born again and choose to abide in Jesus, sinning is our destiny.

A) Before we experience the miracle of rebirth and choose to abide in Jesus we “can do nothing but evil.” (3SM 196)

B) After we experience the miracle of rebirth and choose to abide in Jesus we are free to sin or not to sin.

C) Whether we sin or not depends on whether or not we continue to abide in Jesus.

D) God knows if we will abide in Jesus or not.

The definition that you suggested, that one has free will if one has the ability and freedom to do what one chooses, is consistent with all the above. The definition of free will that I used in the beginning of this topic, that free will means one can do either of A or B, is logically consistent with none of this way of thinking, especially D).

I was wishing to make two points in this topic. This is one of them. I'll make the second if we get agreement on this point. (this point being that if it is true that A must occur, then B cannot occur, and a logically consistent defintion of free will, will reflect this).

I really wasn't wishing to debate whether or not your viewpoint (or mine) is correct or not. We've debated that before, and can debate that on another topic (or this one too, if that's what people want to talk about), but I don't want to lose sight of the purpose for which I started this topic.

I wanted to comment on the horse race analogy. The problem with it is, to borrow a legal phrase, it is assuming things not in evidence. That is, it is assuming that the future is such that one can jump forward in it and see one given alternative (i.e., a fixed rather than open future). But if the future is not like that, one cannot do that.

Let's assume the future is open, and there are six horses, any of which could win with equal probability. Assume one jumps into the future six times. The first time one sees the first horse wins, the second time the second, and so forth. Under this scenario, one could go forward into the future, see the first horse win, report to the better that the first horse was seen to win, the better bets on it, and the second horse wins! The fact that one has seen a given event happen does not mean that it must happen.

But while were on the topic, going back a ways:



If you went into the future and saw that A won, how could you break A's leg? If A's leg were broken, then A wouldn't have won, and you wouldn't have seen him win; you would have seen A's leg broken and some other horse winning. (This is besides the point, but it was bugging me.) This scenario sounds like someone's been watching too man "Back To The Future" movies!

Bro Tom,

I want to find out a bit about your background, so I know how to proceed. I'm only about half way through the posts, so I don't know if this has already been addressed.

Are you at all familiar with the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics? In particular, I'm thinking of the double-slit experiment for electrons.

How about Feynman's sum-over-paths concept? How about the physics theories that propose multiple universes?

Thanks.

TE: Therefore a definition of free will which depends upon both A and B being doable is logically inconsistent.

MM: Inconsistent? You mean because “B” is logically impossible?

TE: You have sort of addressed this by suggesting a definition of free will which is logically consistent with your viewpoint that only A is possible.

MM: Please don’t misunderstand me. It’s not my viewpoint. I’m only going along with it until we can discuss pertinent details. If “B” is impossible I do not count it as an option, so far as free will is concerned. If both “A” and “B” are equally doable, then we have the ability and freedom to choose either one.

TE: The definition that you suggested, that one has free will if one has the ability and freedom to do what one chooses, is consistent with all the above.

MM: I agree.

TE: The definition of free will that I used in the beginning of this topic, that free will means one can do either of A or B, is logically consistent with none of this way of thinking, especially D).

MM: I disagree. Hopefully we can discuss this in more detail. Let me know when you’re ready.

TE: If you went into the future and saw that A won, how could you break A's leg? If A's leg were broken, then A wouldn't have won, and you wouldn't have seen him win; you would have seen A's leg broken and some other horse winning.

MM: Only humans can botch things up as bad as you have described. God doesn’t make mistakes. He gets it right the first time. Thus, there is no need to change things. In other words, God doesn’t watch the rerun, realize He made a mistake, and then resolve to go back and fix it.

Arnold, many years ago I was briefly a Physics major (before I wised up!). I studied post-graduate Mathematics. I have a strong statistical background, having worked in the actuarial field, as well as studying Math. Right now I'd say I have a better than average lay person's understanding of Physics, but not much beyond that.

I'm quite familiar with the statistical nature of quantum mechanics (and have thought about how that fits into the things we are discussing here). I used to know about the double-slit experiment, but it's been too many years to remember any details. I'm familiar with Feynman in a general sense, having read some of what he's written. Before I went to the link you gave, I would have said I was not familiar with the sum-over-paths idea, but I am somewhat familiar with it, I just didn't know that's what it was called. (I also didn't know it was Feynman's idea).

Bro Tom,

Good to know that. I want to explore what you're saying in the context of physics. That might give me a better handle on what exactly you're saying and its ramifications.

For a refresher on the double-slit, the wiki is pretty good. I believe Feynman's idea is also called sum over histories. Maybe that's more familiar. Anyway, I'm no physicist myself, but I dabble in it now and then.

I only have time for a general question right now. I'll save the more detailed stuff for next time.

In classical mechanics (deterministic), it was theoretically possible to accurately predict a future event if one knew the exact values of every particle's momentum and position. But the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle makes modern mechanics probabilistic, making it impossible for us, even theoretically, to accurately predict a future event.

Is God limited by the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle? If not, does He then see a deterministic universe, where complete knowledge of the present allows an accurate view of the future?

That's a good question, Arnold. I wouldn't say that God is limited by the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, but that God chose to create things in this way. That is, God chose to create things so that they are spontaneous and non-fixed. Even inanimate objects are like this. I think this was more "very good" than a Universe where everything would be fixed. That is, God created things in such a way that even He can experience joy and spontaneity in the things that happen.

My understanding of the physics is that the quantum principle is not due to a lack of knowledge. That is, it is not the case that if we simply knew more about the way things work that we could predict what would happen, instead of describing it probabilistically. That is, even if you asked God Himself what would happen to a certain particle, He would say, "Well there's an x% chance it will do A, a y% chance it will do B" and so forth. The laws of probability describe the way the particles move because that's the way God created things. He could have created them deterministically had He wanted to (assuming that would have worked, of course).

TE: Therefore a definition of free will which depends upon both A and B being doable is logically inconsistent.

MM: Inconsistent? You mean because “B” is logically impossible?

Yes.

TE: You have sort of addressed this by suggesting a definition of free will which is logically consistent with your viewpoint that only A is possible.

MM: Please don’t misunderstand me. It’s not my viewpoint.

The definition of free will which you gave as your understanding of what free will is not your viewpoint? I don't understand that. You told me what you thought free will meant. I'm pointing out that what you think free will means (according to what you said) is consistent with the other things you have been saying. This is only your viewpoint that I was discussing when I made this comment.

I’m only going along with it until we can discuss pertinent details. If “B” is impossible I do not count it as an option, so far as free will is concerned. If both “A” and “B” are equally doable, then we have the ability and freedom to choose either one.

