Thomas:If God knows that I will be saved or that I will be lost, that would greatly concern me that if God knows that I will be lost I really cant do or choose anything that would end up in a different end result than in my damnation, or if God knows that I will be saved, I couldnt really do or choose anything that would have a different end result than in my salvation.

Rosangela:God only sees what you will choose, and He died to make this choice possible. It's simple. Choose salvation and you will be saved. Choose it every day and every hour.

But you can't choose to do something which cannot happen! That's Thomas' point! How could Thomas possibly choose to do something different that what God has seen? Thomas may *think* he can choose something different than what God has seen, but he can't, because the logical conclusion is untenable. That is, say God has seen that Thomas will be lost, yet Thomas winds up being saved. Then something God has seen would happen would not have happened, which is not possible. (this whole paragraph is assuming your premise regarding the future, that's it can be seen like a T.V. re-run).

It's as simple as 1, 2, 3.

1)God sees that Thomas will be lost.
2)Everything that God sees will happen, does.
3)Therefore Thomas will be lost.

Thomas may be ignorant regarding his future, ignorantly feeling like he can choose to do either salvation or damnation, but unless you want to open up the possibility of being able to bring into being a reality which is different than what God has foreseen will happen, Thomas cannot do differently than the action that God has foreseen will happen.

Again, I hasten to point out that the problem is not that God has seen what will happen (as if God's seeing what will happen causes it to happen; no one is saying that), but the problem is that there is (supposedly) only one future, and that future is such that if Thomas is lost, then Thomas can do nothing to change that future (just as he can do nothing to change any other future; we can do nothing different than what is known will happen).

The precise description is that small variations in initial conditions result in large variations further along the process. Here's the Wiki:

It seems random because variations in initial conditions are propagated through the system exponentially. But if we eliminate the variations, i.e. measurement errors, the system is deterministic and completely predictable.



There are only 4 forces that are universally accepted: Gravity, Electromagnetic, Weak, and Strong. Gravity between the water and air molecules is too weak in that scenario to make any difference. The Weak and Strong forces work only at subatomic distances. That leaves us with the Electromagnetic force.

Earth's Gravity and Electromagnetic interaction between the water particles and the air particles determine the path of every drop. If we knew the exact positions and momenta of every particle in the system, we could determine where every drop of water will end up. At that scale, there is nothing random about its behavior. It only seems random because we lack information.

Again, the chaos is due to ignorance of initial conditions combined with exponential growth of the error, leading to vague predictions. The article you linked to said as much.

With a slight change to your words, it expresses what I believe at this time: There is (supposedly) only one future, and that future is such that if Thomas is lost, then Thomas will do nothing to change that future.

The key is not Thomas' ability, but his choice. Free will speaks of ability; foreknowledge (in the way I think of it) speaks of choice.

And in either case, my future would be set as if in stone. One theory would be harder on God than the other but none would offer me free will as in "it is my choise to either accept or reject God." Wether I cant do something or I wont do something has implications for some questions, but neither offer me free choise.

Tom, sorry, but I’m not understanding the point you are trying to make. I’m free to obey or disobey God. If God knows that I’m going to disobey Him, what is your contention? That I’ve never really had the alternative to obey Him?

Thomas,

Are temptations real or not? Have you ever felt the force of temptation? If God knows that you will be victorious over temptation, does this mean you didn't have the choice to do wrong? If you didn't have the choice to do wrong, how could you feel the force of temptation? How could there be any real struggle?

Temptations are real, and yes, sometimes they are very persuasive.

You ask: If God knows that you will be victorious over temptation, does this mean you didn't have the choice to do wrong?
-In such a situation as this, if I do wrong, Gods knowledge would prove to be a lie. We dont want to go there do we?

You ask: If you didn't have the choice to do wrong, how could you feel the force of temptation?
-I have heard that a person that is on a drug high can be entierly convinced of things which have no connection to the real world. Pink elephants, having the capacity to fly, fear of being hunted and so on. The Matrix all over again.
But if I do have the choise to do either right or wrong, then this is no problem, is it?

You ask: How could there be any real struggle?
-Indeed, how could there?

If the future is such that only one thing can happen (the thing which will happen, the thing which God sees), then you are not free to do anything different than what will happen. You may *feel* like you are free to make a different choice, but you can't actually do anything different than what is known will happen (this is using the one-threaded future model, which can be seen like a T.V. rerun).

Your "freedom" is really ignorance. You *think* you can do either of A or B, but if it is known with 100% certainty (the fact that God knows what you will do is immaterial; the important point is that it is known, or knowable) that you will do A, then your thinking you might do B or could do B is just ignorance.

The definition you quoted from Webster's was a compabibilistic definition of free will, which basically stated that you are free to do what you choose to do. This definition avoids the logical problem which comes of asserting that free will implies one can actually do either of A or B (not just do the action one wishes to do, but actually do either of several mutually exclusive actions).

What I've been pointing out is that the future-is-like-a-TV-rerun model is not logically consistent with the view of free will SDA's have traditionally held that one is free, not simply to do what one wishes, but to do either of more than one mutually exclusive alternatives (the latter being a stronger definition).

To put it in less technical terms, you come to a road which forks. You can go either right or left. The definition of free will you quoted says you are free to go right if you choose to go right. The definition of free will I've been using (the traditional SDA one) says that you can actually go either right or left.

Now if it is known that you will go left, then you can't go right (not because of a physical constraint, but a logical one). You can't logically do something different than that which is with 100% certainty known will happen.

This doesn't express the logical problem strongly enough. It is not simply that case that Thomas *won't* do something to change the future, but he *can't*.

It's not possible that Thomas could do something different than what God has known for all eternity with 100% certainty will happen, correct?

What passes in Thomas' mind as free will is in reality just ignorance.

I guess that's why I don't see a logical problem. There is none, in my mind.

As I see it, the case is *won't*, not *can't*.



Right. Because the will is the governing power in the nature of man, you cannot do what you will not do. But the inability is not inherent in nature, nor is it dictated by God's foreknowledge; it is determined by Thomas' free will choice.