This is indirectly lumping together two things which are mutually contradictory, unless you use a compatibilitistic definition of free will (which you aren't). That is, if we assume that God knew things would happen in a certain way (not could, but would), then it is not possible that they could have happened in any other way. This should be obvious. (for example, consider if the following question can be answered "no". God has known for all eternity that X will happen at a precise time in a precise place. Is it possible that X not happen?)

Given that only one thing can happen at a given time in the future, which is the thing that God knows will happen, then it follows that a free moral agent does not really have the possibility of doing something different than the only thing that can happen at the given time in the future. He may think he can, but it's an illusion. Even the act of thinking he can do something different is the only thing he could have done at that time he was thinking it.

The problem that comes into play is not that God's knowing something will happen gets in the way of what one chooses to do. It doesn't. Everyone knows that. The problem is that it rests upon certain assumptions regarding the nature of the future (that is, the future is determined), which in turn contradict the imcompatibilistic or libertarian concept of free will. One can avoid the contradiction involved if one uses the compatibilistic definition.

The reason the compatibilistic definition of free will is called "compatible" is because it is compatible with the notion of a determined future. The definition of free will is given that a being has free will if said being is free to do what he wants. This definition does not rest upon the notion of valid options. One can have free will, although one has only one option (the future being determined) because one is free to do what one wants.

Jonathan Edward's work "Freedom of the Will" discusses this definition in detail here: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/edwards/will.html (click on "plain text" to view on line).

The imcompatibilistic definition, also called "libertarian", asserts that free will implies that not only must the free moral agent have the desire to do something (either A or B), but must possess the ability to do those things (that is, it really is possible to do A and not B, or vice versa). It is "imcompibilisitic" because it is not compatible with determinism.

What's happening here is a mixture of deterministic ideas (only one thing can happen at a given time in the future) and libertarian ideas (a free moral agent can choose between different options, implying that more than one thing can happen at a given time in the future). So to be logically consistent, we can either go along with Edwards, who proposes the compatibilistic definition and shows the results of this view, or we can go with the libertarian definition (a free moral agent can not just desire to do A and not B, or vice versa, but actually do it), and accept the implications of that view. But it's logically inconsistent to mix and match from one system to the other.

Now Lutheran theology does this, but it admits to the logical inconsistency. It says its theology (specifically regarding predestination; which it asserts applies only to the elect, but not to the last; i.e. they reject Calvin's double predestination, which includes the lost being predestined to being lost) is not logical, but it is Biblical. In so asserting, Lutheranism is being honest (in recognizing that it's not logically consistent).

This is quite a statement, MM. "Nothing in the NT ... is conditional". Well since you singled out Revelation, I'll pick something from there, but there must be hundreds of examples that one could pick from the NT to show your assertion is false.

A conditional prophecy is a prophecy which has conditions, right? Just off the top of my head, wouldn't everything in the 7 letters to the churches in Revelation fall into this category? They are chock full of "ifs," stipulating conditions upon which either this or that will happen. That's conditional prophecy, isn't it?

I disagree with most of this.

Tom,

I see nothing “incompatibilistic” in the notion that it’s I who decide if I will be saved or lost, because I am a free moral agent, but God knows beforehand which will be my decision, because He knows the end from the beginning.


I would define it as a promise or threat whose fulfillment depends on certain conditions. I wouldn’t classify the 7 letters, for instance, as conditional prophecy. It seems to me the conditional prophecies consist just of the promises or threats themselves, without an “if”. If you have an “if”, you no longer have a prophecy, but just a promise or warning which can only be true. Statements like “If you don’t repent you will be lost” or “If you accept Christ you will be saved” are not prophecies – they are truths, aren’t they?

I didn't say His alternate death would have also been on a cross.

Where did you get that idea?

I only said that He would die this alternate death at the same precise time He died on the cross. I was referring to the same exact timing of His death, not the manner in which He would die.

I guess I am not the only one who is guilty of not reading another person's post carefully and properly, or is it my wording that may have been confusing?

What about the prophecy concerning Judas Iscariot?

What about the prophecy that Peter would deny Christ?

Were these conditional prophecies? If it were not a conditional prophecy, then why would Christ give Judas every opportunity to not go ahead with his plans of betrayal, by telling him what he was going to do, knowing the choice Judas would make?

At any rate, the above two prophecies are telling us what choice each would make even to the point of who would repent and who wouldn't repent.

Tom, none of the prophecies in the Revelation are conditional. The example you cited is a conditional promise, not an unconditional prophecy. There are plenty of promises and prophecies in the Revelation. Which prophecy do you think is conditional?

Daryl, you're right, I misread your post (which, you may note, I am recognizing and admitting; I think I am the only one guilty of this!)