Well, this is the question. If God knows that A will happen and not B, is B doable?

TE: The definition that you suggested, that one has free will if one has the ability and freedom to do what one chooses, is consistent with all the above.

MM: I agree.

TE: The definition of free will that I used in the beginning of this topic, that free will means one can do either of A or B, is logically consistent with none of this way of thinking, especially D).

MM: I disagree. Hopefully we can discuss this in more detail. Let me know when you’re ready.

Go ahead. Explain how the definition of free will as being able to do A or B is logically consistent with the idea that A must happen and not B.

(snip)

TE: Well, this is the question. If God knows that A will happen and not B, is B doable?

MM: “B” was doable before the fact, but not after the fact. God’s ability to watch it happen before it happens does not limit what is doable before the fact. Watching a rerun and knowing what will happen before it happens does not limit what could have happened, that is, assuming other options were humanly possible.


MM: Again, if “A” must happen, then “B” is not an issue. The equation does not elicit the question. However, it is important that we understand why “A” must happen. What is the basis of our information?

TE: That is, even if you asked God Himself what would happen to a certain particle, He would say, "Well there's an x% chance it will do A, a y% chance it will do B" and so forth.

MM: I disagree. God is not simply a super-gifted statistician. He’s not just another great guesser. God is omniscient. He knows everything. Again, unconditional prophecy is positive proof. The Revelation is not a compilation of great guess work, of what God thinks is most likely going to happen in the future. No way. Instead, it accurately describes precisely what will happen. No doubt about it. There is no possibility that things will play out differently, not even in the least detail. From atoms to ants to mankind, God knows exactly how and what everything will do in the future.

TE: Well, this is the question. If God knows that A will happen and not B, is B doable?

MM: “B” was doable before the fact, but not after the fact.

Before what fact? God's seeing it? There is no before that! God has always known that A will happen, so there was never a time when B was doable.

God’s ability to watch it happen before it happens does not limit what is doable before the fact.

Again, what fact are you talking about? His watching it happen, right? There is no time before when this happened, hence, again, no time when B was doable.

Watching a rerun and knowing what will happen before it happens does not limit what could have happened, that is, assuming other options were humanly possible.

There's only one future to watch, and hence only one thing that could possibly have happened, which is precisely what God saw happening.

MM: Again, if “A” must happen, then “B” is not an issue. The equation does not elicit the question. However, it is important that we understand why “A” must happen. What is the basis of our information?

B is an issue because the whole question is if it's possible for one to do B. That's the question that started the whole thing! If we define free will as the ability to do A or B, then B is most assuredly an issue.

You might not have noticed this, by *my* point (and I'm the one who started the topic!) is in regards to free will, not God's foreknowledge (at least, not directly; it *is* directly concerned with free will).

Now if you wish to use a definition of free will where B is not an issue, then, OK, you can say B is not an issue. But if you have a definition of free will which involves B, then B is an issue!

TE: That is, even if you asked God Himself what would happen to a certain particle, He would say, "Well there's an x% chance it will do A, a y% chance it will do B" and so forth.

MM: I disagree. God is not simply a super-gifted statistician. He’s not just another great guesser. God is omniscient. He knows everything. Again, unconditional prophecy is positive proof. The Revelation is not a compilation of great guess work, of what God thinks is most likely going to happen in the future. No way. Instead, it accurately describes precisely what will happen. No doubt about it. There is no possibility that things will play out differently, not even in the least detail. From atoms to ants to mankind, God knows exactly how and what everything will do in the future.

You're free to disagree with quantum physics, but I was just making a comment about the physics. The part you are commenting on was explaining that the theory of quantum physics is statistical not because of a lack of knowledge (if we knew more, we could say where the particles go; we use statistics because we don't understand the underlying mechanism) but because of the essential nature of the particles themselves; that is, they act statistically. That's the theory.

Isnt the idea about quantum particles that you can either know where they are or where they are going but that it is physically impossible to know both of these at the same time?

Assuming I remember this correctly, can God know something that is not knowable?

Prophecy is not evidence that he knows it like that.

Are you saying that the way we know the future, is the way God knows the future?

There is no twist. All the way along we are talking about salvation and not things.

But you MM, indeed have a twist. In your mind it seems that hope translates to doubt since you said: "God does not doubt...or wonder or question". Those are not activities of hope. Faith is the opposite of doubt, and hope is the opposite of despair. You seem to think that hope and doubt are harmonious and faith and despair go together. To think that doubt, wonder, and question are the activities of hope is indeed a twist.

• Rom 8:20 For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the same in hope,
• Rom 15:13 Now the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that ye may abound in hope, through the power of the Holy Spirit.

I hope you consider the scriptures.

I might have muddied up the issue by mixing Heisenberg with the double-slit. I'll stick to Heisenberg this time, and leave probability functions for another time.

For those not familiar with it, here's a very rough summary: The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle states that the more accurately you know an object's position, the less accurately you will know its velocity (and vice versa). IOW, the more you know about where something is, the less you know about where it's going. For "big" and "slow" things, it doesn't really matter. But for things about the size and speed of an electron, it matters a lot.

Bro Tom, here's my simple Yes/No question, to find out your thoughts on God's omniscience (not even touching foreknowledge yet). Given a specific electron, does God know exactly (taking the physics definition that measurement error can be arbitrarily small) both its velocity and position?

I would say yes, God can know both, because His knowledge is not bound by being able to observe things.

The Heisenberg uncertainty principle involves our limitations based on observing things. If we could know a particles velocity (or position) without observing it, then we would be free to observe it's other property without a problem. (by problem, I mean, without violating the Heisenberg uncertainty principle).

Interesting question! I had to think a bit about that one.

I'll remark a bit further. The reason for the Heisenberg principle is that you cannot observe an object's behavior without changing it. In the case of an electron, you need to apply energy in some way to see where it is (in the form of light, for example), or how fast its going, which impacts its position and velocity. So while you're observing one thing, you're impacting the other.

In the case of big objects, as you pointed out, the impact is minimal. (Light hitting us doesn't impact our velocity or position much, like it would for an electron). However, it's interesting to note that the Heisenberg uncertainty principle has had implications in the social sciences. (People change their behavior when you observe them).

Have you heard of Heisenbugs, Arthur?

JB: You cannot know that he knows it like that; but you can know that he does not know it like that, as I have plainly shown.

MM: I disagree. Unconditional prophecy is evidence God knows the future like a rerun. Otherwise, He would be able to foretell it.

JB:Prophecy is not evidence that he knows it like that.



"I have purposed it, I will also do it." This is an explanation of how God can know what's going to happen in the future.

