Why so much complication? Free will is just freedom of choice, as opposed to coercion. This is a simple definition, and is Ellen White's definition.

"God might have created man without the power to transgress His law; He might have withheld the hand of Adam from touching the forbidden fruit; but in that case man would have been, not a free moral agent, but a mere automation. Without freedom of choice, his obedience would not have been voluntary, but forced. There could have been no development of character. . . . It would have been unworthy of man as an intelligent being, and would have sustained Satan's charge of God's arbitrary rule." {CC 13.3}

"To man alone, the crowning work of His creation, God has given a conscience to realize the sacred claims of the divine law, and a heart capable of loving it as holy, just, and good; and of man prompt and perfect obedience is required. Yet God does not compel him to obey; he is left a free moral agent." {NL 30.1}

Although they didn't like it, this is what they wished to do and chose to do at the moment to achieve the objective they wished to achieve (preserve their lives, or earn money, or whatever). It's opposed to being forced by someone to do that. For instance, you could be forced to do that under hypnosis. Under hypnosis you have no free will - your will is the will of the hypnotist.

So you are saying that a man is unable to choose to do something which he does not wish to do? I disagree, but you knew that of course.

Thomas

As I said, we are free to do that which we do not wish to do.

Rom 7:15 I don't understand what I am doing. For I don't do what I want to do, but instead do what I hate.

Hmm. My post vaporized. I'll try again.



The concept is not at all complicated. There are two main definitions of free will that are most often postulated in regards to theology. The compatibilistic one you are suggesting:

a)Free will is the ability to do what you wish to do.

The incompatibilitistic (or libertarian) one is

b)Free will is the ability to do either of more than one mutually exclusive event.

Iow, as Thomas has been mentioning, the ability to do something you do not wish to do. The libertarian definition asserts that this is possible. The one you are suggesting says it isn't.

Choice b) is the traditional definition used by Arminianists, a) the choice of Calvinists. The reason Calvinists like definition a) is because it is logically compatible with the deterministic view of the future which they hold (which is why it is called "compatibilistic"). Arminianists reject the principles of Calvinism, and proposed a different definition, as in b). Free will, in the view of Arminianists, includes the ability to perform either of mutually exclusive events at a given time.

SDA's come from a Wesleyan tradition, which is Arminian. Calvinistic ideas started coming into the church about 60 years ago. Now while your view is not the traditional SDA view, it is logically consistent with the view of the future which you hold (that it is one-threaded), so it does have that going for it. However neither Ellen White, nor others of our spiritual ancestors, held the view you are suggesting. This is perhaps most easily seen in their conviction that we can hasten or delay Christ's coming, a conviction which is logically impossible given the single-threaded idea of the future.

Thomas,

Before his conversion, man is indeed a slave of Satan. But he still can choose to be free in Christ.

Rom 8:2 For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has made me free from the law of sin and death

There must be something wrong with your definitions. First, most choices, if not all, presuppose mutually exclusive events. You cannot go and not go to the beach at the same time. Second, every day we do things we do not wish to do – beginning with getting up instead of staying in bed. So how can a distinction between two definitions of free choice be based on elements like these, which are present in most choices?
The best definition is Ellen White’s definition – free choice is the power to choose without being coerced.

First of all, regarding what Ellen White wrote, not being coerced is a necessary but not sufficient condition for what free will means from an Armenian perspective. That is, everyone on both sides of the question agrees that free will involves the will not being coerced. The difference of opinion is regarding whether or not it involves actually being able to do either of more than one mutually exclusive event. More on this later.

Regarding the word "wish," or "desire," or "will," the meaning of this word has to do with what one chooses to do, not with one's tastes. Your previous posts were using the word correctly (in the context of this discussion). I used the word in the same way you were using it (before).

Ok, here's an example of the point. Let's use your beach example. If one defines free will in the compatibilistic was (i.e. you are free to do what you wish to do; remember "wish" = "choose") then it does not necessarily follow, under this definition, that you can either go to the beach or not. God could see that you would not want to go to the beach (because He knows it's going to rain, or whatever), and knows with 100% certainty that you will not go to the beach. Now if God knows with 100% certainty that you will not go to the beach, then you are not going to the beach. That will not happen. It can't. It's impossible. Nothing that God knows with 100% will happen will not happen. However, this is not a logical problem under the compatibilistic definition. In fact, it's called "compatibilistic" precisely because it's not a logical problem. As long as you are able to do that which you choose to do, as is well. No logical problems. This is the Calvinistic definition, and, as I've pointed out many times, is logically consistent.

The liberatarian, or incompatibilistic condition, is a stronger condition than the compatibilistic one. The compatibilistic definition is necessary, under the libertarian one, but not sufficient. It requires all that the compatibilistic one requires, and more besides. It requires that you are actually able to either go to the beach or not go to the beach. This definition is logically inconsistent with the view of the future which you hold. This definition is the traditional Armenian definition (SDA's come from a Wesleyan/Armenian tradition) which is why I started my post on this subject, on whichever thread this was, asking if everyone agreed with the definition.

You have probably heard the story of two preachers exchanging pulpits. They met midway in their buggies, and one said,

- The Lord knew from the beginning that we would exchange pulpits today.

- To prove that he didn't I'm turning around to preach in my own church today.

Did they prove anything?

No, it didn't prove a thing, for the Lord knew that he would end up preaching in his own church today.