Bro Thomas,

You've touched on a fundamental question. Is the universe such that there are some aspects of it of which God is ignorant? IOW, is there such as thing that is not knowable to God?

I suppose it depends upon how you define "knowable". This is one of the questions that comes up regarding the open view of the future. I maintain that God knows the future perfectly, but the future is open, not fixed. Therefore God knows it as open, meaning that He knows every possible thing that can happen. I would say this is knowing. There are some who say "No, no. If God does not know exactly what will happen, that means He's not omniscient." But I think this is just a matter of misunderstanding the nature of the future.

This example could be applied to other areas. (i.e., it depends on how one defines "knowable").

Anyway, my answer would be no, there's nothing of which God is ignorant.

Another interesting and related question is if it's possible for God to learn.

Can you learn something if you already know everything?

TE: B is an issue because the whole question is if it's possible for one to do B. That's the question that started the whole thing! If we define free will as the ability to do A or B, then B is most assuredly an issue.

TE: You might not have noticed this, by *my* point (and I'm the one who started the topic!) is in regards to free will, not God's foreknowledge (at least, not directly; it *is* directly concerned with free will).

TE: Well, this is the question. If God knows that A will happen and not B, is B doable?

MM: “B” was doable before the fact, but not after the fact.

TE: Before what fact?

MM: Before the person did it.

TE: God's seeing it?

MM: No. Before the person did it.

TE: There is no before that!

MM: From our perspective there is.

TE: God has always known that A will happen …

MM: True. But why? I believe it’s because God “inhabits eternity”. In other words, He can look back on the future like watching a rerun. From His perspective it has already happened. Thus, perfect foreknowledge is based on perfect hindsight, which is more than saying God is pretty good at estimating what might happen in the future, and getting it right most of the time. By the way, the view you have been postulating disallows God knowing with absolute certainty that “A” will happen. Or, did I misunderstand it?

TE: … so there was never a time when B was doable.

MM: How can you be so sure? Does the view you espouse allow you to believe God knows the future with absolute certainty?

………………………..

TE: That is, even if you asked God Himself what would happen to a certain particle, He would say, "Well there's an x% chance it will do A, a y% chance it will do B" and so forth.

MM: I disagree. God is not simply a super-gifted statistician. He’s not just another great guesser. God is omniscient. He knows everything. Again, unconditional prophecy is positive proof. The Revelation is not a compilation of great guess work, of what God thinks is most likely going to happen in the future. No way. Instead, it accurately describes precisely what will happen. No doubt about it. There is no possibility that things will play out differently, not even in the least detail. From atoms to ants to mankind, God knows exactly how and what everything will do in the future.

TE: You're free to disagree with quantum physics, but I was just making a comment about the physics.

MM: The part I am disagreeing with is – “if you asked God Himself what would happen”. You brought God into the picture in way that made it seem to me you think not even God can know the future behavior of “particles” with absolute certainty. By “absolute certainty” I mean there is no doubt in His mind what will happen, that is, He knows exactly, precisely what will happen. He doesn’t have to guess or wonder which possible outcome is most likely to occur. Do you agree?

Thomas:Can you learn something if you already know everything?

Tom:Possibly, if new things can be learned in the future.

Regarding the particles, God does know the behavior of the particles with absolute certainty; they will act exactly as designed. With probability x, they will do A; with probability y, they will do B, and so forth. That's how they were made! (That's the theory, at any rate).

Regarding the other points, it appears that you are suggesting that there whether A or B is possible depends upon one's perspective. From our perspective, either is possible, because we are ignorant. From God's perspective, only A is possible, because He really knows what will happen (thanks to His T.V. re-run ability).

So according to this idea, isn't it clear that B is not really doable? Ignorant beings can *think* it's doable, because of their ignorance, but they're wrong. God, who is not ignorant, knows the truth, which is that B is not doable.

Merely thinking a thing is doable doesn't make it doable. That seems to be what you're suggesting.

This requires a less than absolute definition of "everything".

JB: Prophecy is not evidence that [God] knows [the future] like [a rerun].

MM: On this we disagree.

JB: Are you saying that the way we know the future, is the way God knows the future?

MM: Not at all. The reason Esau and Cyrus knew their future is because God revealed it. That’s how they knew what would happen.

JB: In your mind it seems that hope translates to doubt since you said: "God does not doubt...or wonder or question". Those are not activities of hope. Faith is the opposite of doubt, and hope is the opposite of despair. You seem to think that hope and doubt are harmonious and faith and despair go together. To think that doubt, wonder, and question are the activities of hope is indeed a twist.

MM: Another nice twist - a double twist. But it doesn’t represent what I believe. The word “hope” has many meanings. Hopefully we can agree on this. Sometimes “hope” implies knowing it will eventually happen. (A) “I hope it happens sooner than later.” But sometimes “hope” implies not knowing whether it will happen at all. (B) “I hope it happens.” Neither “A” nor “B” applies to God.

…………………………….

TE: "I have purposed it, I will also do it." This is an explanation of how God can know what's going to happen in the future.

MM: This only applies to God’s future behavior. He is simply saying what He will do. It doesn’t address what FMAs will do.

TE: [A] Therefore God knows [the future] as open, meaning that He knows every possible thing that can happen. I would say this is knowing. [B] Anyway, my answer would be no, there's nothing of which God is ignorant.

MM: “A” and “B” above are not compatible. According to this theory God doesn’t know ahead of time exactly what will happen. Knowing a zillion possible outcomes only means God is the ultimate smartest guesser.

…………………………

TE: Another interesting and related question is if it's possible for God to learn.

TV: Can you learn something if you already know everything?

MM: There isn’t anything God doesn’t know. Thus, He cannot learn something He doesn’t already know.

TE: Regarding the particles, God does know the behavior of the particles with absolute certainty; they will act exactly as designed. With probability x, they will do A; with probability y, they will do B, and so forth. That's how they were made! (That's the theory, at any rate).

MM: Thank you for clarifying it.

TE: Regarding the other points, it appears that you are suggesting that there whether A or B is possible depends upon one's perspective. From our perspective, either is possible, because we are ignorant. From God's perspective, only A is possible, because He really knows what will happen (thanks to His T.V. re-run ability).

MM: Correct.

TE: So according to this idea, isn't it clear that B is not really doable? Ignorant beings can *think* it's doable, because of their ignorance, but they're wrong. God, who is not ignorant, knows the truth, which is that B is not doable. Merely thinking a thing is doable doesn't make it doable. That seems to be what you're suggesting.

MM: God knows “B” will not happen simply because from His perspective it didn’t happen. But from our perspective it hasn’t happened yet, so our options are many, not in theory, but in reality. God’s knowledge of it has nothing to do with us, unless, of course, He tells us ahead of time. But even then our options are many. Just because God knows what we will do, it doesn’t mean our options are only one. We still have to choose, out of many options, to do the one God knows we will do.

Does this make sense to anyone besides MM? Especially I'm interested if anyone thinks the following statement makes sense, "But from our perspective it hasn’t happened yet, so our options are many, not in theory, but in reality."


(To me it seems obvious that God's perspective accurately reflects reality, and if we think something differently than God does -- e.g. we can do B, whereas it is God's opinion that we can't -- then God is simply right and we're wrong.)

TE: "I have purposed it, I will also do it." This is an explanation of how God can know what's going to happen in the future.

MM: This only applies to God’s future behavior. He is simply saying what He will do. It doesn’t address what FMAs will do.

What I wrote was addressing God, so of course it's not addresing CFMAs. What it points out is that God can known what's going to happen in the future by influencing it. In fact, that exactly what He said.

TE: [A] Therefore God knows [the future] as open, meaning that He knows every possible thing that can happen. I would say this is knowing. [B] Anyway, my answer would be no, there's nothing of which God is ignorant.

MM: “A” and “B” above are not compatible. According to this theory God doesn’t know ahead of time exactly what will happen. Knowing a zillion possible outcomes only means God is the ultimate smartest guesser.

I'm not understanding your point. Are you saying that if the future is open and not fixed, that means God can't know it? Well, you say, He doesn't know "exactly" what will happen. It sounds like you're just restating what we're discussing. Is the future open or fixed? Your correct that if the future is open, God can't know "exactly what will happen," if by "exactly what will happen" you mean what would happen if the future were fixed.

The way our prof derived the quantitative expression for the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle was by analyzing the effect of a photon on an electron (transfer of momentum, random recoil, etc). Sure enough, it came out just like the book had it (after quite a bit of arm-waving).

But, as I understand the principle, the uncertainty is not truly caused the the act of observation; the uncertainty is an inherent part of nature. The current theory is that no matter how you gain the information, whether through bombardment of photons or some exotic, non-interacting way (presumably something God can do), improved accuracy in one aspect results in degraded accuracy in the other. From a human perspective, since physics does not involve itself with things beyond the human perspective, infinite precision is theoretically impossible. (Feynman describes an experiment that demonstrates this with the double-slit. I think it was in his book on Quantum Electrodynamics, which was a surprisingly easy read.)

Anyway, if we say that God can have infinitely precise knowledge of an electron's present momentum and position concurrently, then that violates the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle as we know it today. More, it violates Quantum Mechanics as we know it today.

But that's not to say that the concept is wrong. All it says is that it is not compatible with our current understanding of QM (just like General Relativity is not compatible with QM).

That reminds me that Einstein was also uncomfortable with the idea that uncertainty is an inherent part of nature. As he wrote to Max Born, "Quantum mechanics is certainly imposing. But an inner voice tells me that it is not yet the real thing. The theory says a lot, but does not really bring us any closer to the secret of the Old One. I, at any rate, am convinced that He does not throw dice." So, to say that QM is an incomplete theory (since one would be foolish to say it is wrong, considering its remarkable accuracy in describing physical phenomena) would put one in illustrious company.

OTOH, the other side of the fence has its share of luminaries. Niels Bohr told Einstein, "Quit telling God what to do." Stephen Hawking said, "Not only does God play dice, he throws them where we can't see them."

Assuming that you will continue to hold the belief that God's knowledge of the present is not limited in precision, I'll go on to the double-slit. Next time.

Yes, I have heard of Heisenbugs. But I have never been infected by it, since I always initialize my variables.

In the double-slit experiment (click here for a good explanation), an electron gun shoots electrons randomly toward a wall with 2 slits in it, and another wall behind it to catch the electrons that make it through. If the electrons acted like regular bullets, you would expect that the ones that make it through the slits will end up on the part of the wall behind the slits. Instead, what we find, assuming the slits are set up properly, is that there is an interference pattern, with electrons ending up where they should not be, and no electrons where they should be. (That's a really weak explanation, so I suggest going to the links.)

Anyway, if you send the electrons through the slits one at a time, each electron will obviously hit the back wall at one point along the wall. The electron will not be smeared. In that sense, it acts like a regular bullet. But as you continue to shoot electrons, the interference pattern will build up.

QM makes very reliable predictions about the interference pattern. We can calculate very precisely what kind of pattern we will see based on the size and location of the slits, energy of the electrons, etc. Shoot a trillion electrons and the pattern will match what QM predicts.

But QM is unable to predict the path of any individual electron going through the slits. The probabilities all work out fine for a big pile of electrons. But for one electron, we have no idea where it will end up. So, if we shot just one electron, all we can do is guess.

As that one electron is travelling toward the slits, does God know where it will end up?

This is from Wikipedia, so it can't be wrong:



Notice that is speaks of measuring. This goes along with my understanding of it. Since God can know these things without measuring them, He can avoid the problem.

Regarding the slit experiment (I'm pretty sure I've actually observed this one in a physics lab; I did OK in the theoretical part of the courses, but stunk at labs) I think that Quantum theory is accurate in its explanation of the movement of particles being statistical in nature, and that God would respond to the question, "Where will the particle go" the same way a physicist would. I think God created things this way because He loves spontaneity.

This is quite a statement of confidence. :pIs there not a level of contradiction between the first and the secound boldened statement?

If we take Wikipedia as authority, here's part of that wiki:

The observer effect is what you are talking about. The HUP, really has nothing to do with observation, but with the nature of the universe.





If God can know a particle's exact position and momentum concurrently, He violates the HUP.

Back to electron bullets. You can ask a physicist, "Where will this particular electron go?" He will have to answer, "I can tell you where it's likely to be, but I have no idea where it will actually be. It could end up behind the slit, or on your nose, or in the Andromeda Galaxy."

Are you saying that God would be as clueless as the physicist? IOW, when the electron lands, God will learn something He did not previously know.

TE: [A] Therefore God knows [the future] as open, meaning that He knows every possible thing that can happen. I would say this is knowing. [B] Anyway, my answer would be no, there's nothing of which God is ignorant.

MM: “A” and “B” above are not compatible. According to this theory God doesn’t know ahead of time exactly what will happen. Knowing a zillion possible outcomes only means God is the ultimate smartest guesser.

TE: I'm not understanding your point. Are you saying that if the future is open and not fixed, that means God can't know it? Well, you say, He doesn't know "exactly" what will happen. It sounds like you're just restating what we're discussing. Is the future open or fixed? Your correct that if the future is open, God can't know "exactly what will happen," if by "exactly what will happen" you mean what would happen if the future were fixed.

MM: From God's divine hindsight perspective the future is neither fixed nor open - it is what it is. The future, for God, is like history, like watching a rerun. He knows exactly, precisely what will happen because He has already watched it happen.

But history is fixed. Isnt it?

There might be. I don't think so. I feel more certain about the second statement than the first. It would be interesting to get an opinion from a physicist.

TE: [A] Therefore God knows [the future] as open, meaning that He knows every possible thing that can happen. I would say this is knowing. [B] Anyway, my answer would be no, there's nothing of which God is ignorant.

MM: “A” and “B” above are not compatible. According to this theory God doesn’t know ahead of time exactly what will happen. Knowing a zillion possible outcomes only means God is the ultimate smartest guesser.

You're assuming that God can't know what will happen ahead of time unless the future is fixed. I don't agree with your assumption.

TE: I'm not understanding your point. Are you saying that if the future is open and not fixed, that means God can't know it? Well, you say, He doesn't know "exactly" what will happen. It sounds like you're just restating what we're discussing. Is the future open or fixed? Your correct that if the future is open, God can't know "exactly what will happen," if by "exactly what will happen" you mean what would happen if the future were fixed.

MM: From God's divine hindsight perspective the future is neither fixed nor open - it is what it is.

It's obviously fixed if He can look at it like a T.V. rerun. Imagine watching an old I Love Lucy rerun you've seen dozens of times, and all of a sudden Lucy starts doing something different. That's not possible, right? Why not? Because what Lucy will do is fixed. If the T.V. rerun analogy holds, then the things which God is watching are as fixed as Lucy's behavior.

The future, for God, is like history, like watching a rerun. He knows exactly, precisely what will happen because He has already watched it happen.

I'm reposting this, because I didn't get any responses, and I've very interested in knowing what others think about this.




Does this make sense to anyone besides MM? Especially I'm interested if anyone thinks the following statement makes sense, "But from our perspective it hasn’t happened yet, so our options are many, not in theory, but in reality."

Even though God knows what choice we will make before we even make it, it still remains our choice to make.

Yes, but we can only make the choice He knows we will make. This is my point in noting the contradiction between defining free will as the ability to do either of mutually exclusive events. This is not possible. We can only choose to do what God knows we will do. You can't validly argue that if we would choose to do something different, then God would have foreknown it differently, because God foreknows the event *before* we make our choice.

That is, God knows at 11:00 what choice we will make at 12:00, but we haven't made the choice yet. So before we are even aware of what our choice is, what we will do is already certain. The event has already been determined before we have taken action.

Now the definition of free will which MM has suggested *is* logically consistent with this view of the future (only one possibility, known ahead of time by God. He suggests that one has free will if one is able to choose and perform that which one wishes to do. (not his exact words, but that's the idea). With this definition, it is not necessary that one be able to do either of multiple events which are mutually exclusive, only that one be able to do the particular event which one wishes to do.

No Tom, it isn't "Yes, but we can only make the choice He knows we will make." It is "Yes, but we will only make the choice Her knows we will make."

Can you do something you won't do? Isn't the only answer to this you could if you wanted to? That gets back to MM's definition of free will, which is that free will is being able to do what you want to do.

Everything you're saying implies that this is the definition of free will you want to use (MM's, not mine). The fact that you can't accept "can't" eloquently brings this out.

My definition is the ability to do (i.e. "can" or "can't") either A or B.

Responding to this in another way, what I've been bringing out is that if God knows you will do A and not B, then it must be the case that A will happen, and not B. Now if A will happen and not B, then you not only won't do B, but you can't. Isn't that clear? Otherwise you'd have to be able to do something which can't happen, which is impossible.

Yes, if God knows that I will do A is because He knows that I will choose A. If I choose A, which God knows I will choose, then I can't/won't do B. My freewill isn't compromised whatsoever. God didn't make me choose A. The choice to choose A was still mine to make. The only thing on God's part is that He knew in advance that I would choose A. This makes perfect sense to me.

It depends on how you define free will, which has been my point all along. If you define free will as you're being able to do A or B, then that's clearly wrong because, as you have recognized, you won't/can't do B.

It's not a matter of your free will being compromised anyway. That's a wrong way of discussing the issue, because that's never been the issue. God does nothing to force you to one thing or the other. Your free will isn't "compromised" by God's knowledge of the future. It simply doesn't exist, if it's defined as being able to do A or B.

What you really have is the ability to *think* you can choose A or B. That is, as MM puts it, from your perspective you have two options. However, from God's perspective, you don't. You only have one. So if God's perspective reflects reality, then you only have one option, even though you feel as if you had two.

Anyway, my point is that free will should be defined in a way which is logically consistent with the view of the future that we take. If we take the view that only A can happen and not B, then our definition of free will should agree with this idea (like the definition MM suggested).



This definition is logically consistent with the view of the future that you, Rosangela and MM have been suggesting. It is not logically consistent with the definition of free will which I suggested, which is the ability to do either A or B. Obviously if we can't/won't do B, we do not have the ability of doing either A or B.

TE: [A] Therefore God knows [the future] as open, meaning that He knows every possible thing that can happen. I would say this is knowing. [B] Anyway, my answer would be no, there's nothing of which God is ignorant.

MM: “A” and “B” above are not compatible. According to this theory God doesn’t know ahead of time exactly what will happen. Knowing a zillion possible outcomes only means God is the ultimate smartest guesser.

TE: You're assuming that God can't know what will happen ahead of time unless the future is fixed. I don't agree with your assumption.

MM: God knows what will happen in the future because He knows it like watching a rerun. There is nothing “fixed” about it.

……………………….

TE: I'm not understanding your point. Are you saying that if the future is open and not fixed, that means God can't know it? Well, you say, He doesn't know "exactly" what will happen. It sounds like you're just restating what we're discussing. Is the future open or fixed? Your correct that if the future is open, God can't know "exactly what will happen," if by "exactly what will happen" you mean what would happen if the future were fixed.

MM: From God's divine hindsight perspective the future is neither fixed nor open - it is what it is.

TE: It's obviously fixed if He can look at it like a T.V. rerun. Imagine watching an old I Love Lucy rerun you've seen dozens of times, and all of a sudden Lucy starts doing something different. That's not possible, right? Why not? Because what Lucy will do is fixed. If the T.V. rerun analogy holds, then the things which God is watching are as fixed as Lucy's behavior.

MM: You are taking the analogy too far. We’re talking about God, not me or you watching a rerun of I Love Lucy.

……………………………

MM: The definition of free will, as I understand it, is that we possess the ability and freedom to do as we please.

TE: This definition is logically consistent with the view of the future that you [Daryl], Rosangela and MM have been suggesting. It is not logically consistent with the definition of free will which I suggested, which is the ability to do either A or B. Obviously if we can't/won't do B, we do not have the ability of doing either A or B.

MM: First of all, I qualified my definition of free will. We are born in slavery to sin, self, and Satan. As such we are not truly “free” to do as we please. We are not free to sin until we are free from sin. We must be born again and abide in Jesus to be truly free.

Secondly, your argument does not take into consideration whether or not God tells us in advance what we will do or will not do in the future. If God doesn’t tell us then His hindsight knowledge of it does not affect us in the least. Our “options” are many, not in theory, but in reality. If He does tell us then we will do it because we love Him.

TE: [A] Therefore God knows [the future] as open, meaning that He knows every possible thing that can happen. I would say this is knowing. [B] Anyway, my answer would be no, there's nothing of which God is ignorant.

MM: “A” and “B” above are not compatible. According to this theory God doesn’t know ahead of time exactly what will happen. Knowing a zillion possible outcomes only means God is the ultimate smartest guesser.

TE: You're assuming that God can't know what will happen ahead of time unless the future is fixed. I don't agree with your assumption.

MM: God knows what will happen in the future because He knows it like watching a rerun. There is nothing “fixed” about it.

What is not fixed about a rerun?

……………………….

TE: I'm not understanding your point. Are you saying that if the future is open and not fixed, that means God can't know it? Well, you say, He doesn't know "exactly" what will happen. It sounds like you're just restating what we're discussing. Is the future open or fixed? Your correct that if the future is open, God can't know "exactly what will happen," if by "exactly what will happen" you mean what would happen if the future were fixed.

MM: From God's divine hindsight perspective the future is neither fixed nor open - it is what it is.

According to you, like a rerun; this is, fixed.

TE: It's obviously fixed if He can look at it like a T.V. rerun. Imagine watching an old I Love Lucy rerun you've seen dozens of times, and all of a sudden Lucy starts doing something different. That's not possible, right? Why not? Because what Lucy will do is fixed. If the T.V. rerun analogy holds, then the things which God is watching are as fixed as Lucy's behavior.

MM: You are taking the analogy too far. We’re talking about God, not me or you watching a rerun of I Love Lucy.

The T.V. rerun is your analogy. If you don't mean something which cannot change by "T.V. rerun," what do you mean?

……………………………

MM: The definition of free will, as I understand it, is that we possess the ability and freedom to do as we please.

TE: This definition is logically consistent with the view of the future that you [Daryl], Rosangela and MM have been suggesting. It is not logically consistent with the definition of free will which I suggested, which is the ability to do either A or B. Obviously if we can't/won't do B, we do not have the ability of doing either A or B.

MM: First of all, I qualified my definition of free will. We are born in slavery to sin, self, and Satan. As such we are not truly “free” to do as we please.

What does one please to do before being converted, if not sin? How is one not free to do what one pleases?

We are not free to sin until we are free from sin.

We are not free to sin until we are free from sin?

We must be born again and abide in Jesus to be truly free.

How does this tie in with a definition of free will? What do you think free will means?

Secondly, your argument does not take into consideration whether or not God tells us in advance what we will do or will not do in the future.

Of course not. Whether or not God tells us something about the future has nothing to do with any argument I've presented.

If God doesn’t tell us then His hindsight knowledge of it does not affect us in the least.

Your assuming here that the only thing God could do to affect our future is to tell us about it, which is, of course, not true. God can do many things to affect our future besides communicating with us about it.

Our “options” are many, not in theory, but in reality.

If "many" meant "one," as in "A" in the example we've been discussing, then this would be true.

If He does tell us then we will do it because we love Him.

Or we might not, if we have more than one option.

If God knows you will choose A, then you can't/won't choose B, so B is not an option. I'm not discussing whether your free will is compromised. That's never been an issue I've discussed. My only point is that, if one wishes to be logically consistent, if one has a view of the future in which only A can happen, then one should have a definition of free will in which only A can happen. Like the one MM at first suggested.

TE: We are not free to sin until we are free from sin?

MM: That's right. Apart from Jesus, all we can do is sin. We cannot not sin. We are natural born slaves of sin, self, and Satan. As such, until we are born again, we have one choice - to accept Jesus as our personal Savior.

...................

MM: If He does tell us then we will do it because we love Him.

TE: Or we might not, if we have more than one option.

MM: Born again believers abiding in Jesus have many options. Since they truly love God they will do what He, from His perspective, saw them doing.

TE: We are not free to sin until we are free from sin?

MM: That's right. Apart from Jesus, all we can do is sin. We cannot not sin. We are natural born slaves of sin, self, and Satan. As such, until we are born again, we have one choice - to accept Jesus as our personal Savior.

This sounds just like Calvinism. Except, given this assumption, we couldn't even choose to accept Jesus as our personal Savior, if all we can do is sin.


...................

MM: If He does tell us then we will do it because we love Him.

TE: Or we might not, if we have more than one option.

MM: Born again believers abiding in Jesus have many options. Since they truly love God they will do what He, from His perspective, saw them doing.

Except they can only do A, since that is what God has seen will happen. So they, just like those who are not born again, have one option.

You're trying to introduce elements which have nothing to do with the issues.

a)If God sees that A will happen, then A must happen, and not B.
b)Therefore a person (or any other thing or being) can/will only do A, not B. It makes no difference whether the person is born again or not, or even if the thing is a person, or being.

Regarding what MM has said, I understand him to be saying that from God's perspective, there's one choice, A, but from man's there's A and B. MM has affirmed several times that man's options are real options, not theoretical ones. This means that there are multiple realities (since from God's perspective, the reality is that A will be chosen; there is no B, as MM puts it).

Now if God tells someone about the future, then man's perspective changes, and hence his reality. This would explain why something which I view as irrelevant (whether or not God has told man what will happen; to my way of thinking that has no impact on the future) would be important to MM, given that the future is dependent upon our perspective.

Have I expressed your point of view correctly, MM?

Regarding my point that if only A can happen, then our definition of free will should reflect this, I don't know what anyone else's opinion on this is, who has been arguing for the only A can happen future. Agree? Disagree? If disagree, why?

I've been thinking about this the last couple of weeks, and it's still not clear to me.

Consider this. I set up a double-slit experiment where I will send only one electron toward the slits. There being only one particle in question, there will be no interference pattern. In keeping with QM, the probability of it landing in any particular spot is described by its wave function (which can be thought of a "smeared" all over the place). But when it does land, wherever that may be, there is a 100% probability that it will be there (i.e., it is not "smeared" all over the place after impact).

Humanly speaking, we have no idea exactly where it will land before it actually lands. You seem to be saying that God also does not know. Am I right?

If that's the case, can we say that God knows the end from the beginning, even in just this experiment? When I start it by shooting the electron, it doesn't seem that God knows how it will end.

Of course, He knows all the possible outcomes, and their corresponding probabilities. But then, so do we (by using Dirac's equation). We also know what's possible and what's probable. What we don't know is what will happen. IOW, we don't know the end from the beginning. Is God in the same boat?

I'm going to answer in general things, just suggesting some possibilities.

First of all, I believe the laws of Physics in terms of describing the motion of particles apply to God as to us. So if God designed a given particle to work probabilistically, then that's how it works. So if you ask God what will happen, then He will respond with the appropriate probabilistic explanation. It wouldn't be right to suggest to Him, "If you can't tell me exactly where the particle will be, then you can't see the end from the beginning" because God could respond that He was telling you how He created the particles, and what they will do, which is exactly what they were designed to do. Indeed, the question is implying that in order for God to know what will happen, He must design things deterministically. But everything about our world suggests that God does not like determinism; He prefers spontaneity, even in inanimate objects.

The other point I wanted to mention is that even though it's not determined what a particular particle will do, that doesn't mean the larger picture must be unclear. For example, we know with great precision what certain chemical or physical processes will do, even though we don't know specifically what individual particles will do.

Fair enough. I don't think any of us can say that we know for sure what is going on. But we can consider the possibilities.



Even if the laws of physics apply equally to God and us, there is no reason to believe that we have a full knowledge of what those laws are. In fact, one of Einstein's arguments against QM was that things seem probabilistic to us only because there are hidden variables of which we are ignorant.

Just as we now see Newton's formulations as only approximations, that work very well in the realm of common experience, QM might eventually turn out to be approximations. It is possible that what we know think of as probabilities will turn out to be more definite, if we knew more about how things really work.

EGW put it this way:

It took a week to get to Heaven according to the EW quote. Maybe that's figurative. But if it's literal, then we have problems with the known laws of physics.

There's nothing within 7 light days of earth. The nearest star is 7 light years away. So if they travelled at the speed of light, they wouldn't get to any place interesting. If we count 7 days from the earth's frame of reference, they had to travel faster than light. That's impossible as far as we know.

But maybe the 7 days is from the travellers' frame of reference. With time dilation and enough energy for rapid acceleration (assuming the people were miraculously protected from being crushed by the acceleration), it is possible to get anywhere in 7 days. But even then, the trip would still take a very long time from earth's point of view. (The Orion Nebula is about 1500 light years away.)

But check this out: "At the beginning of thy supplications the commandment came forth, and I am come to show thee; for thou art greatly beloved: therefore understand the matter, and consider the vision. (Daniel 9:23)

Gabriel was commanded to go to Daniel at the beginning of his supplications. Surely, Daniel's supplications did not last 1500 years, which would be required if Gabriel was limited by the speed of light.

But let's say that Gabriel is massless, since angels are spiritual beings. That would remove the "infinite energy" needed to accelerate a massive object to the speed of light, and also the "imaginary mass" required to exceed the speed of light. Even then, he still would violate causality by transmitting information faster than light. That's still a problem.

Then consider the amount of lead time needed to get from Heaven to earth, in order to arrive on time for the 2nd Coming. That implies that the time of the 2nd Coming has to be set thousands of years in advance, messing up the "spontaneous" theory. Either that, or Heaven is going to be empty while everybody hangs around somewhere in the solar system, waiting for humanity to get ready for the harvest. But that would move the sanctuary from Heaven to somewhere around here. That would be problematic, I think.

As I see it, inspiration tells of things that violate the known laws of physics. I'm constrained to believe that we don't know the laws very well.

Another possibility is that God is not bound by the same laws that govern mortals. Since He is fundamentally different, it is not impossible that His existence is fundamentally different.



But isn't that the nature of the sure word of prophecy? What God says is 100% true. If He says something will happen, it is going to happen. Regardless of the causal factors involved, His word is sure. Therefore, if He said it, then it is "determined" to happen (whether He caused it to happen or He knew how the actors would choose, the outcome is the same).

If that wasn't the case, then prophecy loses its authority. God said that sin will not arise again. Is that just the most probable scenario given all the possible scenarios? Or is that a guaranteed fact?

But if sin comes from a creature's choice to disobey his Creator, how can God guarantee that no creature will ever choose disobedience? Will He take away the ability to choose? I doubt it.

So how can God know for sure? Or is it just a best guess from Him? But if QM is right, then given enough opportunity, every possible event, no matter how improbable, will eventually happen. If you let neurons bounce around for eternity, one will eventually bounce the wrong way. Mathematically speaking, sin must arise again.

I see a problem here.



That's true. But you know, there is a non-zero probability of the sun suddenly turning into a bowl of petunias. Even though we're pretty sure it won't happen tomorrow, given eternity, it eventually will. So, even though we know precisely what will probably happen, we can never be 100% sure. So says Quantum Mechanics.

Regarding the first part of your post, of course my statement that the laws of physics apply to God incorporates the idea that these are the laws of physics as they actually are, not according to whatever wrong thinking we might have about them. I wouldn't think that would need to be pointed out. Also, God is not a finite being, so when we are talking about His interaction with things, there could be (is) a great deal that we simply don't know about what's going on.



The way you're phrasing things here sounds like the way fundamentalists/Calvinists look at things. I don't know what your background is on these things, so don't want to repeat a bunch of arguments you may already be familiar with. But as a very short answer, if you read Jeremiah 18, you can see that what you are asserting in the last sentence here is exactly what the Israelites were asserting. You can note that God's answer does not agree with constructing His statements in a deterministic way.



Not arbitrarily, which you seem to be implying here. IOW, what will happen will happen, not because God says it will, but because God tells the truth. He knows how things work, being the creator. But God has created beings with free will who can act contrary to His will, so conditionality is implied in much of what God says, of which Jonah is a classic example, and of which Jer. 18 speaks to in detail.



The authority of prophecy is not an arbitrary authority. God doesn't operate that way. His authority is based on principles of truth. If God were to lie about the way things work, then prophecy would lose its authority. But God does not predetermine what's going to happen, nor is what He says will happen destined to happed, of which Jonah is a classic example.



God can see everything that will happen. If in the virtually limitless possible futures, sin never arises, God can "guarantee" that sin will not arise again.



Of course God won't take away the ability to choose. Without choice, love would be impossible. God can "guarantee" what will happen because He knows every possible future.



We have free will. We've seen the Great Controversy. We've seen the love of God revealed in Christ. We are more than simply neurons bouncing around. I don't see the problem.

Originally Posted By: Tom Ewall
The other point I wanted to mention is that even though it's not determined what a particular particle will do, that doesn't mean the larger picture must be unclear. For example, we know with great precision what certain chemical or physical processes will do, even though we don't know specifically what individual particles will do.



Eventually the sun will turn into a bowl of petunias? First of all, it's not possible for the sun to turn into a bowl of petunias. A zero probability, even given eternity, remains a 0 probability.

Secondly, your assertion is not allowing for the fact that the universe changes, which affects the probabilities. For example, it was possible for sin to arise in the past, but not in the future (in terms of probability, not in terms of capability). Why? Because the Great Controversy changes things.



This seems like apples and oranges here. There's a finite number of possible things that can happen. They can be enumerated. God knows what they all are. If none of them involve the sun turning into a bowl of petunias, then God can affirm with absolute certainty that this event won't happen, without violating any laws of quantum mechanics.

Bro Tom,

Thanks for the reply. I will respond when I have a bit more time. For now, I want to gauge how close we are.

Conditional and probabilistic are two entirely different concepts.

Do you agree with that statement?

For example, I can tell my son that if he purposely punches his sister, I will punish him. The outcome is conditioned on his choice. Therefore, the punishment is conditional.

But there is nothing probabilistic about the punishment. I will do everything I can to guarantee that his choice will determine with 100% certainty what the outcome will be. In that sense, it is fully deterministic.

The only places where probability comes into play is whether or not he will choose to purposely punch his sister and if I can detect it. But the uncertainty lies in my knowledge of his character. The more I know his character, the more certain I will be of his choice, even before he makes it.

Does that make sense?

One more quickie. There is a non-zero probability of the sun suddenly turning into a bowl of petunias. Just like there is a non-zero probability that an electron will tunnel through an energy barrier greater than the electron's energy. And that happens countless times whenever you turn on your computer.

Given eternity, a non-zero probability is a certainty. But of course, the sun's natural lifetime is only on the order billions of years, much too short for its petunia trick to come to pass.

Arnold, the probability of the sun's turning into a bowl of petunias is 0. Eternity has nothing to do with this. It's still 0. Just like the probability of the sun turning into Casper the friendly ghost is zero, or turning into Arnold.

Actually, there are various ways that it could theoretically happen. Neutrons can turn into protons, and vice versa. Looking at the QM wave function of the electron shows that there is a non-zero probability that it could pop up somewhere far from the sun. A fortuitous flow of extra energy away from the system is also possible. Sure, a lot of things have to go just right, but the probability is not zero.

You know, there is even a non-zero probability, though much smaller than the sun's petunia trick, that the whole universe just popped up, as is, last Thursday, complete with all our memories, etc. Very unlikely, but not impossible.

QM is a strange beast. If God's creation is truly probabilistic, then we have to be open to possibilities that are almost impossible to imagine. But it seems that, like me, you can't quite swallow everything that a fully probabilistic universe entails.

One more thing. The greatest miracle is the redemption of the soul. It is easier to turn the sun into a petunia than it is to turn a sinner into a saint.

I agree with the essence of what you are saying, but the electrons of the son are not independent of one another, which you example seems not to account for. That was a point I was getting at earlier, that while individual elements (as in "things") may act unpredictably, that doesn't mean the sum of the parts will act in an unpredictable way. However, even here, if you take God's words at face value, groups of humans have acted in ways that God did not expect. For example:

The fact that the electrons interact with each other is what makes the petunia probability incredibly small. Under different circumstances, electrons do "impossible" things much more often (e.g. tunneling). But though the probability is infinitesimally small, it is not zero.

I agree that unpredictability in individual particles does not always translate to unpredictability in the aggregate. In fact, QM is one of the best examples of that; it says nothing about individual particles, but gives extremely accurate predictions about the macro world.



I think we'll have to investigate that more closely, to see if God can indeed be surprised. I suppose that's one of the topics of this thread.

Anyway, what do you think about the distinction between conditional and probabilistic?

I don't know what you're asking here.

There's a verse in Scripture somewhere which God says, "It never crossed my mind ..." The idiom in Hebrew is a bit different, so different translations render it differently. Those who hold the traditional position take the position that these things are anthropomorphic. However, that position has several problems, including being circular in reasoning. (when Scripture says something you disagree with, you disregard what God says as being anthropomorphic; in this case, how could God possibly communicate the thing with which you disagree.)

An example of this is when God is speaking to Moses, and Moses asks how can he know that what he says will be accepted, and God says that he'll do a sign, and Moses what if that's not accepted, and God says, they may believe when the next sign is performed. Why would God say they "may" believe, if He knew for certain they would believe? Those who hold to the traditional position say this is just a figure of speech, for Moses' benefit, because Moses didn't know what would happen. But suppose it really was possible for the people to believe the signs at different points. How would God communicate that?



Here's an interesting Spanish translation of verse 8:



"quizá" means "perhaps"; this is, perhaps the people would believe the second sign. If not, Moses could proceed to the third.

God was laying out the future in a contingent fashion.

Conditional = If you eat the fruit, you will die.

Probabilistic = If you eat the fruit, you might die, but you might not. I'm not sure what will happen in your specific case.

I know what conditional is and what probabilistic is, but I don't know what you're asking. You're asking what I think about the distinction. What sort of answer are you looking for? There must be some context to your question that I'm missing.

I want to know, first of all, if we agree on the distinction between the two. Second, I want to dig a bit deeper to see how each one applies to God's foreknowledge.

I have no problem with conditional. But I'm not so sure about probabilistic. I have thought of the universe as deterministic, though conditional based on our choices. I don't know if that's fundamentalist or Calvinist or whatever. I have to think about it some more.

I think it's a combination. That is, something things are deterministic, and some probabilistic (or conditional, depending upon the context). How this applies to the future is that the future is comprised of a combination events which are known ahead of time and events which are yet to be determined.

Maybe to us humans the future is comprised of a combination events which are known ahead of time and events which are yet to be determined, however, to God the future is fully known beyond probability to the point that He knows what a person is going to choose to do before that person even knows himself/herself what he/she is going to do.

Daryl, that's only possible if the future is fixed. The future cannot be different than God knows it to be. If we perceive it to be different than it really is (e.g. it has possibilities, it's not certain), that just goes to show our ignorance; it doesn't alter what the future is like.

The future actually is some way, either fixed or open. Our perception of it does alter what it really is.

Does that make sense?